Delivery Of Usaid Aid To Afghanistan, 2001-2017 by Bataineh, Abdullah Fayez
Wayne State University
Wayne State University Dissertations
1-1-2017
Delivery Of Usaid Aid To Afghanistan, 2001-2017
Abdullah Fayez Bataineh
Wayne State University,
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations
Part of the Public Administration Commons, and the Public Policy Commons
This Open Access Embargo is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Wayne
State University Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Bataineh, Abdullah Fayez, "Delivery Of Usaid Aid To Afghanistan, 2001-2017" (2017). Wayne State University Dissertations. 1916.
https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations/1916
 
 
 
 
DELIVERY OF USAID AID TO AFGHANISTAN, 2001-2017 
by 
ABDULLAH BATAINEH 
DISSERTATION 
Submitted to the Graduate School  
of Wayne State University, 
Detroit, Michigan 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
2018 
                                             MAJOR POLITICAL SCIENCE 
              Approved By:  
 
   _____________________________________________ 
                                                                   Advisor                                                        Date 
_____________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© COPYRIGHT 
ABDULLAH BATAINEH 
2018 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
PREFACE 
In my experiences as a Social Scientist for the Human Terrain System (HTS) 
program, I was part of a team that conducted over 100 missions to study local cultures and 
their needs in Afghanistan. I collected data from interviews on current aid delivery 
programs and wrote made reports on completed projects to inform future aid programs. 
There was a direct link between my involvement with HTS and this dissertation, because 
my employment within the US Army and my months of experience in Afghanistan sparked 
my aspirations for this dissertation research. The poverty and injustice that I witnessed was 
paramount to my desire to investigate the billions of dollars of USAID money allocated 
and to understand where it went. Also, I became involved with many Key Leaders and 
local Afghan officials. I understood their perspectives in a unique ways, largely due to my 
studies in political science and the fact that I am a Jordanian-American familiar with the 
Afghan culture.   
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has allocated over 100 
billion US dollars since 2001 to the development of Afghanistan, and the United States has 
invested over 700 billion US dollars overall. Yet, Afghanistan is currently foreign aid 
dependent. There is a breakdown, a problem, in the USAID funding system for 
Afghanistan, whereas the money allocated is not always utilized for intended purposes. Is 
there accountability for the management of billions of American dollars? 
The aim of this research is to examine specific details of what political and social 
barriers exist that hinder the effective use of American foreign aid and funding in 
Afghanistan, specifically aid allocated through USAID. Today Afghanistan remains a 
LDC, or least developed country, with extensive poverty, limited energy supply, poor 
infrastructure, and low literacy rates despite extensive spending by USAID, an agency of 
the US government. Afghanistan continues to be aid dependent for health care, education, 
civil services, infrastructure, economic development, and training of soldiers. Lack of 
infrastructure includes basic utilities, such as water and electricity. (Brinkley, 2013 para. 
2).  
A significant amount of aid to Afghanistan was wasted due to poor governance and 
mismanagement on all sides. The governance entities involved in aid allocation and aid 
delivery include Afghan national, regional, provincial, and local governments, and the 
United States involvement through United States Congress, the Inspector General’s Offices 
(OIG) of USAID, the contractors and sub-contractors, and indirectly, the US Army’s 
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Human Terrain System. Other agencies involved included SIGAR (Special Inspector 
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction), the United Nations, and PRTs (Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams). All these efforts and funding were to alleviate the chaotic 
economic and living conditions for the people of Afghanistan.  
USAID describes its mission as follows: “We partner to end extreme poverty and 
promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity”1. 
Their mission is to raise Afghanistan out of extreme poverty and to help alleviate the 
deficiencies in infrastructure for the nation. Based on modernization theory, if enough 
money is poured into a less-developed country, development is predicted to occur, and the 
nation will become economically stable and modern. Human capital theory as part of 
modernization theory states that education is an investment that benefits people and 
societies, spearheading the nation out of poverty into modern development (Tilak 2002). 
Therefore, for the context of this dissertation, aid projects will be considered within the 
parameters of the education and energy (electricity) sectors.  
My experience with the US Army’s Human Terrain System2 prompted my interest 
in writing this dissertation on the efficacy of American aid in Afghanistan for several 
reasons. The first and primary reason was the extreme economic degradation I witnessed 
during my work there. With so many people suffering, I had to question where the billions 
                                                                
1 See https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/mission-vision-values With the war involvement in Afghanistan the USAID 
approach to development has been more aligned with the US Army’s winning hearts and minds counterinsurgency 
strategies. This is how the unique HTS, Human Terrain System, of which I was a part, became indirectly involved with 
aid. Creating the potential for building schools, bridges, and positive outreach became a joint effort of USAID and the 
US Army.  
2 The Human Terrain System was a small program, which began in 2005 and ended in 2014. The idea was to train and 
embed social scientists in US Army platoons while in combat zones to mediate some of the cultural misunderstandings 
that undermined winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan (and Iraqi) people.  
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of dollars of US/USAID investment had gone. A secondary reason was my observations 
of the convoluted and corrupt policies concerning financial transactions within American 
agencies as well as among Afghan officials. Most disturbingly, I observed that “winning 
the hearts and minds of the Afghan people” became more about excluding their culture, 
rather than integrating it within aid distribution, often leaving the people without the 
benefits of the aid that was intended to help them. 
This study examines conditions found in Afghanistan through specific research on 
two aid related projects: energy and education. Topics on foreign aid funding to LDC 
nations are addressed herein to find barriers to development, contribute to the body of 
knowledge, and assess possible improvements for Afghanistan. 
Research questions for this study:  
1. What are the barriers or factors preventing the effective delivery of USAID 
funding in Afghanistan for the project of the Tarakhil Power Plant and in 
the sphere of education? 
2. How are project factors perceived by individual stakeholders, government 
agencies, government watchdogs, the media, and scholars? 
3. If needed, what are some strategies that could improve aid delivery and 
address any lack of efficiency and efficacy of aid in Afghanistan? 
Conditions in Afghanistan 
To study these questions, we must first understand the general conditions in 
Afghanistan.  Reuters (2014) reports numerous gains made in Afghanistan in recent years: 
GDP rose from $4 billion in 2002 to $20 billion in 2013; access to electricity rose from 6% 
4 
 
 
 
in 2002 to 28% in 2013; school enrollment increased from 1 million in 2003 to 8.7 million 
in 2013; and high school attendance grew from 224,078 in 2004 to 717,015 in 2013.  For 
the 40 million people living in Afghanistan today, life expectancy climbed from 56 to 61 
years of age.3 There was a 5% increase in life expectancy, which still makes life expectancy 
rather low when compared to other nations. Low life expectancy is expected in a war-torn 
country, but there were also low birth rates. With out-migration population, growth would 
be slow to increase. Despite these gains, Donati (2014) stated that reconstruction in 
Afghanistan was a “development mess.”  
After 16 years of US war in Afghanistan, some scholars believe that not only has 
the US and allies failed at reconstruction, but that Afghanistan is a failed state. According 
to the Fund for Peace: “The twelve CAST (Conflict Assessment System Tool) indicators, 
upon which the Fragile States Index is based, cover a wide range of state failure risk 
elements such as extensive corruption and criminal behavior, inability to collect taxes or 
otherwise draw on citizen support, large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population, 
sharp economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or 
discrimination, severe demographic pressures, brain drain, and environmental decay. 
States can fail at varying rates through explosion, implosion, erosion, or invasion over 
different time periods.” For 2017, Afghanistan ranks 9th out of 178 countries and scores a 
107.3 out of a possible 120 in the Fragile State Index. The trend in Afghanistan from 2006 
-2017 has been one of worsening with some minor improvements; the ranking on the 
                                                                
3 Donati (2014) From an in-text graphic figure created by J. Pong, Reuters, 12/16/2014.  
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Fragile State Index is worse now than in 20064. Building a modernized nation where 
generations have suffered through war is difficult.  
Throughout history, invaders of Afghanistan have been defeated, earning the 
country the nickname “the graveyard of empires” (Huffington Post, August 29, 2017). 
Indeed, after $714 billion dollars and 16 years of investment in Afghanistan, most world 
leaders believe that America cannot win at nation building in Afghanistan and that America 
cannot beat the Taliban, according to Al Jazeera English. The Taliban have a stronghold in 
50 to 80 percent of Afghanistan (The Nation, 2017). They have taken over major cities in 
almost all the Northern provinces, giving the Taliban back control in these areas.  
Violence, criminality, and danger go hand and hand with corruption, especially at 
the Durand Line5, or the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The contested 
imaginary line is a frontier boundary unrecognized by the Pashtun (including the Taliban) 
as an official border. With many illegal crossings, the line runs through Pashtun territory 
and is known for being a hotbed of corruption. The Taliban are predominantly Pashtun6, 
and those operating from Pakistan have centered their leadership against the West (The 
                                                                
4 http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/country-data/  Founded in 1956, the Fund for Peace is an independent non-
profit 501c3 based in Washington, D. C. and Abuja, Nigeria. Produced annually, the Fragile States Index, 
ranks 178 countries across 12 indicators of the risks and vulnerabilities. 
  
5 The Durand Line was established by the British Empire in 1896 and attempted to force Afghans to 
become either Indian (then the British Raj) or Afghan (then an independent state). The Afghan government 
has never officially recognized this border. The imaginary Durand Line cut through the Pashtun people’s 
land making today some Pashtuns Pakistani and others Afghan today.  
 
6 The Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group of Afghanistan and the second largest in Pakistan. Pashtuns 
speak the Pashto language.  
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Nation, 2017). Maps indicate the illegal movements of the Taliban along the Durand Line, 
a frontier boundary unrecognized by the Pashtun (or the Taliban) as an official border.7 
The United Nations reports that violence increased by 21% in Kabul in 2016 from 
the previous year. Civilian casualties were at a record high, and it was a precarious time in 
Afghanistan. Militant attacks increased since the drawdown of American troops, which 
began with a speech by President Obama in 2011 and ended in December 2014 leaving 
9,800 US troops (Institute of the Study of War). From 2010 to 2017, half a billion US 
dollars was spent to improve intelligence units. However, without a provable matrix and 
with officers afraid to leave American compounds, it is difficult to know the effectiveness. 
Reliable information was and still is vague and opaque (Tritton, 2017).  
Security is the number one problem inside Afghanistan with corruption being a 
close second, depending on the perspective. According to Transparency International, 
Afghanistan ranks 169 out of 176 countries in terms of corruption, and only Libya, Sudan, 
Yemen, Syria, South Sudan, North Korea, and Somalia ranked as more corrupt in 2016. 8 
Corruption in Afghanistan can be seen in something called the ghost phenomenon. 
References are made by survey participants in this study about ghost soldiers, ghost 
schools, and ghost teachers all receiving paychecks or funds from American investments, 
                                                                
7 “Map of the Durand Line Cutting Through Pashtun Population”. http://nation.com.pk/columns/28-Jan-
2017/durand-line-saga, and “Map of Taliban Drug Routes from the Pakistan side of the Durand Line. 
Afghanistan-Pakistan Drug Transit Routes”, Posted April 30th, 2015, by Naseer Kakar and Niala 
Mohammad https://blogs.voanews.com/durand/page/3/ 
 
8 www.transparency.org Transparency International was established in 1993 and is now in 100 countries. It 
is a non-partisan in its efforts to end corruption. 
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but they do not exist. It is money from USAID and the US government that pays these 
ghost individuals for work that is never done, and the Government of Afghanistan 
sometimes reports exaggerated numbers of individuals in the workforce (Al Jazeera 
English, August 1, 2017).  
 Bribes, false reports, and theft are widespread in Afghanistan. This dissertation 
research examines and finds support for claims that corruption and security issues prevent 
American foreign aid dollars from modernizing Afghanistan. Still, more money is being 
poured into Afghanistan and it remains dependent on American dollars to function.  Many 
scholars and reporters agree that a complete pullout of funding from Afghanistan would 
create a vacuum for the Taliban to fill, and Afghanistan would disintegrate further into a 
failed state.  
 This option is considered unbearable for the people of Afghanistan and the world, 
who are alert about the possibility of increased terrorist activities. However, other efforts 
have failed as interactions with the Taliban have proven thus far. They target schools and 
educated individuals, and undermine those who will not convert to Taliban 
fundamentalism. The Taliban destroys and controls road access. They are quite savvy when 
it comes to making money in the opium and illegal drug trade. Peace talks have failed, and 
Presidents Bush and Obama could not move forward in restraining the insurgents.  
In August 2017, President Trump announced that “we are no longer nation 
building,”, and that America is fighting to win (Burki, 2017). Trump stated that America 
will be with Afghanistan without any conditions “until the end” (PBS News Hour, August 
22, 2017). However, with so much corruption and fraud in all facets of the political system 
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it will be difficult for outsiders to control the Taliban and the violence. There must be a 
political settlement and agreement, and hopes are pinned on parliamentary elections in 
2018 and a presidential election in 2019. Also, the Afghan security forces must be actively 
involved in any resolution.  
A Center for Strategic Studies’ recent report claims the United States has done a 
very poor job of training the Afghan police and military (Patel and Ross, 2007, 10). Once 
again corruption hinders this effort through waste and inefficient use of money. The 
corruption is not only in the Afghan arena. Many Americans, mostly contractors, are 
overpaid and mismatched with jobs. There are also hostilities from some Afghans, who 
resent the American presence, and some Americans are overtly angry at the Afghans. The 
high presence of USAID money is one factor that fuels these conflicts. 
An Overview of US Aid Mechanisms  
USAID is an agency of the federal government led by US Congress and overseen 
by an Inspector General office. In Afghanistan the reconstruction is overseen by the Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). The World Bank and USAID 
boast about their successes. USAID claims to have transformed many communities in 
Afghanistan with infrastructure, clean water, schools, and health care. They purport that 
they bring investors to the cities to build businesses and hotels and though there are 
challenges with the security issues, they give little attention to corruption or fraud.  
By 2004, USAID developed plans in the education and energy sectors to build 
schools, clinics, and infrastructure using all contractors. USAID funding paid contractors 
for projects, many of which were never completed, were mismanaged, or were done poorly. 
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There were no routine on-the-ground inspections, no follow-up, or long term maintenance 
plans in USAID designs. By 2007, with the approaching presidential election in the US, 
there was a huge push to get large-scale projects operational, such as the Tarakhil Power 
Plant in Kabul, and the Higher Education Project in 24 colleges and universities around the 
country. Some saw hope in the tertiary school system as those who go to college can shape 
the future. The belief was that books and pens were mightier than the Taliban’s weapons.  
By 2010 both of those projects were documented failures. This study shows that 
USAID also denied criticisms, such as the major failure of the TPP. The wasted billions of 
dollars in Afghanistan should be a concern for all parties involved, but particularly those 
who care about the Afghan people. Their suffering continues every day, while many steal 
and selfishly contribute to the perpetuation of a broken system. By 2011 USAID was trying 
to stave off accusations of fraud, waste, and the misappropriation of funds through an 
increase of evaluations, both internal and external; transparency before the public through 
online databases; and an effort to prove to the US Congress what projects were productive 
with successful outcomes for the money allocated.   
Even though the Inspector General’s office audits projects and SIGAR produces 
quarterly reports, problems continue. From 2012 to 2016 US Congress debated the Foreign 
Aid Transparency and Accountability Act, giving final approval in 2016. On July 15, 2016, 
President Obama enacted H.R. 3766 (114th Congress): Foreign Aid Transparency and 
Accountability Act of 2016 to become Public Law 114-191. This new law directly impacts 
USAID and increases requirements for transparency and accountability.  
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Additionally, it is important to provide an overview of the US Army’s attempt to 
rectify cultural and ethnic misunderstandings through the program of Human Terrain 
Systems (HTS). The disconnect between Western and Afghan worldviews impacts and 
disrupts aid, and these cultural misunderstandings render much aid wasted. The attempts 
through the HTS program to bridge the cultural gaps have had mixed results, not 
necessarily because of its idealized notions, but because of internal corruption and 
complaints. Also, HTS was not welcomed by all in the US Army partly due to the 
controversial approach of trying to use anthropologists and partly due to the HTS workers 
being paid at the pay grade level of officers in the US military.  
Summary of the Central Research Focus 
The central focus of this study is to find the barriers or factors preventing the 
effective delivery of USAID funding to Afghanistan.  The focus is on two aid projects, or 
the TPP and education aid in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2017.  The study examines official 
documents, reports, and investigations. They reveal the systems of goal setting and 
processes of aid delivery. The perspectives of stakeholders reveal the effectiveness of the 
aid from the recipients’ points of view and clarify barriers to the success of the aid, which 
impacted modernization processes for Afghanistan. Thus, the systematic research to reveal 
the barriers of effective aid delivery, analysis of the data collected, and subsequent 
conclusions are the focus of this dissertation. 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter One is an Introduction 
Chapter, which reveals the problem statement, purpose, and focus of the study, along with 
the three research questions for the dissertation study. The second chapter is a history of 
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the problem concerning the research questions outlined in Chapter One. Chapter Three 
reviews the theoretical implications of the study.   
Chapter Four presents research data covering two aid sectors in Afghanistan, 
energy and education aid funding through USAID. This dissertation research utilizes data 
from official aid reports and audits, academic and media reports, the lived experiences of 
respondents involved with Afghan aid projects, and HTS research concerning aid projects. 
Specifically, the qualitative data uses respondents’ narratives from individuals who 
administered and implemented aid, plus those who worked as advisors, interpreters, HTS, 
and contractors with knowledge concerning energy and education aid projects in 
Afghanistan. I also include data drawn from participant observation as an HTS social 
science researcher. Finally, I examine the reports including program audits from the 
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), reports from 
USAID’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG), third party research reports, and the 
media.   
Chapter Five uses multi-level and multi-focus analyses for the data. The end results 
from analyses of USAID aid funding data will directly address the research questions, and 
also answer the question, ‘Did the Afghan people receive aid benefits as intended?’ The 
results of the inquiry into these questions will be beneficial for scholars, development 
agencies, policy makers and governmental agencies in the US and Afghanistan. Global 
implications may be tested by other scholars in future research. Chapter Five includes 
theoretic parameters to analyze the data, and  discusses the results of delivering energy and 
education aid to Afghanistan.  Chapter Six addresses limitations of the study, future 
12 
 
 
 
research needed, and the final research question of what can be done to improve aid 
delivery in Afghanistan? Recommendations given propose strategies that could improve 
aid delivery dynamics.  
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CHAPTER 2 HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM 
History of Aid in Afghanistan 
 The motivation to provide aid to Afghanistan was frequently influenced by the 
desire of external governments to increase political stability in the country, because of a 
strategic position in the Middle East in relation to other nations (Svensson, 2003, 382). The 
geo-political position of Afghanistan was also the cause of three wars with Britain called 
the Anglo-Afghan wars (of 1839–42; 1878–80; and 1919). Through wars and other foreign 
incursions, several European nations tried to influence Afghanistan through the delivery of 
aid money.  
In this context, the provision of funds from external stakeholders played an 
increasingly prominent and important part in Afghanistan’s economy (Pain and Goodhand, 
2002; Rubin, 1995) Afghanistan became what is known as a "rentier" state, or when the 
major revenues of a nation is derived from the ‘rent’ of their natural resources to another 
nation. Funds for resources were paid in foreign aid, and the implication was that external 
political and economic control would follow. Foreign aid from Europe in the 1960s 
accounted for more than 40% of the Afghan government's budget, which made it heavily 
reliant on aid (Rubin, 1995). While the aid facilitated modernization programs in 
Afghanistan, it came with outside influences from the external stakeholders.  
 A bifurcation of the social and economic situations occurred in Afghanistan due the 
influx of this foreign aid. An economically divided society increased the level of inequality 
between those who lived in the rural areas with subsistence agriculture, and those in the 
urban areas where much of the aid was focused. The impact of foreign aid facilitated the 
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emergence of a new elite social structure, and included the funding of higher education for 
Afghan’s top social echelon (Rubin, 1995). The situation became self-sustaining, as those 
who gained select status from aid benefits, were invariably the same people who were 
placed in control of government positions. 
 The Soviet Union entered Afghanistan by force in 1979 to end an Afghan civil war 
and to annex Afghanistan.9 The Soviets tried to build Afghanistan into a modern 
Communist nation-state through aid projects. Afghanistan’s receipt of aid from many 
Western countries came to almost a complete stop in 1979 as a result of the Soviet invasion 
(Rubin, 2000). Since the United States was embroiled in the Cold War with the Soviets, 
the US sent military aid to the Afghan resistance fighters, the Mujahedeen or “holy 
warriors”, to fight against the Soviets. However, it could be argued the country did not 
suffer significantly, as occupation by the Soviet Union resulted in an increase in the level 
of aid from Soviet sources. Therefore, the alignment of aid with political tug of war was a 
repeated historical feature, and continued aid provided by the Soviet Union only served to 
increase Afghanistan’s reliance on aid (Rubin, 2000). 
 The strategic geographical position of Afghanistan, which is next to nuclear armed 
Pakistan and India, played a role in the Cold War and the post-Cold War too. (Baitenmann, 
1990). The Afghan resistance supported the Mujahedeen,10 which also received support 
from Pakistan. Several of the refugee camps set up by non-governmental organizations 
                                                                
9 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Office of the Historian, Department of State.  Retrieved August 28, 2017. 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/soviet-invasion-afghanistan 
10 The plural form of mujahid, the term for one engaged in jihad, or a struggle, according to the Quran. 
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(NGOs) aid agencies in Pakistan were then utilized as a base for mujahidin fighters. 
Interestingly, the delivery of Western NGO aid for humanitarian purposes mirrored the 
delivery of arms to resistance groups against the Russians, and the Western programs 
provided a significant element of support for resistance to the Soviets. Those who were 
living in refugee camps were required to register with one of seven political parties 
determined by the Pakistani government. This identification process separated and 
identified different religious and political Afghan groups, of which some were politically 
favored over others (Baitenmann, 1990).   
 From Pakistan, Afghan humanitarian aid from NGOs went to areas controlled by 
the Mujahedeen through cross-border operations in a semi-covert manner. The aid 
provisions through NGOs facilitated middlemen, which hid the origins of the funding, 
reduced transparency, and avoided accountability (Baitenmann, 1990). With this approach, 
it was unsurprising there were suspicions of many NGOs, and their potential for aiding 
rebels through cross-border operations (Nicholds and Borton, 1990). Until 1988, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations were not able to provide aid 
due to sovereignty issues, but expressed concerns regarding the way that NGO aid was 
being provided. 
 Much of Western aid was destined for eastern Afghanistan that was easy to reach 
as it was near Peshawar, on the Pakistani border.11  The location facilitated movement of 
aid that utilized other stakeholders with connections to political parties related to the 
                                                                
11 Peshawar was a key city in Pakistan where aid agencies and Afghan rebels congregated. 
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Mujahedeen. This was a practical necessity as it was the only route through which aid could 
reach those in need (Nicholds and Borton, 1990; Baitenmann, 1990). This system of 
secrecy facilitated and even supported the development of political favoritism and 
corruption (Baitenmann, 1990). Resistance commanders set up checkpoints in order to 
charge taxes on the aid as it was distributed.  Wheat distributed through the NGO aid had 
"wastage” up to 40%, which was accounted for by local commanders taking "taxes" 
(Nicholds and Borton, 1990).  
These practices exacerbated the problems of dependency, as levels of food 
production decreased in the area as much as 50% to 60% (Rubin, 2000). Therefore the 
reliance, supply, and the delivery of aid supported a negative self-sustaining cycle. In order 
to continue providing aid, many NGOs remained silent on specific issues including the 
humanitarian atrocities caused by the Mujahedeen, and even discussions on pursuing peace 
initiatives. The NGOs involved did not tackle these issues to maintain admission and aid 
delivery (Rubin, 1999, 2000). The Soviets completed their withdrawal in February 1989, 
following a decision of Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.   
By 1990, a new collapse of the Afghan state resulted in an increased level of support 
from the United Nations. Opening up Afghanistan increased aid provided to the entire 
country, so the previous focus on the eastern part of the country was broken (Donini, 
Dudley, and Ockwell, 1996). This stage of aid up to 1996 was referred to as the second-
generation of aid (Rubin, 2000). The period saw an increased level of efficiency, as 
different NGOs undertook the provisions of aid in a more coordinated manner. The current 
pattern of aid was established that placed the official providers of aid as central actors in 
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Afghan affairs (Rubin, 2000). The Afghan government’s influence was relatively limited, 
and Afghans were relegated to the primary role of recipient rather than partner.  
 Humanitarian aid efforts to help Afghanistan from the United States started in 1945, 
but to a lesser degree until 2001 (Svensson, 2003, 388). The United States’ involvement in 
Afghanistan from the years 1979-1992 was largely to support the Mujahedeen rebels 
against Soviet Union or what William Blum (2004) called the American Jihad in his book 
Killing Hope. With all of the foreign political and economic incursions, Afghanistan’s 
stability suffered. “In the years following, many of the funding nations that provided aid 
claimed Afghanistan to be a "failed state" and took up roles associated with their 
government, effectively becoming "surrogate governance" (Surkhe, Strand, and 
Harpviken, 2002, 20). The Afghan government was highly fragmented, and the internal 
systems faced challenging conditions from lack of infrastructure. The Afghan government 
had so many concerns that overall effectiveness of aid delivery was reduced (Surkhe et al., 
2002, 2). The aid programs developed mostly small projects, with the exception of mining 
through the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA). Aid projects supported 
rural development through the building of roads, helped to support small businesses and 
community projects, and for the provision of livestock. The aim was to improve the overall 
economy to reduce the potential for conflict caused by competition for resources (Surkhe 
et al., 2002, 45).  
 While this period provided a greater level of successful aid, the Afghan government 
lacked structure. Large projects were not viable as there was no national governmental 
support systems in place (Surkhe et al., 2002, 46). Attempts by agencies to provide aid on 
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a broader scale, such as the utilization of Shuras at a district level, were relatively limited. 
Aiding local farmers transitioning from drug programs to other arable programs was also 
ineffective (Surkhe et al., 2002, 48).  The weak Afghan government resulted in many types 
of corrupt venues. An example was the food aid program often resulted in client-lists 
benefiting from food distribution (Surkhe et al., 2002; Duffield, Leader, and Grossman, 
2001).  
 With political fragmentation, the rise of the Taliban was enabled. They were sort 
of a ‘religious police’ for the people, and monitored and controlled fundamentalist religious 
values. The Taliban had many followers, but their values were contradictory to many 
international aid goals that emphasized modernization. At odds to the Taliban were the 
treatment and rights of women and the establishment of formal education. During this time, 
corruption also created difficulties for aid to reach those for whom it was intended (Surkhe 
et al., 2002, 51).  
As the Taliban took charge politically and socially in 1996, foreign concerns 
increased about hindrance of aid delivery, threats of terrorism, and that more drugs would 
be produced. Furthermore, Osama bin Laden was living in Afghanistan and working with 
the Taliban. The Saudi citizen, bin Laden, was deemed a terrorist by the international 
community. This brought international attention, and the United Nations imposed sanctions 
during 1999 and 2000.  The results of the sanctions reduced aid provided by international 
aid organizations. At this time, a strategic framework to promote peace was emphasized 
by both the United Nations and the United States (Duffield et al., 2001, 7). Called the third-
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generation of aid, from 1996 to 2001 the emphasis on aid was also accompanied with 
concern for humanitarian and diplomatic processes.   
When the Taliban fell in 2001 and Afghanistan’s government changed to have 
international recognition, once again aid delivery changed too. There was a greater level 
of international support, especially from major governments. However, the major supplier 
of aid became the United States (Figure 2.1). By the end of 2014, over $100 billion from 
the US had been earmarked for Afghanistan (Brinkley, 2013; BBC News, 2012).  
Figure 2.1 – US Foreign Aid to Afghanistan (1946-2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.pakistankakhudahafiz.com/afghanistan-big-winner-u-s-foreign-aid/ 
Reflections on Aid Efforts 
 A historical perspective is very important, when examining political influences 
concerning foreign aid. A review is needed on how different types of significant 
government structures within Afghanistan influenced levels of aid and methods of delivery 
with other government aid benefactors. Starting in 1996, the Taliban’s shadow government 
20 
 
 
 
usurped the rule of law for the Government of Afghanistan, and aid delivery was reduced 
(World Bank, 2005). Therefore in 2001, aid was part of the US counterinsurgency plan 
against the Taliban, using an international strategy of aid implementation. This plan 
utilized aid programs to reduce poverty and improve the material conditions in areas of 
conflict to reducing the potential for counterinsurgency (US Army/Marine Corps, 2006). 
 The ‘Winning Hearts and Minds’ counter-insurgency strategy was one of the goals 
for the US involvement in Afghanistan. Yet, in many instances, “buying into” the 
American way of doing things was muddled by the top-down development of US 
strategies, which resulted in inequitable distribution of aid. Contractors and non-Afghans 
typically received a majority of the funding from top-down planning for large development 
projects. Additionally, beginning in 2001, USAID funding to Afghanistan typically went 
to the areas with greatest violence in order to deter the Taliban from gaining control. The 
result was that the most impoverished districts with the least violence receive less aid, since 
those districts were less strategic for the US.   
Bearce and Tirone (2010) and Boyce (2000) agree that local governance is more 
likely to support aid programs, when strategic benefits of aid are greater for the recipient 
country, rather benefits for the donor country. Therefore, if there are significant strategic 
advantages for the donor country in delivering aid, there may be a higher level of resistance 
by the recipient government (Bearce and Tirone, 2010). From these conclusions we infer 
that the less strategic or smaller scale projects would be most likely to gain support, and 
therefore most likely to be more successful. However, elements that contributed to 
successes of aid delivery have been highly debated. 
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 Burnside and Dollar (2000, 4) offered that aid benefited governments that 
implemented "good" economic policies. Svensson (2003, 382) agreed that when indicators 
supported economic growth, then aid was more likely to be successful. However, these 
findings were not unilaterally accepted, and research by Boone (1996, 23) and Easterly, 
Levine and Roodman (2004, 776) found no improvement in the impact of aid in areas with 
"good" economic policies. Indeed, many examples stemming from aid projects in 
Afghanistan supported or derailed aid concepts.  
The war on terror included humanitarian aid from the beginning for the Afghan 
people. Basic needs such as electricity were viewed as a primary task for reconstruction 
efforts led by USAID in Afghanistan, and large top-down projects were implemented for 
these Afghan aid projects. The Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP), the subject of analysis in 
Chapter 5 of this dissertation, was designed and built by USAID starting in 2007 to provide 
electricity for the city of Kabul. However, the diesel power plant cost three times as much 
as those in Pakistan and the annual operating cost was 280 million US dollars - more than 
a third of Afghanistan’s annual tax revenues. Years later it produced almost no electricity, 
because of the costs of diesel fuel. “Juma Nawandish, the former deputy minister of energy 
and water, told a reporter that he wanted to develop the gas fields in northern Afghanistan 
instead. Nearby lakes and rivers could have provided far cheaper hydropower.” (Gall, 
2008) However, US projects were planned and funded one year at a time by Congress, 
which caused fragmented objectives.   
 The “Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA),” signed in May of 2012, outlined the 
US-Afghanistan relationship through 2024, but funding was still to be approved annually. 
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The new SPA continued to reveal top-down approaches in Afghanistan. For instance, the 
ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) coalition agreed to fund and support the 
Afghan security forces, but the SPA did not say how. The US Administration in 2013 asked 
Congress for funding to continue every year, and the same is true for NATO member states, 
but there were no guarantees the funding would continue. Yet, the SPA was a step in the 
right direction as it created a longer time frame than the prior one-to-two years planning 
strategies for the Afghan war (Keller, 2011).  
Frost (2012) asserted that future plans should be definable and achievable with an 
eye towards long-term success. Furthermore, policymakers needed to apply ‘lessons 
learned’ to transition strategies and the future of US operations in the country. Only by 
addressing these critical shortcomings could such aid strategies have any hopes of success. 
It was also beneficial to look at how successful aid program were implemented.  
The 2003 National Solidarity Program (NSP) was the largest development program 
within Afghanistan. It was funded by US dollars and administered by the Afghan 
government. The NSP process of development was based on intervention that targeted 
community and village level initiatives (Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov, 2012, 9). Aid 
delivery went to community development councils located in each village. The councils 
were elected through a universal vote utilizing equal numbers of both genders (Beath et al., 
2012, 10).  
The practical application of this development program started with the 
disbursement of $200.00 grants for each household. The village could have a maximum 
level of $60,000.00 to undertake selected projects (Beath et al., 2012, 11). The projects 
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were usually based on infrastructure development, such as road building, provisions of 
clean drinking water, or the building of canals for irrigation. Funds were also utilized to 
provide teaching and training, including literacy courses. Different levels of the Afghan 
government supported the projects, which may be a significant factor in the success of 
more than 29,000 villages benefiting from the aid.   
 By 2012, the impacts were measurably successful for the 29,000 project villages 
with costs of nearly $1 billion (Beath et al., 2012, 15). Research assessed the perceptions 
of the quality of life for those in the participating villages. The respondents had a more 
positive view of their potential future and current economic conditions in comparison with 
villages that did not take part. Depending on the measurements used, such as quality of life 
and material improvements, the results were between 12% and 17% greater for 
participating villages (Beath et al., 2012, 15). It was also worth noting the villages 
displayed a more positive attitude towards the Afghan government and its agencies. 
Development aid has been highly criticized for not using the labor of local people and 
appropriate technologies. Schumacher’s 1973 Small is Beautiful, describes how village 
based economics refute the Western notion of “bigger is better.” 
USAID’s Role in Aid  
President John Kennedy created the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) in the Foreign Assistance Act in 1962 as part of the executive 
branch, with program and funding approval by the US Congress. The main objective of 
USAID was the alleviation of poverty throughout the developing world and later within 
war zones. Under foreign policy guidance from the President, Secretary of State and the 
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National Security Council, USAID played a key role in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. 
Audits of USAID Afghanistan missions were conducted by the Office of the Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, or SIGAR, which was created by 
Congress in 2008 and began its work in 2009.   
In one of SIGAR’s reports, (SIKA) Stability in Key Areas Programs (July 2013) 
stated that for 16 months and $47 million spent USAID had not met essential program 
objectives during the  reporting period, including the four quarters of 2012 and the first 
quarter of 2013. USAID was accused of delays in contracts and a lack of disbursement of 
funding to local governments in all four regions. There were problems of misuse of the 
funds. Although allocated money was distributed to Academy for Educational 
Development (AED) contractors, much of the money was not applied to projects, which 
was in violation of United Nations protocols related to corruption. This audit was of interest 
to this dissertation study because it pointed to instances of corruption and lack of 
accountability from within USAID’s bureaucracy.  
USAID has denied any wrong doing and according to the report, “USAID 
Engagement in Afghanistan, 2014 and Beyond,” the agency has accomplished 
improvements in health, infrastructure, and gender higher education over the past twelve 
years. “Our partnership with Afghanistan will extend past the 2014 security transition as 
we seek to work with the Afghan government, private sector, and civil society to end 
extreme poverty through a focus on agriculture, private sector development, and 
maintenance of much-needed infrastructure” (USAID, 2014). According to Sandefur 
(2012) at the Center for Global Development, any off-budget or non-secure aid delivery 
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problems shifted for the better since the Tokyo agreement of 2012 to keep aid targeted and 
on budget in Afghanistan.  
USAID aid money in Afghanistan had some successes, such as projects with the 
grape farmers, who moved away from opium production due to the 30% higher profits 
achieved with growing grapes (Constable, 2013, 22). Furthermore, USAID supported 
education, especially higher education for women (Bakhtar News Agency, 2013, 1). 
However, while there are some successes, overall goals to alleviate suffering remain 
elusive. For example, in counteracting the success of the grape farmers referenced above, 
between 2012 and 2013 there was a 36% increase in opium production, from 154,000 
hectares to 209,000 hectares (Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013). Constable (2013) 
expected that problems may increase if an agreement to move control of aid is realized, 
with at least 50% of the funding going through the Government of Afghanistan (2013,  22).  
The need for accountability for funding is generally recognized, and checks and 
balances, especially regarding taxpayer money to the tune of millions of dollars, should 
require accountability at all levels. A chain of accountability is optimal that includes the 
responsibility of the donors as well as the recipients. The largest projects for USAID are 
associated with very expensive infrastructure projects such as road building and provision 
for power. In a chain of responsibility, the NGOs and contractors receiving the aid should 
answer to USAID, who in turn answers to the US government. The US government has a 
responsibility to the US taxpayers, whose tax dollars are providing the aid funding (Groves 
and Hinton, 2013, 25; Scott, Mcloughlin, and Marquette, 2009, 510; Wenar, 2006, 2). 
Furthermore, a system of checks and balances should also apply to Afghan leaders and 
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stakeholders. A model is needed in advance of project planning and implementation for 
checks and balances.  
Additional Information on Aid in Afghanistan.  
USAID and the Pentagon aid programs in Afghanistan do not meet the stated 
mission goals to alleviate poverty. Sandefur (2012) says: “Three points stand out: 1. 
Violence is lowest in the poorest provinces. 2. Aid is lowest in the poorest provinces. 3. 
There are huge aid flows to unstable provinces where aid development and impact are 
questionable.” This shows an evident priority for the US to address the Taliban rather than 
comprehensive humanitarian aid. In contrast, aid money channeled through the Afghan 
government — like the much-celebrated National Solidarity Program — is, in principle, 
much more equitably distributed across provinces and districts. Sandefur (2012) points out 
aid focus should be on areas where the security and governance situations allows for 
genuine development, rather than implicitly punishing peaceful districts or wasting 
projects in insecure areas with unsustainable results.12 The conclusions of this dissertation 
align with Sandefur’s early evaluation of aid projects in areas that were unsecure due to 
Taliban insurgency. Both Sandefur (2012) and the Center for Global Development present 
clear indications that American development aid is not funneled to the Afghan people that 
need it most. I concur with these findings from my HTS research and experiences in 2012 
in the Helmand Province.  
                                                                
12 Sandefur, Justin. 2012. Center for Global Development’s blog. July 10, 2012. Accessed March 1, 2017. 
http://www.cgdev.org/blog/16-billion-afghanistan-why-less-money-might-be-good-thing 
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 Other issues associated with accountability are corrupt practices with the supply-
chain stakeholders, both US and Afghan. US contractors (living in the US or Afghanistan) 
may take bribes to exert influence in the allocation of contracts. Government officials and 
warlords in Afghanistan may require bribes or payments for aid projects to be implemented 
(Department of Justice, 2014, 1; Brautigam and Knack, 2004, 258). Who is accountable 
and what are the criteria? The Army and USAID’s use of Agricultural Development Teams 
(ADT) proceeds with no knowledge about local climate, labor, or soil needs (Keller, 2011). 
Transparency could improve the status of Afghanistan and reduce ongoing reliance on aid 
and reveal latent economic systems in place (Draxler, 2014, 39; Fukuyama, 2006, 126). 
Several authors noted the potential for conflict of interests in provisions of aid in 
Afghanistan (Scott et al., 2009, 509; Rupp, 2006, 284).  
The self-interest focus of the US resides with long-term security to promote 
Western culture, and to apply controls to an American-model free market economy 
(Fukuyama, 2006, 4).  In modernization processes, mass corruption must be controlled 
through accountability and transparency for both political and economic processes. 
Entrenched systems of audits, checks and balances, and safety are vital in the initial stages 
of modernization.  
In the arena of US policy, Ferejohn (1995) states that one of the first considerations 
in terms of accountability is transparency, especially in the context of the US government. 
The second aspect is the presence of US elections, so the views and pressure of the 
electorate may be felt by government (Ferejohn, 1995, 131). How much do the US 
taxpayers know about aid or how funding is being spent in Afghanistan? Whom do they 
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believe? USAID typically denies any or all allegations of corruption, even after audits are 
published, (SIGAR, 2010).  
Without accountability, there is little motivation for any form of change, including 
improvements to efficiency or effectiveness in the implementation of aid. According to 
Brautigam and Knack (2004), it is established that with a lack of accountability, there is 
increased potential for corruption. This is not endemic to Afghanistan, but an issue with 
foreign aid everywhere in LDCs. Research found in fragile states within Sub-Saharan 
Africa that corruption with foreign aid is a significant issue (Brautigam and Knack, 2004, 
258). Others, such as Deaton (2013) believe that it may be an inadequate structure of aid 
or funding itself that corrupts political processes in impoverished nations.  
The weakness of the Government of Afghanistan is reflected in the continued levels 
of military aid provided by the US in order to support political operations. Allied 
governments are providing other resources as well, including military support for law 
enforcement and training.  More recently, Angus Deaton claims in his The Great Escape: 
Health, Wealth and the Origins of Inequality (2013), “It is not possible to develop someone 
else’s country from the outside.”  The presence of traditional and informal political systems 
found within the Afghan government is conducive to corruption through nepotism and 
networking. Within Afghanistan, the presence of the Tashkeel system remains, which 
incorporates civil servants chosen through their familial or tribal alliances. In this manner 
they are not held accountable to the electorate. Due to this complex recruitment and 
management processes of positions, secrets and corruption are often tightly sealed.  The 
civil service management results in a mismatch between the central government and local 
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levels for provisions of resources and personnel allocations based on legacy and not on 
merit or need (Evans, 2004, 38).   
The Human Terrain System 
As a member of a Human Terrain Team in 2012 and as my experiences are the 
inspiration for this dissertation, it is important to briefly map out what the Human Terrain 
System was and what role it played in Afghanistan. The HTS program dealt with cross-
cultural meanings and information in a war zone. Their research benefited both sides as it 
mitigated cultural misunderstandings, which were deadly at times. In one instance, guns 
fired in salute at a wedding caused the US military to bomb the site, thinking they were 
insurgents, and 30 people in the wedding party were killed (Guardian, 2002). This incident 
early on in the Afghan occupation created horrendous outcomes for US policies. To 
summarize, cross-cultural miscommunication occurs when one ethnicity exhibits a 
behavior and another ethnicity assumes incorrect meanings, and conflicts may ensue.  
Within this scenario, dominant ethnicities usually escalate circumstances and have more 
impact on the results within conflict situations (Schaefer, 2015, 6).  
It was recognized there was a cultural knowledge gap between the US military and 
local cultures, so the idea for the HTS was first proposed by Montgomery McFate and 
Andrea Jackson (McFate and Jackson, 2005). In 2007, HTS was launched under the United 
States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) as a proof-of-concept, or pilot 
program (Forte, 2011). Five initial HTS teams were set up for Afghanistan and Iraq, using 
academic professionals from the social sciences, including anthropology, political science 
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and other behavioral social sciences (Forte, 2011). The number of HTS teams expanded 
over the years in Iraq and Afghanistan within each US military command.  
The Human Terrain System (HTS) program operated within the US military to 
provide the military staff and commanders with a better understanding of the culture of the 
local people through academic research (HTS, 2014). The goal of HTS reports was to 
inform military commanders of cultural variances. Through the ‘Winning of Hearts and 
Minds’ policy, military commands were assigned large sums of money to infuse into aid 
projects at the Commander’s discretion. The funds (called CERP money) aided the PRT 
(Provincial Reconstruction Teams) to build infrastructure projects, and to work in tandem 
with aid agencies like USAID. Within their missions, HTS often assessed cultural needs 
for project planning and evaluated finished aid projects.  
The duty of HTS teams was to research the nuances of local Afghan culture and 
write informative reports with suggestions to mitigate cultural conflicts.  The purpose of 
the cultural research was varied and ranged from finding cultural misunderstandings that 
impacted the efficacy of aid projects to other cultural actions that created unnecessary 
violence.  Besides the US Army commands, the reports were shared with the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), who planned reconstruction projects and issued reports to 
other aid agencies. USAID aid planning, distribution, and implementation often existed 
without specific and intricate knowledge of cultural or religious awareness, and an effort 
was made in both Afghanistan and Iraq to close this gap through the Human Terrain 
System.  
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During deployment, HTS researchers interacted with the local people and gained 
cultural knowledge of ongoing political, economic, social, and physical lifestyles through 
studies using such mixed methods as interviews, ethnographic studies, observations, 
surveys, and document studies. They sought to bring the expertise and ethics of academia 
to gain valid and reliable data.  
This expertise drew on academic capabilities in anthropology, among other disciplines. 
Within the field of anthropology, as in other branches of knowledge, there are over 900 
definitions of culture. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,, “Most 
definitions characterize culture as something that is widely shared by members of a social 
group and shared in virtue of belonging to that group.” Within the multitude of 
definitions culture has both human and material variables such as behavior, beliefs, 
traditions, language, religion, food, literature, art, music, and artifacts (Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2018).  This is not to be confused with ethnicity that entails 
an all-inclusive identity with both culture, genetics, and other factors. The use of ethnicity 
replaces the concept of ‘race’, because with new technology racial concepts are proven to 
be false (Maybury-Lewis, 2001).   
Colonel Thomas Roe, the director of the US Army’s Center for Lessons Learned, 
said in an interview that the troops needed to adopt a more cultural approach to fight 
effectively in places like Afghanistan. However, this understanding most often took the 
form of crash courses in “culture” for soldiers during pre-deployment training. Tens of 
thousands of other civilians have also served in Afghanistan, but one would be hard pressed 
to identify where increased cultural understanding has become practice (Frost, 2012). 
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Cultural understanding has not been a high priority in most avenues of US foreign policies; 
especially in LDCs. Outside administrators did not understand the communities’ needs 
(Baker, 2009). For instance, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan tried to bring Sesame 
Street characters to Afghan education without understanding the Muslim culture of 
aversion to reproducing animal or human forms. Furthermore, in an infrastructure without 
electricity for children to watch TV, the Sesame Street characters were not understood. 
This demonstrates that in this instance, the State Department was as uninformed as the 
Army (Keller, 2011).   
The academic social science degrees of the HTS personnel enabled navigation 
within the complicated and complex venues of the realities of culture and ethnicities in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. They brought new and more complete insights to mitigate cultural 
misunderstandings, gave voices to those not otherwise heard, and reduced violence on all 
sides. The HTS program was critical, because one of the biggest obstacles was the cultural 
differences in the commands’ area of deployment. When cultural misunderstandings 
occurred, resistance and violence could follow. In Afghanistan, the military faced 
increasing IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), which also created an urgency to 
improve cross-cultural communications (HTS, 2014).  
  However, each military deployment was only for twelve months and then 
commands were replaced by new units. This was not conducive to successful relationships 
or projects, because commanders had to accomplish much quickly, and then hand off to 
the next group. Due to different personalities and agendas of the commanders, the 
transitions were not always smooth and promises to locals were not kept, which created 
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new enemies. Frost (2012) stated, “Decisions [were] made in the moment without 
understanding long term consequences.” Therefore, the HTS program also represented 
continuity of cultural information from one US Army command to the next.  
  Unfortunately, HTS was highly criticized by the anthropological academic 
community. With no on-the-ground research or other than opinion-oriented inquiries 
within academia, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) arbitrarily decided 
that social scientists should not conduct social science research in a war zone. They said 
research ethics could not be maintained. However, members of the HTS teams often 
reported the opposite, or that their research gave a voice to women and those not otherwise 
heard. For HTS, academic protocols were to be followed with voluntary permissions, 
informed choices, and the other ethical guidelines for conducting ethical research when 
respondents were involved. This was accomplished under different research protocols than 
the military or even diplomatic inquiries. HTS reports had the potential to save lives of 
Afghan people, aid workers, and military personnel.   
HTS did not directly administer aid to the Afghan people. It did, however, 
participate in many development or modernization projects to provide information and as 
a vehicle to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. HTTs (Human Terrain Teams) 
frequently aligned themselves with PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams), NGOs (non-
governmental organizations) and Afghan civil servants. This reduced violence and 
enhanced cross-cultural understanding to ensure successful aid delivery (especially for 
women’s needs). By August 2013, there were 14 HTS teams in Afghanistan, but by the 
end of September 2014 the HTS teams were withdrawn as part of the drawdown strategy. 
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The HTS teams had previously left Iraq in 2011. The HTS project has since been disbanded 
and defunded.  
Conclusions  
The history of aid in Afghanistan shows a long and troubled past through invasion 
by outsiders and warlords and religious fundamentalists from within. The location of 
Afghanistan is of critical importance to world powers for trade and resources. However, 
the poverty in the country is dire, so that those who invaded also tried to modernize though 
the application of aid funding. Economically, Afghanistan became a rentier state with 
dependency on outsiders for survival.  
The modern stages of aid delivery to Afghanistan divided into three eras before 
2001. The 1960s-1970s foreign aid projects through the Foreign Assistance Act in 1962 
were implemented by USAID involvement with programs approved by US Congress, The 
Soviet aid projects (1979-1989) sought to make Afghanistan into a modern communist 
nation, while the US gave covert aid to the Mujahedeen to fight the Soviets. The post-Cold 
War aid (1990 to 2001) flooded the country with help from the United Nations and 
international NGOs. The US aid has now continued for another 16 years from 2001-2017. 
This time aid was deemed for a ‘Winning Hearts and Minds” campaign connected to 
fighting the Taliban; all in hopes the Afghan people would favor the side of US. The 
planning and distribution of aid was implemented by either the US Army or USAID and 
called the Afghanistan Reconstruction. The efficiency and efficacy of these aid projects for 
the last 16 years are the topics of this dissertation.  
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With money flowing into Afghanistan through the US military and USAID, the top 
down models of aid distribution enabled corruption through the decades. Therefore, those 
in need were generally not helped as much as expected in relationship to the incoming 
funds. Part of the problem stemmed from a lack of cultural understanding. The US effort 
to study the Afghan culture through the HTS program was developed in tandem with the 
US Army, but with no real efficacy to implement strategic recommendations to either the 
US Army or USAID. Recently in 2014, HTS was disbanded and dismissed as non-
productive and non-important. 
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CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
The primary research focus of this dissertation is on the efficacy and sustainability 
of aid administered in Afghanistan to attain modernization. What are factors that motivate 
modernization according to modernization theory? Western international interests strive to 
link modernization to democratic ideologies. According to Inglehart and Welzel (2009, 36) 
the process of modernization of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) advances the 
conditions necessary for the implementation of democracy. Albeit Western motives for 
modernization may focus on the installation of democracy within LDCs, the results of this 
literature review recognize there are many other motives for modernization of LDCs. 
Essentially, scholars often characterize modernization as a “syndrome of social changes” 
that is inherently linked to the expanse of industry, including occupational skill 
development/specialization and urban development. Inglehart and Welzel (2009) also link 
modernization less evidently to increases in education, improved life expectancy, and 
economic expansion in LDCs. The link between modernization and human and social 
capital extends from the belief that investments in these elements can support progress and 
beneficial change in underdeveloped nations.  
Foreign aid agencies like USAID operate to advance modernization and human 
capital in underdeveloped areas, such as in war-torn Afghanistan13. This chapter will 
examine the relevant literature for the critical topic of how theories of modernization and 
                                                                
13 The wars in Afghanistan include the British invasion: (1823 to 1926), the Russian invasion: (1979 to 
1989), the Civil war: (1989 to 2001), and the recent war by the United States and her NATO Allies 
beginning in 2001 to the present day.  
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human capital apply to USAID’s work specifically in Afghanistan. Horowitz, Driskill, and 
Mendez (2009, 723) noted that a significant amount of academic work has paid attention 
to the concept of capital formation for modernization. Similarly, Chaudhary (2013, 34) 
emphasizes the importance of understanding the connection between modernization and 
any supporting essential skills development, institutions, curriculum, and normative 
values, which also influence the processes of modernization. Therefore, understanding the 
social and cultural side of the development of education is essential to create modernization 
as well as the presence of monetary funds needed for capital developments. Chaudhary 
(2013) emphasizes the interconnection of funding and understanding the impact of 
education. Governments and aid sources must know the importance of human capital 
before they allocate funds.  
As this dissertation research is guided by modernization and human capital theories 
to provide data interpretation, the study will also compare the efficacy of the aid and 
problems with aid delivery expended for nation building efforts by foreign aid agencies 
such as USAID in Afghanistan from 2001-2017. Notably, nation building involves both 
human capital development and development of physical infrastructure, especially where 
external aid is provided. To inquire into the delivery of aid, the study will investigate 
projects in two different sectors in Afghanistan. The first concerns the energy sector, with 
the Tarakhil Power Planet (TPP) as an example, to increase energy production for the 
development of electricity. The infrastructure project of the TPP in Kabul was funded by 
US assistance to provide higher levels of energy and electricity nationally. Using 
modernization theory, this research will examine whether the project was successful or not. 
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Success for aid projects as outlined in a SIGAR report (SIGAR, 2015) was measured by 
initial set up attainment, efficacy of outcomes, and sustainability of change.  
The next case study in this dissertation will address the role of the aid provided by 
USAID and other foreign aid agencies for increasing levels of education to facilitate human 
capital growth and play a major role in creating a modern nation in the future. With respect 
to human capital theory, the more human capital or the intangible assets and resources that 
individuals have are thought to have an aggregate impact on changing the culture of 
traditional societies, and eventually will lead a nation to implement and continue a modern 
society (Gonzalez, Karoly, Constant, Salem, and Goldman 2008, xvii). As part of 
modernization theory, human capital explains the ways in which human capabilities and 
resources are utilized to benefit people and to support the modernization efforts in 
achieving nation building. While human capabilities and resources are valuable and 
provide complex benefits for communities and nations, Inglehart and Welzel (2009,  36) 
and Chaudhary (2013, 34-36) believe the greatest human capital investments are found in 
education. As a result, human capital theory will be used in this dissertation to examine the 
issue of education in Afghanistan and to find out whether or not the aid designated for 
education actually developed beneficial educational attributes in this LDC. 
In this chapter, discussions of modernization and human capital theory applications 
are explained to provide a clear picture of methods for promoting modernization in 
Afghanistan, an LDC with heavy reliance on foreign aid. Additionally, the research will 
examine problems with US foreign aid delivery and implementation, the central focus of 
this dissertation. These theories may contribute to a deeper understanding of the insights 
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provided by the data in this dissertation. To practically apply these theories, comparisons 
will be drawn between actual results of USAID projects, and the assumed outcomes of the 
relevant theories. This will eventually help to answer the questions of success or failures 
of the efforts of USAID fashioned in Afghanistan for modernization, as evident in the 
spheres of infrastructure development and education.  
Modernization Theory 
There are a variety of different ways to define modernization linked to the 
transformation of societies within social, political, or economic parameters. Earlier 
definitions saw a linear progression of modernization. Rostow (1960, 4) described 
modernization as a part of the economic continuum through which most societies progress, 
moving from traditional conditions to those sparked by the move to mass consumption.  He 
outlined the processes or steps to accomplish modernization and eventually result in a 
modern society. Rostow (1960, 4) explained that, “It is possible to identify all societies, in 
their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories: the traditional society, 
the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-
consumption.”  According to Huntington (1968, 52), modernization is “a multifaceted 
process involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity.”  Chaudhary (2013,  
34) also asserted that modernization is a process of socio-cultural change involving values, 
norms, culture, institutions and structures. 
Since WWII, critical debates over the conceptualization of modernization have 
taken place, influencing perspectives on this theory. Modernization theory may be traced 
to the response of Americans to the international setting of the post-Second World War era 
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(Tipps 1973, 200). The theory emerged from the economic and political conditions of the 
post-war era, specifically the rise of the US as a superpower, the growth of global 
communism, and the decolonization of Africa and Asia, leading to the identification of 
LDCs (Rahman 2017, 2). This viewpoint reflects the relationship between modernization 
as a theoretical construct and its application to a number of areas influencing the 
development of LDCs, including political, social, and economic areas. The Cold War 
climate occurring between 1947 and 1991 placed value on modernization that had not 
previously been realized on such a large scale.  Suddenly, the least-developed world 
societies were becoming a part of the economic landscape with greater significance.  This 
turned attention to the impact of modernization and its value in creating political stability, 
economic development and social/cultural change in these countries (Tipps 1973, 100).  
Western Europe is an example of the successes related to modernization and its 
potential for impacting democratic political development in independent nations.  
Democratic ideals are frequently linked to the process of modernization. Some scholars 
believe that modernization can favor democracy and eventually result in a freer society, 
because it enhances the masses’ abilities and motivation toward self-rule that applies 
pressures to the elite (Rostow 1960; Eisenstadt, 1966; Gonzalez et al., 2008; Inglehart and 
Welzel, 2009). Thus, self-expression or freedom of speech and assembly, rule by law, plus 
educational attainment can influence the levels of democracy. “The greater the self-
expression ability then the more flow toward a stable democracy” (Inglehart and Welzel 
2010, 552).  “In the decades before 1990, mass emphasis on democracy became 
increasingly widespread in many authoritarian and agricultural societies, and this 
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contributed to a subsequent downfall for rule by force” (Inglehart and Welzel 2010, 554). 
However, researchers, including the later work of Inglehart and Welzel (2010), do not 
assert that modernization efforts always bring about Westernization ideals of democracy, 
capitalism or Western democratic-socialism. “The most recent wave of democratization [in 
agrarian nations] does not seem to have been motivated by a desire for greater income 
equality, as their model holds [a Western model]; it was driven by the fact that a large share 
of the population gave high priority to freedom itself” (Inglehart and Welzel 2010, 552). 
A key aspect of modernization identified by Inglehart and Welzel (2009, 36), as 
well as Fukuyama (2011, 1), is the belief that modernization creates a cycle of continued 
cultural transformation that has a self-reinforcing mechanism with clear social and political 
ramifications. This transformation leads more to nationalism, i.e. a sense of belonging to 
the larger collective of the nation, and less to traditional allegiances such as tribal or 
familial connections. This seems to showcase and illustrate a perceived dichotomy between 
traditional allegiances and nationalism. Western modernization ideals reflect the 
connection between economic opportunity and participation in mechanisms that support 
economic growth, including political institutions that can drive the process of 
democratization (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 36).  Fukuyama (2011, 1) recognized that this 
view is the commonly held Americanized version of modernization theory that links 
economic growth, social mobility, political process, and cultural values, but it translates 
somewhat differently in other countries.  The belief that this kind of transformation is self-
supporting and occurs as a natural progression of the modernization processes is an overly 
optimistic assessment generally challenged when assessing its implications for LDCs.   
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Fukuyama (2011, 1) argued that a belief in modernization naturally supporting a 
distinct political order in changing societies does not recognize the complex mechanisms 
at work.  Increasing social and economic change can correspond with significant disorder, 
“characterized by coups, civil wars, upheavals, and political instability” (Fukuyama 2011, 
1).  He warned to expect resistance to nationalization when trying to modernize societies. 
Subsequently, modernization, for some including the concept as it was introduced by 
Huntington (1971, 283) is linked to the concept of dramatic social change.  He linked the 
concept of modernization to social change, a necessary leap in order to address the variety 
of elements that influence the progression of change within industrializing nations. 
According to Huntington (1971, 52), modernization is “a multifaceted process involving 
changes in all areas of human thought and activity.”  Therefore, it is critical to understand 
the history, logic, and presence of a society’s existing cultural norms before any assistance 
or change can be introduced.  
However, the reasoning that modernization leads to democratic political systems is 
clearly not a given. While many in modernized nations assume that modernization naturally 
leads to a freer and more prosperous society, Inglehart and Welzel (2010) clarified that 
many outcomes are possible. According to Inglehart and Welzel (2010, 552) 
“Industrialization can lead to fascism, communism, theocracy, or democracy.” However, 
they still insisted that modernization can favor democracy and eventually flow into a freer 
society. Therefore, they found that modernization benefits the trends toward democratic 
tendencies through greater personal freedoms and justice. However, while modernization 
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can lead to democracy, they are not precisely linked as history demonstrated in the rise of 
communism and fascism (Inglehart and Welzel 2010). 
 The theoretical view of modernization as a Western ideal is only partially 
supported by the findings in the existing literature. In the 1960s, scholars saw 
modernization as a Western concept that became a dichotomy between traditional and 
industrialized societies. Early on, Eisenstadt (1966, 4) defined the term modernization as a 
process of societal change that traditional societies adopted to develop their nations to 
imitate the Western model. However, this viewpoint influenced the scope of modernization 
processes and aided imperialistic models of colonization to change societies from 
traditional to industrial. The theory and the reality did not match because different 
traditional societies require different kinds of modernization. Modernization needs to be 
culturally sensitive and allow developing nations to develop with their own styles and 
models. Some parts of traditions need to be a part of the foundation of the future. Colonial 
empires espoused bringing modern ways of life to the underdeveloped world, but instead 
created more stringent societal divisions and less hope for future democracies.  
A cultural issue surrounding modernization theory hinged on debates concerning 
whether it promoted modern economic stability, or destroyed traditional cultures while 
promoting Western cultures (Rostow 1960, 4).  It became clear that the either/or and polar 
arguments did not apply across the board. “Modernization theory needed to be revised due 
to fact that the evolution of societies is not linear and modernization can be reversed due 
to economic downfall, such as in the Great Depressions in Germany, Italy, Japan, and 
Spain, and during the 1990s in most Soviet successor states” (Inglehart and Welzel 2010, 
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553). Therefore, societies individually have external and internal pressures that develop 
their own time line of change within their cultural norms, which varies greatly between 
societies. Therefore, these elements can create many different results from the same 
modernization applications. This conclusion does not dismiss modernization theory as a 
whole, but examines each instance in consideration of other variables. The factors must be 
examined one by one and this sets the precedent for evaluating measures of the progression 
of modernization for different countries.   
At the same time, modernization outside the scope of a Western model was 
examined by other scholars too.  Tilak (2002, 23) also concluded that it was location 
specific or a case-by-case topic. There was no way to stereotype one nation as very similar 
to another, even among the modern or the LDC nations. He examined the Chinese concept 
of modernization and concluded that while China industrialized after the rise of 
communism, it lacked a model of what most deem democratic principles, including 
freedoms and improvements in living conditions. He related this in terms of the post-WWII 
successes experienced by Japan, as well as with other Asian nations, including Taiwan and 
South Korea.  These other Asian nations have been viewed as paradigmatic examples of 
the success of modernization within non-Western cultures. Tilak (2002, 23) used the labels 
of the Asian Tigers for his case studies, applying strategic approaches to support 
modernization in these countries versus industrialized change in China.   
Many scholars see modernization as an ongoing debate or view it as a feasible plan 
simply in need of new definitions and understandings. Chaudhary (2013, 35) stated that 
though in the beginning “modernization referred to a model of an evolutionary transition 
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from a 'premodern' or 'traditional' to a 'modern' society”, this concept is no longer 
widespread. Many scholars have dismissed the modernization concept of a progression 
from premodern to modern for many reasons, including its discounting of the inherent 
values of traditional ways of life. The word traditional is used in this context as meaning 
the use of long-standing practices that emphasize the common identity within small groups 
and/or tribal people (Tilak, 2002; Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 2010; Fukuyama, 2011; 
Chaudhary, 2013). They saw no problem in placing traditional values within modernization 
practices as basic values vary more between societies than within them. As a result, these 
scholars argued that the dichotomy that emerged from suggestions that modernization 
could only occur in industrial societies external from traditional values and ideals appears 
less relevant today.  Therefore, groups do not always have to be modern to have democracy. 
Many people in traditional societies want personal freedoms, medical care, education, and 
economic prosperity. Yet, they also need the communal security and the values of their 
traditional societies. 
Here, it is essential to note the literature shows that variances in modes of 
economics may focus either toward a traditional society or a modern society with the 
differences found in an agrarian versus an industrial economy. Another dichotomy between 
traditional and modern societies may be found within their interactions with nature. 
Agrarian societies are seen as those where people work in nature through harvesting food 
by land cultivation and the raising and care of animals, while economically modernization 
is usually associated with urban and industrial development, which impacts the 
environment. It has been upheld that some reflections should be made about whether or not 
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modernization does in fact degrade the environment (Inglehart and Welzel 2010, 553). 
“Indeed, the… market has created a new class of “green” human rights abuses, [for] 
peasants and indigenous peoples… in their traditional territories.” Klein (2015, 222) sees 
capitalism as a relentless growth machine wreaking havoc on the planet, as capitalism's 
prime directive is economic profit, not human improvement. Due to this, people in more 
traditional societies must breathe toxic air and suffer from deforestation and land and water 
deprivation.  Natural resources such as wood, water and oil are often processed in 
modernized societies, and skyscrapers and factories begin to transform the landscape. 
Environmental problems, such as climate change, are believed to be the result of industrial 
development and production. However, just because modernization may have negatively 
impacted the environmental conditions and depleted resources in the past, this does not 
mean that has to be is a feature of modernization. Redirecting the focus to sustainable 
modern practices is not only achievable, it also can create new trends for investments. 
There are no exact formulas for modern economies (Klein, 2015, 222).  
Rahman (2017, 1) summarized some modernization methods by saying: “The basic 
notions and objections attached to the modernization approach are highly debatable.” It is 
noteworthy that some scholars are in favor of modernization, but believe in totalitarian or 
fascist political control of the people. Therefore, they see that modernization could be a 
tool for the regulation of populations (Rahman, 2017; Eisenstadt, 1966). In this case, except 
for vocational education, a highly educated population would not be optimal in a 
totalitarian society, as Rahman (2017, 1) purports.  Highly educated populations have better 
critical analysis and problem solving skills, which aids a democratic model. The political 
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and economic use of modernization can be a dichotomy of motivations based on core 
beliefs of whether personal freedoms or totalitarian control as being better for the masses. 
Chaudhary (2013) cited a negative aspect, that modernization may destroy culture by 
leading to globalization. In this case modern cultural norms and ideas would spread 
throughout the world via contact and media. Here we can envision a sort of universal 
culture that serves as a baseline for all, which may not be a good scenario.  
Other views on modernization show it may lead to the betterment of conditions and 
standards of living, and that it allows for the possibility of rule by law instead of rule by 
force, the former of which leads to more personal freedoms.  This is linked to the belief 
that education is a key component of both modernization and the expansion of 
opportunities that shape the standard of living. This becomes relevant when researching 
education projects in Afghanistan, as the Taliban is not in favor of modernization or 
Western education models.  
Most scholars agree that designs of modernization are not so easily administered 
and  prescribed political paths are not that clear-cut for either economics or politics within 
societies.  For instance, if socialism is paired with democracy, there are still personal 
freedoms, security, and rule by law. Socialist democracy allows for a broader distribution 
of wealth for the masses, which is more prevalent than within a capitalist democracy. Yet 
if socialism is paired with totalitarian rule, the political structures will not be democratic, 
no matter the structure of the economy. Furthermore, under totalitarian rule, even if an 
external security exists, an internal fear of persecution from rule by force or perhaps a sense 
of paranoia against other nations may be part of the political climate. North Korea exhibits 
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this fear of other nations, and so did Al Qaida in Afghanistan, a non-state actor, resulting 
in the 9/11 attacks.  The many possibilities support Tilak’s (2002) argues that each case 
must be evaluated on an individual basis, in the context of the political, cultural, and 
economic conditions of each society plus their domestic and international influences. At 
the core of the stated Government of Afghanistan’s position on aid in the country were 
modernization efforts leading to the care for the masses and their security, while 
encouraging self-improvement resulting in modern democratic policies. Fukuyama (2006, 
4) asserts: “the American focus rests on concerns for long-term security to promote 
American democracy and Western culture, and apply control in regards to nation building 
and an American-centric free market economy.” 
Within modernization processes, cultural differences do exist, but they are not 
overriding within politics or economies. When security is at risk, concepts of 
modernization are not in the forefront for leaders in their allocation of funds and human 
resources. “Agrarian societies emphasize religion, national pride, obedience and respect 
for authority, while industrial societies emphasize secularism, cosmopolitanism, 
autonomy, and rationality... [Yet] When survival is insecure, it tends to dominate people's 
life strategies” (Inglehart and Welzel 2010, 554). This is particularly relevant for the 
research on aid in Afghanistan by underlining what is important to investigate concerning 
security and the development of modernization efforts and the subsequent impacts on 
politics, traditional culture, and industry. This begs the question: “Can traditional cultures 
and modern cultures co-exist with respect and mutual benefit?” We may look for the 
answers to this debate in such nations as Canada and New Zealand, which are quite modern, 
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educated, industrialized, and are still multicultural nations. They are not perfect societies, 
of course, and some still have discrimination within the society, but their standards of living 
and freedoms for the masses far exceed those, for instance, for individuals who live in 
China.  
Upon closer investigation, there have been practical modernization projects that 
were culturally successful outside of a political debate (Chaudhary 2013, 38). Chaudhary 
states that modernization, though a prevalent concept, has not radically changed cultures 
or destroyed values. By focusing on two major USAID projects in Afghanistan: the TPP 
plant and the higher education project, this dissertation is able to analyze the dynamics 
involved. It must be clear within this study what the Government of Afghanistan sought in 
order to evaluate failures or successes for modernization in education and the building of 
infrastructure such as the Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP).  In order to do this, it is important 
to provide an understanding of Afghan’s expectations compared to the theoretical 
background of modernization and human capital as an element of defining measures of 
modernization. 
Human Capital Theory 
 Human capital theory is based on the premise that there are economic gains secured 
through investment in people (Sweetland 1996, 341).  A great deal of literature emphasizes 
the rebuilding of a suitable infrastructure to support economic development, but less 
emphasis has been placed on human capital as a necessary force in that process. Human 
capital theory is a segment of modernization theory. It seeks to theorize about how to build 
better societies by infusing investment in the education of people within a nation to create 
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a strong future for all. Human capital refers to the resources humans have to offer their 
nation, such as knowledge, skills, experience, abilities, intelligence, and talent (Benhabib 
and Speigel 1994, 143).  More precisely, investing in methods to enhance the skills and 
knowledge of people has a variety of positive impacts, including improvement of human 
health and wellness. These investments pay off through increased contributory ability of 
more people within the social and economic framework of a nation.  Subsequently, 
researchers have evaluated a number of ways in which knowledge and skills are enhanced 
and have viewed education as a significant measure of investment in human capital 
(Sweetland 1996, 341).   
 The theoretical foundations of human capital principles, though, reflect the belief 
that education can be derived in a number of environments and can include different 
instructional modalities.  Yet for society in general, Chaudhary (2013) revealed that secular 
and scientific education is critical for modernization, if it is to lead to democracy. The 
scope and purpose of education becomes important, which includes the place of theocratic 
education, informal education, and vocational education prevalent in many traditional 
societies.  Sweetland (1996) argued, for example, that education can include formalized 
instruction through investment in public primary, secondary and post-secondary 
instruction; informal education that can occur in the home or environment; and on-the-job 
training.  Education is perceived as a positive measure of investment in human capital 
because it is measurable.  Whether discussing a country’s investment in public education 
or a company’s investment in their in-house training programs, there is a dollar amount 
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invested in the process that can be weighed against tangible performance outcomes 
(Sweetland 1996, 341).   
 The general finding from this theoretical perspective is that human capital 
investment increases the economic capabilities of people (Sweetland 1996, 341). Skills and 
knowledge are measurable but somewhat intangible assets, which are argued to have an 
aggregate impact on the economic status of communities and nations. Tilak (2002, 7) 
asserts that investments in the education sector creates a higher return than investments in 
infrastructure for the purpose of modernization of nations. Furthermore, growth in the 
education sector is correlated directly to growth in a nation’s GDP.  The existence of human 
capital in a nation implicitly or explicitly influences the economic conditions of that nation 
(Benhabib and Speigel 1994, 144). 
 Son (2010, 2) argues that human capital plays a critical role in methods to reduce 
poverty and improve economic conditions in developing nations.  On a smaller scale, 
investment in human capital improves the opportunities for individuals in the labor market, 
improves earning potential, and improves labor productivity.  From a larger societal 
perspective, human capital improves the accumulation of effective labor, increases 
opportunities for large-scale technological innovations, and provides a foundation for 
sustainable growth.  All of these elements are connected to the progression of 
modernization and reductions in poverty for developing nations (Son 2010, 2).   
 Bowen (1964) argued that investment in human capital is frequently based on a 
national productivity perspective, one that deems value in the creation of educational 
opportunities to expand productivity. Correspondingly, he recognized that “in a market 
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economy, differences in earnings reflect differences in productivity” (Bowen, 1964, 14). 
In accordance with this view, Bowen argued the importance of creating a societal impetus 
for investment in human capital aligned with the desire for social improvements. Once 
again, this reflects the early bias that modernization and investments in human capital will 
lead to democracy (Rostow 1960; Eisenstadt 1966; Gonzalez et. al. 2008; Inglehart and 
Welzel 2009).  
 How are human capital outcomes measured? We can build schools and administer 
education, but does it lead to practical social betterment over the long term?  In the context 
of human capital development, the examination of human capital is different from physical 
investments (Horowitz et al., 2009). This is due to knowledge attained as people pass 
through primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of education. This is an important 
differentiation from physical capital, as value is created in the intermediate stages of 
education. For example, a partially built road goes nowhere, and an unfinished factory does 
not generate economic growth. Therefore, the process of human capital development may 
take longer than infrastructure development. For individuals to attain higher skills, it is 
necessary to ensure they have the prerequisites as a result of the sequential nature of 
education (Horowitz et al., 2009).  
When assessing the measurability of human capital investment, there are two 
methods:  1) to identify the monetary expenditures that are allocated for human capital 
education; or 2) to measure the outcomes related to worker productivity. Measures utilized 
in developing countries to assess human capital investment include the level of literacy 
demonstrated within the workforce or the years of schooling that individuals have obtained.  
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The measure of schooling is an especially important evaluative tool in determining 
investment in human capital. In Afghanistan, for example, there are considerable 
differences in the average levels of schooling based on human biases.  In Afghanistan, 
females have about a quarter of the years of schooling that males do, a factor that many 
believe will continue to hinder that country’s capacity for modernization (Son 2010, 2-4).         
 Facilitation of the correct skills and knowledge is needed by each economy to 
compete in the global environment (Horowitz et al., 2009). Global knowledge of 
international market economies is invaluable to lead. This aspect of the sequential 
development may be particularly problematic when an area is not within a timeline of 
sustained economic growth. Tilak (2002, 3) noted that sustained the economic growth in 
East Asia facilitated ongoing investment in education. In Afghanistan, with a heavy 
reliance on aid, it appears that long-term benefits may be gained from increasing the level 
of support for tertiary education. These skills would facilitate further economic 
development by enhancing the resources, which are available and needed for 
modernization. Furthermore, knowledge attained by higher-level academic degrees creates 
educated leaders, who can think critically and respond productively in times of stress or 
crises. Such leaders also attain understanding and concern for the welfare of the people 
through comparative studies of other global systems.  
Human capital investment in education is addressed by human capital theory and 
the belief that understanding the connection between investment in education and the 
outcomes related to educational attributes can help foster modernization (Chaudhary 2013, 
34).  The connection between aid delivery strategies and modernization is shaped by the 
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human capital theory view that investment related to education is essential (Chaudhary 
2013, 34).  
In this section, human capital theory has been discussed as an idealized form of 
modernization that requires education, community development, civic organizations, 
developing individual human assets and investments in the future. However, societies 
steeped in centuries’ old beliefs and traditions may not embrace changes they see as radical 
when it comes to gender roles, caste systems, and tribal economics and politics. A question 
develops if the people want change to modern ways or if modernization is being forced? 
To know these answers researchers must examine the adherence to cultural traditions in a 
society from its leaders to all levels of their population. Furthermore, the motivations of 
those introducing modernization efforts must be examined for pre-existing biases.  
Impact of Cultural Traditions 
 Cultural beliefs and traditions play a role in how people within a developing country 
assess the impacts of modernization. Researchers have realized that significant variations 
in culture and traditions can influence the progression of modernization and the subsequent 
development of human capital.  Even in societies in which significant differences can be 
identified in comparison to modernized societies, it is important to recognize the impacts 
of traditions on the approaches to facilitating a transition to modernity. Traditionalism can 
be defined as the more extremist, negative reactions to forces of modernity, while tradition 
is the general reservoir of behavior and symbols of a society. In LDCs, older, “traditional 
modes or models of politics assert themselves, which impact modernization movements 
(Eisenstadt 1973, 101-102).   
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 Rostow (1960) identified a significant difference between the development of 
traditional societies and the embracing of traditionalism.  The structure of a traditional 
society is developed within limited production, based on pre-Newtonian science and 
technology, and on pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world.  Agrarian societies 
are functional traditional societies that are not stationary, but they lack an integration of 
technical innovations.  Many cultures are rooted in traditional ideals and methods, while 
also seeking ways to progress in relation to modern cultures.  Conversely, traditionalism is 
the principle by which individuals commit to a kind of ideological perspective, which does 
not place implicit value in modernism as an approach to cultural and social development 
(Rostow 1960, 4).  Subsequently, research indicates that there is a connection between a 
culture’s relation to progress and its capacity to develop or modernize.    
 This aligns with the general view that culture has a large impact on motivation 
found within a society for developing assets and supporting movements to ensure human 
capital is available to preserve modernization.  For example, Confucianism and Buddhism 
practiced in East Asia emphasize education and instilling a work ethic and self-discipline, 
which becomes consistent with building human capital. Caring about the welfare of the 
population, while encouraging self- improvement are key factors. Furthermore, educational 
planning is critical, as well as the research and planning to match educational opportunities 
with job markets (Tilak 2002, 1-3). This is currently lacking in many nations, even in 
Western ones. To build democratic cultures, education investments must be egalitarian, 
meaning for all ethnicities and both genders. Class structures, divisive religions, and gender 
inequalities are prohibitive to building human capital; the latter contributes to a stronger 
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national democratic identity. In other words, concern for all the people in a nation needs to 
be present to build human capital (Tilak 2002, 1-3).  
 Indeed, cultural heritage is important for modernization and human capital theories, 
because as education arises out of the needs of the society, it has a common purpose with 
modernization. Chaudhary argues that the main function of education is to transmit cultural 
heritage to the new generations. But in changing society through modernization processes, 
those in positions of control must use education to also aid in preparing the young for 
adjustment to future changes. Modernization has been both criticized and celebrated for its 
capacity to introduce foundational concepts like equality, freedom and humanism, and 
many other elements that drive social and economic change (Chaudhary 2013, 37).  In 
countries like Afghanistan, lack of public infrastructure or educated individuals capable of 
supporting technological advancements have led to continued failures in sustaining 
modernization and supporting market development (Latham 2011, 206).  Many believe 
that this is the result of cultural factors that have influenced the views of modernization 
and Western ideals. Yet foreign aid to the Government of Afghanistan originating from the 
Western world continues to focus on instilling principles through the building of security 
and infrastructure, without examination of cultural values or the need for educational 
support.   
 Cultural variables inevitably impact both modernization and the development of 
human capital necessary for modernization.  Even at a very basic level, it is possible to 
identify significant factors that reduce the capacity for human capital development that are 
culturally defined (Schultz 1995, 4). One specific factor is the way in which men and 
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women are valued differently within a culture. Schultz argued that assessing the productive 
capacity of men and women within an economy can be distorted by cultural perspectives 
on gender. LDCs may often strive to become knowledgeable societies, while also creating 
disparities within their population that minimize the contributions that women could make 
to the knowledge workforce (Gonzalez et al., 2008, xvii).  
 The female talent pool in many growth markets is increasing, but there continue to 
be divisions related to the employment of women in positions to improve the capacity of 
countries to meet critical infrastructure needs. “Deeply entrenched stereotypes make it 
difficult for Western employers to have a clear view of this new tranche of talent” (Hewlett 
and Rashid 2011, 8).  Well-educated women seeking to create new opportunities for 
themselves are challenging cultural stereotypes in emerging markets.  At the same time, 
this continues to be an area where developing countries can make strides and develop 
methods of utilizing their human capital to its fullest potential (Hewlett and Rashid 2011, 
33 and 42; Jonsson 2003, 17).  
 Other cultural factors influence political, social, and cultural change in countries 
like Afghanistan, especially when discussing the application of approaches to 
modernization.  “A given society's institutional and cultural heritage is remarkably 
enduring,” according to Inglehart and Welzel (2010, 555). Roy (1990) argued that divisions 
in the culture between those seeking modernization and the traditionalists have created 
significant conflict and opposition to Western ideals.  Reform measures often focus on 
methods to break down cultural barriers that negatively impact a country’s capacity for 
modernization (Gonzalez et al. 2008, xxiv).   
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It is not modernization (the introduction of technology) that appears to be the 
oppositional pivotal point in Afghanistan, but the challenges to cultural values. Because 
modernization brings with it a paradigmatic shift in cultural and social perspectives, the 
adoption of modernization is continually challenged by the distinct traditionalist 
perspectives of Afghan culture (Roy 1990, 16).  Modernization for LDCs, such as 
Afghanistan, focuses on economic improvement to lift the people out of poverty. This 
requires large amounts of resources to direct individuals into skilled jobs, innovation, 
technology, and enterprise. Energy improvement is considered vital for neighborhoods, 
governments, and businesses to succeed.  
Education is thought of the most valuable method of skill building and training for 
new technologies and innovation. Although basic education or literacy is important, 
modernization, especially for Afghanistan, has prioritized tertiary (higher) education. 
Many colleges and universities already exist in some parts of Afghanistan requiring more 
of revitalization and restructuring than constructing. Though this assertion is generally 
accepted when related to the progression of change in countries like Afghanistan, there 
have been challenges to this premise based on the argument that modernization is linked 
to Western ideals in culture, technology, education and capitalism. The one mitigating 
factor that surfaced frequently while I was stationed in Afghanistan is that the cultural 
differences between Afghans and Americans are vast and sometimes unyielding. This 
factor is recognized by the US Army, hence the creation of HTS, but acknowledgement of 
the fact that Western culture and Afghan culture are different is much easier than changing 
the dynamics to serve both the US and the Afghan objectives in modernization.  
59 
 
 
 
Much of Afghan culture is traditional and tribal. The Government of Afghanistan’s 
(GoA) leadership is under the Pashtun ethnicity, which follows Pashtunwali Codes,14 
ancient social, political, and economic codes. These codes are not exclusive to 
modernization efforts in infrastructure, but may be exclusive for social dynamics within 
education, due to the status of women under Pashtunwali. Western ideals for modernization 
include women’s role in society according to the human capital theory discussed above. 
Only 40% of the Afghan population are Pashtun, therefore, there is room for Western 
modernization in education. However, with the government under Pashtun rule, the GoA 
may not endorse or enforce educational modernization projects.  
 Eisenstadt (1966, 4) and Rahman (2017, 2) argue against using the Western models 
of theory and culture completely. Pre-disposition can be seen in the beliefs of these authors, 
such as Rahman (2017, 4) who stated he favors a more authoritarian model of 
modernization found “in the case of China developing their own style of modernity, 
[which] should be thought of for the betterment of the world as a whole.” Rahman argued 
that Western modernization theories tied modernization and human capital theory to a 
capitalist class structure. These political and economic theories were generally responsible 
                                                                
14 Pashtunwali is an ancient honor code for Pastuns, who make up about 40% of the Afghan ethnic 
population. It is an influential, informal justice system set up by Codes that are defined by its emphasis on 
community consensus and local decision-making. By privileging village, tribe, and even family over the 
state, the Codes depend on active local participation. These rules are based on the honor of men and define 
the fundamentals of social conduct and conflict resolution. Known as the Pashtunwali Codes, they 
authorize the community to resolve its own conflicts. The Codes can be complex and cover most areas of 
life. Found in both rural and urban settings, it is a common Pastun cultural reality. The Taliban are ethnic 
Pastuns.  See Deering, Marissa "The Rules of Pastunwali" 12/22/2011. http://tyglobalist.org/in-the-
magazine/features/the-rules-of-pashtunwali/ Retrieved January 11, 2018 
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for causing failures in the nations of India, Iraq, and Afghanistan, although he does not 
provide specifics of when or how. Without careful scholarship, it is easy to conclude that 
specific political situations influenced outcomes, rather allowing for other possible factors 
that diminished modernization efforts in the three nations. Eisenstadt and Rahman’s 
attribution of failures of modernization in India, Afghanistan, and Iraq does not include 
evaluation of other cultural and traditional conditions in these countries. It is this lack of 
research and cultural understanding that provides a gap in the existing literature, which is 
needed to address the factors influencing attempts at modernization and change in 
Afghanistan.  
 On the other hand, Tilak (2002, 4) examined non-western successes of 
modernization and human capital building in select Eastern Asian nations. Modernization 
and specifically human capital building in the East Asian Tiger nations of Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong were compared with Japan and China (Tilak, 2002, 3). He 
examined the Asian cultural components of hard work, education, and motivation to 
succeed that supported modernization variables.  This perspective contradicts Rahman’s 
(2017) arguments that Western modernization theories tied modernization and human 
capital theory with a Western capitalist class structure.   
Tilak (2002, 3) researched the growth of the East Asian economic developments. 
He surmised that education was already valued in the Asian nations due to the practice of 
Confucianism, which demanded education as a goal for the population. Therefore large 
investments in people to attain education naturally led to economic growth and 
modernization. Thus, the growth of Asian economies in the nations he studied was tied to 
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human capital variables, and termed the “East Asian economic miracle". The education 
attained was not based on Western education models. However, it was investment in 
education sectors that also made the difference. The results were an interdependency 
between the governmental support of education, the rise of human capital, and an increase 
in economic growth for these governments (Tilak (2002). As noted by Tilak, it is important 
that the East Asian Tiger nations of South Korea and Taiwan had a 75% increase in 
economic growth due to human capital investments. In comparison to Africa and the 
Middle East, their 39% increase for human capital expenditures directly related to their 
economic growth as well (Tilak, 2002, 1-4).  
     The commitment of national leaders to support education and its role in 
socioeconomic and political development is an important determinant of human capital 
growth. Government investments in human capital are a cornerstone of nation-building and 
a key factor of economic development. This realization is critically important (Tilak, 2002, 
4). Human capital theories link to modernization theories and national development 
through educational provisions and attainment (Benhabib and Speigel 1994, 144). Due to 
previously stated Asian cultural variables toward education appreciation to build human 
capital, this dissertation will consider the Afghan culture to ascertain the viability of the 
USAID policy approaches toward modernization and investment in education.  
Lacuna in the Literature on Modernization in Afghanistan 
 According to Rostow (1960, 4), modernization theory often reflects the challenges 
of modernization and its economic impact on traditional societies. Though modernization 
may be viewed as a natural extension of the expansion of cultures and societies, 
62 
 
 
 
modernization requires an understanding of how thoughts, culture, and social values 
influence perceptions of change. Chaudhary (2013, 34) maintained that though a seemingly 
natural progression, modernization involves shifts in a number of different areas, including 
socio-cultural and institutional changes, among others. Whether modernization works or 
not is linked to education. Questions arise if Western education is always needed to create 
modernization.  This is important because traditional societies may challenge Western 
modernization, due to a fear education will deplete traditional values (Tilak 2012, 23). 
Therefore, cultural perceptions impact education sectors and thus modernization.  Tilak 
(2012) insists that other cultural education systems, such as in the successful Asian nations, 
may also be congruent with modernization. Aid agencies need to recognize multiple 
models of education to implement the rise of needed human capital.  
Modernization for developing nations outside Western cultures has been difficult 
at best. Good intentions do not necessarily translate into success. Rostow and others have 
focused on the Western industrialized nation model of modernization. Rostow’s (1960) 
stages of development have proven to be problematic when applied to non-Western 
nations. Research, policies, and aid projects have been ethnocentric (focused on the 
Western ideals or bias) in their attempts at modernization. For nations such as Afghanistan, 
with large heterogeneous traditional cultural beliefs, the ethnocentric approach of USAID 
and the US military has been a cause of misunderstandings at best and of conflict at worst.  
The existing literature relates a kind of economic and social dilemma: can Afghan 
society both accept aid from entities like USAID and other foreign aid agencies for 
modernization and still maintain their traditional cultural perspective, while supporting 
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human capital development? This goes back to the belief that there are several factors that 
hinder the effectiveness of aid in Afghanistan, including the presence of cultural norms and 
values that shape how individuals perceive education for different segments of the 
population. This dissertation will examine multiple aid reports and gather data from 
respondents to understand these issues and use the modernization theory literature, 
discussed above, to explain the results. When assessing capital investment driven by 
Western aid, it is essential to recognize that there are factors that shape receptivity to 
external financial influences.  
 In addition, modernization reflects an impact on economics, political structures, 
infrastructure, and social values; therefore, the gap that emerges from the existing literature 
reflects questions about the connection between the delivery of aid, the effectiveness of aid 
that is delivered, and the cultural and social barriers to the delivery getting to its intended 
recipients application of aid across populations. Modernization for Afghanistan means an 
end to extreme poverty and a jump ahead in the economic sectors of energy and education, 
the two sectors under study here. Modernization would mean Afghans have access to 
energy for households, neighborhoods, villages, merchant stores, businesses, services, and 
civil offices. Modernization means the Afghan people would have access to education, 
technology, and resources for literacy, jobs, innovation, and businesses.  
The central focus of the dissertation identifies the goals of the aid given to 
Afghanistan as a starting point for this research. The overarching questions are: What have 
been the barriers to modernization? What were the specific sources and amounts of USAID 
to Afghanistan with regard to education, and energy development? Were cultural and 
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religious differences considered throughout the planning and implementation processes? 
What were the outcomes of the specific projects, including the Tarakhil Power Plant, after 
multiple years and large amounts of dollars spent?  In the remaining chapters, I identify 
information related to these areas primarily reflecting what factors inhibited or enhanced 
the delivery and application of funding to support educational advancement and energy 
modernization in Afghanistan.  
 The belief that educational aid in the form of funding and materials has the potential 
to contribute significantly to infrastructure improvements supporting modernization for 
developing nations is rarely disputed.  Though Eisenstadt (1966, 4) and Rahman (2017, 2) 
have opposed Western models applied to countries like Afghanistan, India, and Iran with 
regard to modernization, Tilak (2012, 7) argues in favor of the importance of integrating 
educational initiatives to support modernization, maintaining that education provides a 
foundation for modernization (2012, 23).   In developing a strategic approach to the 
modernization of Afghanistan, it is necessary to determine the specific barriers that exist 
in the delivery and implementation of aid from USAID. Additionally, the role of the 
Afghan government must be considered for improving efficacy in the delivery and 
maintenance of aid projects, such as those earmarked for the energy infrastructure and for 
the establishment of educational venues. Energy acquisition is a crucial marker for 
modernization and education is needed for the continuation in building a modern society.  
 Rahman (2017, 3) recognized that cultural and social factors can contribute to 
delivery failures or a lack of receptivity to Western aid.  In pursuing this focus, it is essential 
to determine the barriers that exist to the effective delivery of USAID aid in Afghanistan 
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to the education sector, which leads the impacts of application of aid as a component of the 
study. 
Conclusions  
 While research supports the assertion of the benefits of investment in human capital 
as a foundation for modernization (Chaudhary 2013, 34; Rahman 2017, 3), there appears 
to be a gap in the existing research about the connection between the delivery of aid, and 
the effectiveness of aid that is successfully delivered. This relates to the need to explore 
the actual attainment of education that builds human capital and supports modernization. 
Tilak (2002, 7) argued that educational investments that expand human capital demonstrate 
a significant return on investment. More specifically, researchers have argued that 
expansion of educational programming has a direct link with improvements in GDP for 
developing countries (Benhabib and Speigel 1994, 144; Tilak 2002, 7). When effective, 
researchers maintain that investments of foreign aid in developing countries [like 
Afghanistan] can serve as foundational support for improvements in economic conditions. 
Son (2010, 2) argued, for example, that developing countries that effectively invest in 
human capital with the aim of improving literacy are supporting modernization. This 
speaks specifically to the connection between educational aid and cultural challenges that 
emerge for Afghanistan.  
In summary, this dissertation research utilizes data on USAID’s funding of 
education and a large power plant in Kabul to examine problems with aid delivery in two 
sectors of the Afghan economy: education and energy. The dissertation places those 
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findings in the broader theoretical framework of the modernization and human capital 
theories discussed above.    
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CHAPTER 4 DATA COLLECTION  
Questionnaire Methods of Data Collection 
With large amount of money and 16 years invested in Afghanistan by the US, there 
have been multitudes of publications, both scholarly and through the media with attention 
given to the issue of waste in USAID’s work in Afghanistan. Afghanistan remains 
impoverished and struggling, and my months in Helmand province brought me face-to-
face with these conditions.  
To make this study manageable, the focus is on two USAID aid funded sectors 
only: energy and education. This qualitative research study drew on the perceptions of 
experts and stakeholders that worked in those sectors in Afghanistan. Their perceptions 
were juxtaposed with those of official reports, including internal and external USAID 
evaluations, SIGAR audits and investigations, and media and scholarly reports. Three main 
sources of data inform this dissertation, utilizing the so-called “triangulation approach.”15  
The triangulation sources are 1) questionnaires answered by expert respondents and by 
conducting a Shura or focus group, 2) Official reports from USAID and other related 
entities, and 3) media reports and my own eyewitness observations of USAID results.  
The first part of this chapter examines respondent data from 20 questionnaires and 
a focus group interview with eight recent Afghan immigrants to add depth to the data. The 
questionnaire was distributed, with open-ended questions for short answers about energy 
                                                                
15 Triangulation means using more than one method to collect data on the same topic. This is a way of 
assuring the validity of research in qualitative studies through the use of a variety of methods to collect 
data on the same topic, which involves different types of samples as well as methods of data collection. 
Retrieved August 28, 2017. https://www.researchgate.net/triangulation_of_data_in_qualitative_research 
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and education aid in Afghanistan. This data collection followed IRB procedures and ethical 
guidelines as outlined in the respondent informed consent form. (Appendix D)  
As one can imagine, it is complex task to carry out interviews for a project such as 
this dissertation. The questionnaire distribution combined convenience sampling and a 
"snowballing" method, including the following: 
✓ Through my Afghan acquaintances and others whom I worked with in 
Afghanistan, I networked with the target population areas to reach a pool of 
respondents, with respondent criteria being Afghans or those who have 
lived and worked in Afghanistan. 
✓ Over 75 questionnaires were mailed or hand delivered, and in three months 
20 were returned. 
✓ I also created one focus group of recent Afghan immigrants was included, 
with older males from different backgrounds and locations within 
Afghanistan.  
✓ Data were represented in Excel and with descriptive narratives and graphs 
The questionnaires (Appendix E) were not surveys that could be measured with 
quantitative parameters, but rather open-ended questions that allowed each respondent to 
relay their interpretation. Qualitative research lends itself to descriptive detail, which can 
be intimidating for those who want to keep their affiliations and experiences hidden. 
Analysis of the data from this source was organized through the establishment of themes 
and categories, and with tables to show patterns and trends for clarification (Creswell, 
2006, 59; Sangasubana, 2011, 570).   
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Descriptions of Respondents  
The employment profile of the respondents was varied, but all 20 respondents had 
relevant data concerning the research questions. Furthermore, the data gathered from the 
questionnaires added context to the data from the organizational reports. Categories of 
respondents were comprised of different stakeholders and were in three categories. 1) 
Experts working in the aid industry, who were American-born and worked with the US 
military, HTS personnel, USAID, contractors, or SIGAR; 2) Respondents who were 
Afghan-born individuals, who worked as contractors, HTS personnel, cultural experts, and 
interpreters; and 3) Respondents who were Afghans, who had recently immigrated to the 
United States that answered questionnaires in a focus group setting. These eight older 
respondents were farmers, teachers and US military cooks.  
Among the respondents were seven people with work affiliations with the Human 
Terrain Service that were American born and were the largest affiliation of all. The other 
affiliations included three Americans and two Afghans with the US Military, three Afghans 
and one American from USAID, one Afghan and one American from UN/NATO, one 
Afghan with SIGAR, two Afghan engineers, and one Afghan educational administrator. 
All those questioned would be considered experts in their field. Most worked either directly 
or indirectly with aid projects. Most had familiarity with TPP and the education sector in 
Afghanistan. A few individuals had many years of experience and most had at least several 
years of working and living in Afghanistan. Most had had food, water, heating, clothing, 
and transportation provided by either the US Military or indirectly through USAID. Most 
did not suffer directly from lack of energy or food. No one reported any injuries or suffering 
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from violence directly from the war beginning in 2001. Although the majority were experts 
in their fields and some had decades of experience, generally the respondents in this 
research were not famous or high ranking in their respective fields.  
The 20 respondents mostly agreed that their views of Afghanistan had changed after 
working there and seeing the problems first hand. Most did not have a consistent presence 
there from 2001 – 2017, but had spent one to three-year periods of living and working in 
Afghanistan,  and then returned to the US. The Afghan born respondents were mostly 
already living and working in the US at the time of this study or had immigrated to the US 
years before. Some had repeated trips to Afghanistan, and a few were involved in aid 
development in other countries. Some, especially the Afghan born respondents, had 
expertise in multiple languages.  
Figure 4.1: Respondent’s Work Affiliation in Afghanistan 
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Methods for obtaining data from official aid reports and investigations included 
data mining specific to USAID’s involvement in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Some 
reports available by USAID focused on the successes without a critique. Reports published 
from auditors and evaluators in recent years identified problems with the delivery and 
distribution of aid. Data mining included a thorough and rigorous attempt to find details 
that illustrated what was proposed or projected to happen versus what was accomplished 
by USAID funding. Henry et al. (2017, 24) described how qualitative data mining through 
report findings can help map out a process of determination, such as if A happens then 
either B or C could happen depending on the conditions.   
This data collection chapter consists of several sections. The first section has 
original qualitative data collected from the target respondents by a questionnaire with 15 
questions, plus a focus group meeting. Some of the respondents did not answer all the 
questions as they felt they had no direct knowledge. The second section focuses on data 
from USAID and SIGAR reports or reports about USAID by media and scholars revealing 
methods, spending, and consequences of aid projects. The third section reveals the social 
science research eyewitness account by the author of this dissertation through working with 
projects in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.  
Questionnaire Format 
The contribution of the questionnaire data is central to this study by offering 
primary data. It is original in its content and application to education and energy 
development in Afghanistan. This original qualitative research study depends on 
anonymous questionnaires that were completed by experts knowledgeable about the 
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political and economic impact of American foreign aid in Afghanistan. Each respondent 
had either professional or personal experience with one or both sectors. The Human Terrain 
System, although not a foreign aid agency, integrated with USAID’s modernization efforts 
through missions to gain cultural knowledge of local populations and projects that 
impacted them.  Social scientists, such as myself, conducted interviews with Afghan local 
officials and reconstruction agents, which often include discussions about USAID-funded 
projects.  
The questionnaires were created to answer the research questions through 
anonymous and relatively quick responses requiring short answers from the respondents. 
The 75 prospective participants were given three months to return questionnaires. Twenty 
persons, both male and female, agreed to fill out the questionnaire and return completed 
questionnaires. The respondents were assigned numbers from one to twenty. Their 
complete responses are listed in an arbitrary numerical order in Appendix G. Additionally, 
a focus group was conducted in Michigan with eight recent Afghan immigrants in 
attendance. The focus group is addressed separately after the questionnaires.  
All participants were assured of their anonymity. They were informed of their rights 
and informed consent forms were signed and collected. Participants were assured that all 
data that connects them to the study will be destroyed. Questionnaires were collected 
through postal mail or in person. The study followed all IRB ethical codes for research. 
The respondents were presented with the purpose of the study, and were informed that 
questionnaires will be identified with code numbers, not their real names. Participation was 
voluntary, which allowed a participant to withdraw at any time. It was also explained that 
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the keys for the codes will be kept in a safety deposit box, and no one except the chief 
investigator will have access to that data. 
The questionnaire was constructed with a series of questions related to specific 
sectors: education and energy (Appendix E).  The first questions focused on the success or 
failure of the Afghan energy sector in general, and targets one major infrastructure project: 
the Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP), which was constructed in Kabul and funded by USAID 
assistance to provide higher levels of electricity regionally. The next series of questions 
addressed aid for education, provided by USAID. Both sections included the binary 
questions: was the project successful or not, and whether it was beneficial or not for the 
nation? The use of binary questions and answers provided insight into individuals’ 
perceptions.  
Raw Data from the Questionnaires 
 This section includes the raw data from the questionnaires to offer first hand 
insights on the topics of USAID education and energy aid funding in Afghanistan. The 
complete respondent narratives are located in Appendix G. The following part of the 
chapter is divided into topics with quotes from the respondents.  
Education:  
 Many respondents acknowledged that education was critical to improving the 
conditions in Afghanistan and that USAID contributed heavily to building numerous 
schools. One spoke of the delight of the parents, students, and teachers when their school 
was first opened. However, their statements were usually interspersed with despair about 
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school closings. Some respondents had nothing good to say about the efforts or aid spent 
on education in Afghanistan.  
Respondent # One: 
[Education] “will remain weak without foreign intervention and long-term 
strategies. US and USAID were the main players in building and supplying schools 
over the last 15 years. They still need school supplies, plus training for 
administrators and for Afghan officials concerning educational needs. 
 
I helped USAID set up schools and provided assessments for their evaluations. I 
know that USAID asked the Afghan government for recommendations for 
provinces that needed schools and learning centers. However, USAID never trusted 
the Afghans with their information, and they ignored reports and advice. This was 
a negative and unhealthy relationship that impacted the projects.  Teacher salaries 
were very low, and there was no medical care for sick students. Parents kept 
students home to work because school was not mandatory.  Girl’s schools were 
implemented for a while, but now they are all empty and ghost schools. Foreign aid 
for education had a bigger impact in cities than in rural areas, where security was 
not available.” 
 
“Government officials used their power to get educational aid in their favorite areas. 
Local people complained about officials that took humanitarian aid, whether it was 
for education or food for poor people. Even in safer areas, school supplies and 
building materials were stolen. 
 
The US military and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) should have 
been more involved to deliver and monitor foreign aid and provide security for aid 
projects as many aid workers left due to insurgency. Donors and NGOs should have 
trusted local reports and feedback. Media needed to be improved to provide 
information for citizens about officials and what was going on in the country. 
Foreign governments needed to send money to operate the schools as there was 
none from the Afghan government.”   
 
Respondent #Two:  
“In the Arghandab River Valley area, the Taliban used intimidation tactics to close 
schools. They threatened and carried out harm to children, especially girls. There 
were two or three Quranic schools for boys in the area. Hundreds of children 
roamed the streets with nothing to do. 
  
The evaluation of the Adult Literacy program showed that it was a top down 
solution. The US military decided to distribute the books by enlisting a local branch 
of the Afghan army… but the books were stored in a local building without any 
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plans for distribution. There was no coordination between the US military and the 
Afghans. I worked on an evaluation of the Adult Literacy project for HTS and 
received pushback from the military. They would not receive a formal written 
report, but only oral feedback. They said our goal was to provide feedback to 
improve the program, not to criticize it. The US military provided a tent for a 
school, and the Government of Afghanistan GIRoA, (Government Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan) provided teachers, which was a sustainable solution”.  
 
Respondent # Three:  
“I provided briefs and sessions to help Afghan teachers (both males and females) 
in multiple languages. Foreign aid helped education a little at first. This built a lot 
of schools, especially for females to leave their homes and pursue different types 
of degrees. USAID especially built schools for females and orphans, but the schools 
are closed now. Afghanistan still needs educated people so they can better serve 
their country. I was hopeful when first working there, but after a time that hope 
decreased by 2016. I witnessed a lot of tragedy and waste… Gender equality and 
female education could have increased productivity, but it had to come with 
government support.” 
 
Respondent #Four:  
“Foreign aid helped raise the economic and educational level of the average 
Afghan. The work in Afghanistan was important, but the internal conflicts (tribal 
and cultural) hampered Western efforts…corruption kept funds from going to 
intended purposes. Only a few saw impact, and the majority were not impacted. I 
worked with USAID and they had good intentions and tried to assist Afghan people. 
Some of their schools appeared to work in large cities, but not in rural 
communities.”  
 
Respondent #Five:  
“I visited the girl’s school in Kabul. Overall, it advanced development and human 
rights… From visiting the girl’s school in Hazra, I could see there was overall 
development and human rights were benefited. I am less optimistic than when I 
started. There were inefficiencies, corruption, and poor data knowledge 
management… I recommend audits… and investigations.”  
  
Respondent #Six: 
 “Sustainable benefits of educational aid in Afghanistan were that we helped 
women learn entrepreneurship skills such as chicken farming and bee keeping… I 
have conducted research all over the world and the same issues rise on many 
continents. Corruption from the national government restricted aid trickling down 
to the local government, and resulted in mistrust by the people… Key Leaders were 
only interested in their own families.  
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However, our information on aid was not put into use. Nobody studied the lessons 
learned from aid work. No one incorporated good practices of how to administer 
aid.  Money was wasted, specifically, in Afghanistan, because: Schools were built 
with no teachers or staff in the area, and there was a brain drain to Kabul outside of 
Afghanistan.” 
 
Respondent #Seven:  
“USAID built the schools in many villages across the country, but most of the 
schools closed. Local customs and traditions played a role in stopping children from 
attending school, especially girls. The Taliban enforced these traditions by threats 
and even killing people. Negatives of cultural practices, customs, Taliban, 
corruption from many directions, and the inability of aid agencies to develop long-
term educational plans discouraged parents from allowing children to go to school.” 
 
“Education is good for governance and brings prosperity to a country. Education 
opens horizons for people and brings acceptance of differences and tolerance of 
others. Good education will bridge the gaps of gender inequality.” 
 
Respondent #Nine:  
“I remain quite pessimistic with regards to the future of Afghanistan. The 
deteriorating security situation, lawlessness and corruption remained at the 
forefront of many issues. 
 
I discovered that foreign aid did help the education sector in some areas in 
Afghanistan. The schools in Kabul were more modernized and better equipped to 
teach students. I had the chance to visit a school that was located next to my work 
place in Kabul in 2016. The school was in much better condition than the one in 
Helmand. The classrooms were full of students. I met the principal who explained 
to me that the USAID made it possible for his school to buy furniture and other 
essentials required to run the school. The school had a built a food court and play 
ground.  The school was co-ed and males and female students were seen studying 
together...I would say that foreign aid proved beneficial for most of the major cities 
in Afghanistan such as the capital, Kabul. 
 
I was invited for the opening of a new school in Mazar-e-Sharif in 2012, which is 
considered the second largest city of Afghanistan. It was a good experience to 
witness the completion of a large school and the joy was apparent on the faces of 
all the teachers and students. The school was built by an American aid agency and 
it took them several years to build the school. It was closed due to insurgency.  
 
Education in Afghanistan was improved by pouring millions of dollars into 
projects. The USAID mainly helped Afghanistan in building hundreds of schools 
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and other educational institutions, even though most were shut down later. It was 
not unusual to hear about the closing of schools in Afghanistan for several reasons.     
 
In 2015, I visited a school in Nawzad district in Helmand and witnessed that the 
school was hardly operational with only a few students and teachers present. I was 
told that the school had been targeted and partially destroyed by insurgents.  This 
“ghost school” as described by an Afghan interpreter was abandoned and remained 
closed for many years due to the lack of funding. This school was built by an 
American contractor. The locals were scared to send their children to this school 
because the abandoned building was housing criminals and homeless people. The 
roads leading to the school were also considered quite unsafe.” 
 
Respondent #Eleven:  
“I provided security in rural areas near schools. Education was weak and not 
available before 2001, but foreign aid helped to improve the education sector in 
Afghanistan.  
People complained about the outcome. Some parents were not satisfied with the 
levels of learning.  
 
Schools were built by individuals that came to Afghanistan for one year to leave a 
mark. Often times, schools were built without proper planning and understanding 
or appreciation for the political and socio-cultural nuances of the areas. Hence 
schools were built without meeting the needs of the people.  Perhaps if USAID had 
included Afghan experts to help understand the issues of the projects?  
 
I heard that schools were empty because they were built in the wrong area or too 
far with bad roads. During the winter, there was no heat or the roads and schools 
were flooded. I saw many abandoned schools. I reported this to the US Army that 
schools were closed and teachers never came. Locals complained that teachers were 
still paid, but would not come because of security. Many schools closed, even if 
USAID spent millions and millions in some areas. We never trained locals to take 
over the schools and learn how to do things for themselves.”  
 
Respondent #Twelve: 
“I investigated poisonings in a local girl’s school, which NATO also worked on 
findings. The education outreach appeared to be modest and many schools sat 
empty. The USAID and the State Department were very involved in assessing 
education, and efforts for women’s groups. When I worked for HTS, we were 
integrated with analyzing local impacts on education attendance. The education 
advances where I worked was served by international troops.  
 
I visited a site for a midwifery program that was funded in part by USAID. It was 
threatened with broken windows to scare the young students. The other funding 
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was by the Afghan government and their department of education. The Koreans 
also funded some educational medical programs. My most vivid memories were at 
the midwifery school. There were 20 young women undergoing the training. The 
training material was very good and provided by USAID. Those administering the 
school were medically trained and we did HTS research regarding the curriculum. 
I heard the Afghans involved had to leave and are now trying to get to the US  
 
The need for education in Afghanistan was profound and important. Young people 
have few opportunities and are lost in a modern era. The educated live in central 
cities and rural areas had no ability to improve or have social progress.” 
 
Respondent #Thirteen: 
“Designing aid for energy infrastructure and education was unsustainable because 
there were no teachers or engineers to maintain the structures and systems. Often, 
we created programs that looked good on paper, but had no effect or negative 
effects due to a lack of understanding the systems and culture. Funds did not go 
where they were supposed to. Determining program objectives was difficult as 
there were competing narratives from the military, aid agencies, the state, and 
NGOs.  
Many schools were built, but are now abandoned due to lack of security, teachers, 
and parents’ concerns. Still there were some schools that were still functional. It 
was my hope that girls in school will become part of the culture.  
 
Training did work for men and women as long as they were separate and respected 
the culture. There was a radio education program and even a prison literacy 
program. HTS would gather information from the locals and report to the military. 
The military would report to USAID, but it was USAID that made final decisions. 
One program start seemed hopeful that provided women to build solar power panels 
at home, but I do not know the fate of that one.”  
 
Respondent #Fourteen: 
“Ultimately, the aid projects were a waste and time consuming. Locals said that 
projects only benefited western contractors who received big salaries. All I knew 
was that schools did not have energy infrastructure. They had no heat in winter, and 
students did not show up for school because it was too cold. I was involved in 
building heating systems in some schools, but there was no fuel. Eventually, 
security was so bad for schools that the weather was not the main concern.” 
 
Respondent #Sixteen: 
“Rebuilding Afghanistan was more challenging that earlier expectations. USAID 
should have built rapport with all parties in Afghanistan to coordinate donations 
and resources. USAID projects built credibility for the US for many in Afghanistan. 
The lack of infrastructure in impoverished areas made it difficult to deliver 
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education. USAID had helped to elevate the standard of living for millions of 
Afghan citizens, and especially for girls was a big achievement of USAID. If there 
was heavy Afghan government presence, people flourished with the influx of 
foreign aid and foreign investments. More Afghan children were going to school 
than ever before. 
  
However, areas that were infected with heavy insurgents still suffered from lack of 
education. Children often failed to show up to schools due to lack of security and 
poverty and the schools built by aid sat empty and created ghost schools.  There 
was a social stigma for women’s education. Language was a barrier when 
curriculum and supplies were in a language from another region. In my opinion, 
aid should have been given to local villagers to modernize their standards of living 
and strengthen education efforts and projects, rather than building school buildings 
that turned into ghost schools.” 
 
Respondent #Seventeen: 
“Afghans were pessimistic about their future. They were a failed state due to lack 
of education. International donors tried, but their focus was wrong and they did not 
understand the culture. There was no training of locals to continue any project 
funded by international donors. This was true worldwide. Money was not the only 
consideration. Careful planning and accountability was the only way that aid would 
have worked and we had those lessons from decades of aid implementation. Audits 
and monitoring were needed for any nation building project.  
  
Understanding the culture and religion was the key to any progress in Afghanistan. 
It took generations to create slow changes and consistent efforts in education. 
USAID built many schools that were closed. I had visited the ghost schools to 
confirm this. The Afghan government did not get involved in education, and there 
was no money to run the schools, no teachers, insecurity, and no supplies. There 
were no administrators to coordinate the school efforts. International donors and 
the Government of Afghanistan should be blamed for not completing the job. There 
was not enough funds or long-term strategies. Coordination was needed. Locals had 
zero knowledge about the outside world. If there was a good education system, the 
nation could have developed. I was responsible for evaluation and assessing 
projects for educational resources. I issued reports back to my office in Virginia 
about what needed to be developed and what was suggested.” 
 
Respondent #Eighteen 
“I thought the situation would be better, especially with USAID and other agencies 
working so hard and saying they would rebuild Afghanistan. It is really a failed 
state. They could not win this war that has been fought for years and years. They 
more they tried, the more the people suffered. When the Taliban controlled areas, 
80 
 
 
 
it was horrible. There were no schools, good food, no clean water, and women could 
not leave their homes.  
International donors should have built a skilled and educated new generation if they 
wanted to help Afghanistan. Many people tried to help, but it was all uncoordinated 
and inefficient. I heard a Canadian company sent a team to Afghanistan to 
investigate education aid projects to help women and children. They reported on 
corruption by the Government of Afghanistan, and their lack of commitment to 
education.  
 
USAID built schools that were not used and I heard of the ghost schools. I spoke to 
the locals and they talked about they needed food, medicine, and water. Local 
women would ask me for powdered milk for their infants. This broke my heart. 
They wanted protection from the Taliban, while we were in the area. They said 
there would be repercussions. I found there were contradictions between what I had 
been told by USAID and what the locals said concerning projects. USAID said 
locals stole supplies and locals said the contractors never delivered them.” 
 
Respondent #Nineteen: 
“The ways of culture and religion were enforced by Taliban. Each member of the 
Taliban was easily replaced by anyone practicing the laws of their religion. Their 
numbers would always be the same. Someone said you cannot get rid of the 
Taliban; they are our culture. This meant that they were like a Religious Police. It 
was Afghan cultural laws that conflicted with Western ideals. Educating the young 
would change this, but that was not understood by aid agencies or the US either. 
 
 Educational aid was not in line with the environment, cultural background, 
religious preferences, and local needs. The idea was that if given a chance with 
good security, people would change and want Western ways. This may have been 
true for a few, but not for many others.  
 
Due to corruption and lack of input by the locals, the schools built were placed to 
satisfy official’s needs, and not the population. Some schools only had a few 
students within distance, and many areas had few schools, but large numbers of 
students. Aid agencies wasted a lot of money on opening ceremonies and 
decorations. Money went for personal uses, and during construction, there was a 
feeling of…we can buy expensive tools even for a one-time use.” 
 
Energy: 
This section addresses aid money spent on energy infrastructure in Afghanistan 
with a focus on the Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP) built with USAID money. There is across 
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the board negativity about the Power Plant, but there are some positive results with solar 
power units and suggestions for hydro energy sources.  
Respondent #One: 
“I lived in the area of the TPP. It cost a lot, but did not benefit the local people, due 
to poor management. Also, the firm who built the TPP did not designate local 
authorities or teach anyone local how to maintain it. The plant remained closed for 
months and months, and Afghans joked about the 300 million dollars it cost to build 
it. Fuel was bought by energy aid from Uzbekistan and Pakistan. But the Taliban 
controlled the roads, especially at the border, so the fuel could not get through.  
 
There was some productive energy aid for Afghans though installation of small 
solar power units in urban areas. US firms built these. My family suffered from lack 
of electricity or fuel to heat and cook. Fuel was expensive even when it was 
available, which was rare. I could not get gas for a car. People who risked their lives 
to bring it in from other countries charged double prices. We did not drive for 
months and we used wood for heating our homes.”  
 
Respondent #Two: 
“I was very familiar with the Shorandam Industrial Park between the airport and 
Kandahar. The main problem was sustainability as the plant required diesel fuel, 
which the US military provided. It was a short-term remedy for a military solution 
for energy in a conflict area. It was not a long-term or economically viable solution. 
The concepts of accountability, evaluation, and long-term sustainability were 
regulated to a lesser importance as this was a war zone, first and foremost. 
Generally, the US military was well intentioned and not corrupt, yet poorly 
informed, untrained for the culture, and the tasks at hand. 
 
There were many other negative examples from aid agencies of which I was aware. 
Project evaluations and accountability were seldom pursued.  This was also true of 
the USAID projects when I worked for SIGAR.” 
 
Respondent #Three:  
“Taking information from people where I worked and locals, all sides agreed that 
the TPP project was wasteful for not only Afghanistan, but for the American 
taxpayers. I helped plan energy grids for remote areas, but did not work with the 
TPP project.  Neither foreign aid nor energy production was well planned. 
Afghanistan is a huge country, and there was no training or skills for administration 
or services to provide energy.  
 
Energy aid was critical for Afghanistan’s infrastructure. Locals did not have energy 
for heating or cooking or fuel for their vehicles. There has never been an energy 
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grid in the nation. Poor people suffered from the government’s lack of services. If 
the government had put in an energy grid, they could have collected money for the 
electricity or fuel provided to homes for heating or cooking. More energy would 
have provided jobs and markets in the nation. Many tried to help, including the US 
and other western agencies, plus Asian efforts from Japan, India, the Gulf States, 
and Pakistan. 
  
The Afghan government did build some pipelines to schools, and I assisted with 
that project. We also installed solar powered street lights in Kabul. It took months 
and months to do as we lacked materials and not enough security. Major problems 
were lack of security, because corrupt officials, bribes, and shadow governments 
control many areas.  
 
Other problem with aid was that international donors did not coordinate their 
efforts. It was a waste of time and money. There was much failure due to this lack 
of coordination and communication. Also, the locals were not consulted on many 
projects, and they had good information about issues of sustainability and local 
needs. Roads built across land should have had permissions of those on the land 
first, and locals could have been hired for labor, but often they were not. Education 
for the people about immediate projects would have been helpful. In fact, if there 
was media to teach people to change certain ways and for improvement, it would 
have helped.”  
 
“My suggestions are these: 
*Powerful countries should have clear objectives in stopping the fighting. 
* Hydro power plants would be most productive.  
* Safe roads would create an economic boom.  
* All donors should work together to build power grids for cities.”  
 
Respondent #Four: “There was primarily corruption and inefficiency in delivering energy. 
Western methods may not work in Afghanistan.”  
Respondent #Seven:  
“The TPP project was an example of poor work. Corruption resulted in the project 
costing 300 million dollars. However, in Kabul there was lighting added after 
USAID installed hydraulic power on dams. This type of energy should have been 
for all provinces across the country. Energy was important as it leads to economic 
development. Currently, people use wood heat their homes and cook.  
 
Afghanistan needed long term strategies and plans. Three dynamics affected all 
education and energy aid in Afghanistan: 1) Taliban, 2) Waste 3) Corruption from 
Afghan and US agencies. Unless the people of Afghanistan rejected the Taliban in 
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their role of reinforcing old ways, and corruption of others, things will not improve. 
US and other major stakeholders should have played a role for improvement 
through accountability for illegal and corrupt activities. But leaders of Afghanistan 
became wealthy and did not heed the suffering of the people. Their close relatives 
all became wealthy, which hampered the aid programs. Problems are: 
 
● Transit routes for Afghan goods and materials for energy projects do not get 
through.   
● Afghan government officials steal the resources for their personal benefit. 
● Security was too bad to administer aid.”  
 
Respondent # Eight:  
“The TPP was completed and handed over to the Ministry of Energy and Water of 
Afghanistan in June of 2010. Afghanistan imported 80% of its energy from 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The power lines that supplied the 5 
million people of Kabul passes through Salang Pass, which was rough and 
[inaccessible] terrain. This is not sufficient in winter and the TPP should have filled 
the gap. It generated electricity on both crude oil and diesel fuel. At a cost of 335 
million US dollars, the capacity was 150 megawatts of electricity. 
 
Otherwise, propane fuel could have been imported from Pakistan or Turkmenistan, 
and cow dung used for heating fuel and cooking. There was some electric power 
coming from the Naghlow and Sorobi water dams. However, at times there was not 
enough water to generate electricity from these dams. The war lords, (Mujahedeen) 
and other factions would cut off electricity to punish other groups. 
  
My personal opinion is that donor counties who gave aid money should have had a 
system of checks and balances in place and held those people responsible. Aid was 
channeled through contractors to subcontractors, and the results reduced material 
and durability tenfold.” 
 
Respondent #Nine:  
“My research work covered various sectors including but not limited to health, 
education, stability, governance and local infrastructure. The aid given to 
Afghanistan by the western countries did not produce the desired results. The 
majority of the population was without basic necessities such as electricity and 
clean water. My first-hand experience led me to believe that the foreseeable future 
in Afghanistan is quite bleak. 
   
I was able to determine that funding the projects was not the main concern; instead, 
issues such as waste management and corruption were more widespread. When it 
came to TPP, it wouldn’t be fair to blame the Afghan officials for not using this 
costly project and keeping it maintained. Afghans never received the proper 
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training, nor did they hold the basic skills to run and maintain the TPP. According 
to the locals, the blame should have been shifted towards the Afghan authorities for 
being involved in corruption and stealing the TPP supplies. But they shouldn’t have 
been held solely responsible for not running a 330 million dollars project 
effectively.  One of the major challenges was to purchase diesel fuel in order to run 
the TPP. As I know, it was unsafe and costly to transfer diesel from neighboring 
countries. Most of the roads being controlled by the insurgents made it nearly 
impossible to transport fuel. 
 
The foreign aid failed to help Afghanistan improve its energy infrastructure…I 
witnessed that people and businesses struggled due to the shortage of electricity in 
most of the neighborhoods. Those who were receiving electricity without any 
shortage were the rich and elite of the society as well as the foreign officials, but 
not the common people.  
 
I witnessed some progress in regards to the Afghanistan’s energy infrastructure in 
Kabul. When I arrived in Afghanistan in 2009, the load shedding was apparent 
during the evenings and nights. The situation appeared to improve in Kabul by 
2016. According to the locals, the [USAID] foreign contractors helped Afghan 
utility departments improve the infrastructure of residential and commercial solar 
power in several cities in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the locals said that the 
rural areas did not see any changes and the improvements were limited to the capital 
and other major cities. 
 
In Helmand during the winter of 2015, I witnessed that most homes including the 
government offices had no basic heating resources. I also witnessed that several 
medical centers in Kabul had to operate without any heat due to the shortage of 
fuel. 
 
It is true that insecurity hindered the effective use of aid in improving Afghan 
energy sector, because the foreign contractors would not jeopardize their lives in 
conducting projects due to the security issues. The foreign aid agencies needed to 
effectively cooperate with each other and communicate closely with the Afghan 
authorities in achieving long term projects.  
 
The Afghan energy sector was also struggling to find skilled technicians in order to 
effectively execute energy projects. Minister of Labor and Social Affairs urged 
international donors to provide training workshops for Afghan officials, and he 
repeatedly reiterated the importance of training before a project can be executed.” 
 
Respondent #Ten:  
“At first, I thought the war and reconstruction effort was necessary, but now I view 
it as a waste of time and money. Basically the US never trained local Afghans to 
85 
 
 
 
maintain and operate infrastructure. The gap in understanding their religion and 
culture and negotiating the differences was contentious. We were creating 
dependence on Western aid and assistance. At the end of the day, Afghans needed 
to decide what they want. The best outcome I could see was to allow the Taliban to 
have an autonomous state in the south.”   
 
Respondent #Eleven:  
“My confidence in helping to solve problems with the tactics used by the military, 
foreign aid, the Afghan government, and the private sector decreased. HTS teams 
provided socio-cultural information, but it went to the army.  We needed research 
to bring in solutions that would work.  
 
Foreign aid benefited the contractors and other private western firms, but not as 
much for Afghanistan. The Taliban took control of many foreign aid projects after 
the western agencies left the areas. The Afghan government did not know how to 
build any education or energy infrastructure and we did not train them.  
   
The TPP was costly and helpless for all sides. Locals talked bad about the project. 
Some new dams were built using hydraulic power to control water. But the energy 
sector was ineffective in most areas and locals never talked good about it. They had 
difficulty in heating their homes or getting cooking fuel. I made reports about 
energy projects that had been damaged by insurgents.”  
 
Respondent #Thirteen:  
“The US State Department built several dams that were never functional, and I 
imagined other programs had similar fates. If the right people ran the country after 
the initial round up of the Taliban and not funding the war lords, this country would 
have been very different. People preferred the Taliban to the war lords.”  
 
Respondent #Fourteen:  
“Ultimately, the aid projects were a waste and time consuming. Locals said that 
projects only benefited western contractors who received big salaries. My company 
was in charge of TPP. I also worked on several small projects relating to energy, 
such as installing new energy systems in government buildings. For energy 
projects, aid was not enough and was wasted because Afghans had no skills or 
knowledge on how to run energy infrastructure. They had zero knowledge of energy 
installation and the US firms provided no training due to lack of security, money, 
and time. Language was an issue when locals were hired to work on menial jobs.  
 
I provided maintenance for TPP for two years. My assessment was that it was a 
wasted project that cost a lot of money and did not benefit the Afghan people. On 
my job, security was the main problem most of the time. For months we had to stay 
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on military bases due to insurgent activities. Getting fuel to the plant was time 
consuming and costly. Roads were very bad in all areas. “ 
 
Respondent #Fifteen:  
“We experienced lack of supplies and materials, trained or skilled workers, and 
insecure areas…the TPP was given as an example of an expensive, but failed 
project in a speech by an American expert on energy infrastructure… Afghan 
officials said it was harmed by corruption from many parties. Zero tolerance for 
corruption and good management should have been the rule.  
 
The US should not have tried to do this without more commitment from other 
nations. We failed and it made us look bad. It seemed there were no clear strategies 
or central planning for success. Fragmentation hurt aid efforts. Corruption by local 
regional officials did more to harm projects than other factors. Locals were very 
appreciative for anything that helped the villages.”  
  
Respondent #Sixteen:   
“The energy sector suffered due to sabotage, corruption, and inefficiencies for 
power plants and pipelines. USAID invested valuable resources to build the TPP. 
The primary fuel for operation was diesel fuels, which was often unavailable due 
to border closings and insurgent attacks. The TPP was unable to provide power for 
Afghanistan grids. It was to provide backup for emergencies. The US Senate 
committee on foreign aid has launched multiple investigations into USAID work in 
Afghanistan.  
  
Foreign aid helped to subsidize fuel for local consumption, and to establish 
hydropower dams across the country. Building cooperation with local elders and 
procuring security from tribal leaders increased the success rate of delivering fuel 
and providing education in the remote areas of Afghanistan. Eighteen percent of 
Afghanistan had access to uninterrupted supplies as compared to 1% in the year 
2000. More funding should have gone towards building more hydro power plants 
and small-scale dams on rivers for Afghanistan. Foreign aid should have been used 
to harness the tremendous potential for solar and wind energy in Afghanistan.  
  
Most aid was wasted in providing security for the infrastructure. This was because 
power plants in Afghanistan relied on expensive fuels for operations. Interruptions 
in supply chains caused power plants to operate inefficiently, and they sustained 
costly damages. Pipelines suffered with sabotage and vandalism. Lack of roads and 
threats of insurgency decreased efficiency too. The biggest challenges were 
violence and the interruption of supplies at the border with Pakistan, plus lack of 
roads, railroads, and the absence of a dry port. In winter, some passes were 
completely cut off for months.”  
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Respondent #Seventeen:  
“I have worked with USAID since 2002 in many nations. I was an aid expert in 
Afghanistan for 8 years. It was tough to deal with different military and diplomatic 
personnel with different stakes and backgrounds. Energy was an area that was 
critical to the nation’s development. The TPP was a failed project, with no 
sustainability. People were not happy from the beginning because the locals were 
not consulted, but only the corrupt officials. USAID and SIGAR conducted 
investigations and produced reports and I helped. The people said they had wanted 
small generators. They used animal dung for heat and cooking and the children got 
sick.  
 
Pakistan built a similar plant to the TPP. It did not cost as much and was working 
well. The people benefited from it. But Pakistan had a strong government system, 
and the Government of Afghanistan was incapable of running any project. 
Corruption and bribes blocked the way. People were ignorant of the value of nation 
building projects and they stole what they could.”  
 
Respondent #Eighteen:   
“I attended a Shura where the KLE said that the TPP only helped American 
companies. Now Afghan people were blamed that it is shut down. The TPP project 
did not benefit the people, but was built based on American concepts of what to do. 
How could Afghans maintain something like that with no training? One Afghan 
official said the USAID never talked about the TPP, because it would hurt the 
reputation of American contractors.  
 
But the American firms only stuck to their plans and never coordinated with locals. 
It was dangerous work and some people were afraid to work with me. HTS was 
there to talk to locals about their perspectives and report back to military 
commanders. My team evaluated projects completed by USAID and other 
American companies. I also worked as a coordinator between Americans and 
Afghans.” 
 
Respondent #Twenty:  
“I knew the energy sector in Afghanistan was very weak for years. USAID and 
other agencies tried hard to help a huge country to improve, but it would take time 
before Afghanistan could become independent in that area. There were some 
benefits as hydro power systems were built, along with energy lines placed, and 
low-cost grid systems in some areas. 
  
The failures in aid delivery for energy infrastructure was first to not coordinate with 
locals. Western countries lacked knowledge about Afghanistan’s culture, religion, 
and necessary information that only the locals knew. Instead USAID and their 
contracted companies dealt with officials only who were corrupt. Most projects 
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were built within locations of the official’s personal areas with low occupation, 
while thousands went without any needed energy. Westerners did not understand 
the system of corruption and hierarchies. Officials did not care about those under 
their care and no communication occurred so they did not know situations. 
 
There was no training for maintenance on installations either, so that when USAID 
pulled out, the energy infrastructure became useless. I helped to evaluate the TPP 
as was required by USAID program manager in Afghanistan, regarding its function.  
When asked during investigations, the contractors or USAID said there was not 
time or money for this. Afghan locals were out of the picture. USAID funded the 
TPP, and contracted with Westerners to build and implement the power plant.  
 
The contractors had no contact with locals and no knowledge of the local terrain or 
seasonal conditions. There should have also been relationships built with energy 
providers in other connecting nations. They knew what was needed to work with 
the terrain regarding transition lines and installing new hydro power. 
 
I remember one incident during a bitter winter in Afghanistan with no heat. A man 
burst into our office and shouted that his family needed heat. We let him in to see 
that we had no heat in our office either with no blankets to keep warm, and we were 
part of the energy team. I felt that I contributed to some energy increase as I knew 
how to maintain equipment and small generators. I helped some coordination 
between the US contractors and Afghan utilities department. I was also part of a 
team that implemented hydraulic power generators in towns in the southern and 
northern parts of Afghanistan. I saw an increase in street lights in Kabul with power 
from solar panels. What is needed most is training to create skilled technicians.  
 
The Shura Focus Group 
 This section examined the “Shura” or focus group of eight Afghan males. This 
“Shura” (consultation) for recent Afghan immigrants at the local community center was 
held in Detroit, Michigan on Friday, July 28th, 2017 from 2:00 pm to 6:00 pm. A summary 
of the focus group discussion is included below.  
As participants arrived, they were given a name badge and asked to seat themselves. 
There were eight Afghan males present. No names were used in this research and the 
participants were referenced by their professions in Afghanistan.  Their ages ranged from 
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45 to 58. All participants have wives and children, who were born in Afghanistan. Before 
they started working with the US Army in Afghanistan, four of these participants had 
worked on farms and one, a retired sergeant from the military, had worked as a security 
guard for the TPP. Another administrator was an Afghan employee, who had worked 
within the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) in an official capacity. Two of the men were 
teachers. 
These participants came from six Afghan provinces: Farmer One (southern region); 
Farmer Two (southern region); Teacher One (northern region); Teacher Two (southwestern 
region); Farmer Three (northern region); Farmer Four (southern region); plus one security 
guard and one administrator (from central Afghanistan). 
All of these Afghan citizens worked for US Army or American companies in 
Afghanistan, so the US government granted them and their family’s immigrant visas for 
security reasons. Farmer One and Four worked in US military facilities in cafeterias. 
Farmer Two and Three worked as interpreters with International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF).  Teacher One and Two helped the US Army and worked with USAID teams.  A 
security guard worked as a guard for TPP. The Administrator worked at the Afghan 
Ministry of Education (MoE). According to these participants, most of them were still in 
contact with their relatives and family members in Afghanistan on a daily basis. Some of 
them still have brothers and sisters or married sons or daughters there.  
All ethical considerations were carefully read. Participants were told that they did 
not have to participate if they did not wish to do so .  If they did choose to participate, they 
did not have to answer any questions they did not feel comfortable answering, and they 
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could stop the participation at any time. Participants’ identities and their locations, ages, 
genders, occupations, or status of any sort would be protected. The information they gave 
would be used in a report, but their identities would be protected through using 
pseudonyms, coding, and positions to identify participants.  
General Conditions in Afghanistan 
In relating about the living conditions and the situation in general, in Afghanistan, 
these participants relayed many stories and pointed out that the situation was getting worse 
and living conditions were unbearable in Afghanistan for many reasons. The Afghan 
Administrator indicated that the living conditions had been better in the past few years, but 
not now. He stated that people couldn’t afford to buy enough food or drinks because 
everything was becoming expensive.  
Farmer Two mentioned that his family suffered in the winter and he couldn’t afford 
to buy fuel to keep their homes warm. When he had been in Afghanistan, he had three sons 
and one daughter and all of them had been sick because of the severe winter weather in 
2016.  Farmer One said that he had to sleep on the American base, because the security 
situation was dangerous. He added that Taliban militants tracked locals who worked with 
Americans.  
The security guard was also pessimistic about the dangerous situation in 
Afghanistan. He stated that he and his family had survived an assassination attempt, when 
he was shopping in a local market in Kabul. He added that insurgents followed him 
everywhere, and they had tried to lure him with money to work with them and carry out 
terrorist attacks on foreigners.  
91 
 
 
 
Teachers One and Two mentioned that foreign aid agencies were afraid of 
conducting any projects in remote areas because of Taliban and other terrorist groups. In 
October 2013, Teacher Two witnessed the killing of a foreign aid manager, who was 
murdered while he was holding a “Shura” with locals. “Unfortunately, some locals had 
disclosed the meeting time to insurgents, who killed the informant along with other three 
Afghan key leaders,” said Teacher Two.   
Education in Afghanistan 
The school administrator explained that schools opened were often soon closed due 
to violence and lack of security. Foreign aid money for education was distributed unevenly 
between major cities and rural areas. In most of the rural areas with high risk, where schools 
were built, “There is nothing but ghost schools now”, the administrator added.  
Teacher Two said that the education sector in Afghanistan was still suffering and 
that foreign aid had not been effective in improving the Afghan educational infrastructure. 
As he pointed out, he had taught for almost 17 years in different schools and other 
educational institutions throughout Afghanistan.  According to his experience, Teacher 
Two stated that foreign aid had helped Afghan education sector a little, but it still needed 
a great deal of work and funds. He mentioned that he worked in different Afghan provinces, 
where some schools had no infrastructure components such as classrooms, computer labs, 
food courts, playing fields, or medical centers. In September 2013, Teacher Two taught 
students in tents for nine months in Helmand. He added that the US Army and Afghan 
National Army opened these tents and provided him and his colleagues with limited 
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schooling supplies. “Most of the students were absent, plus a few of the teachers.” Teacher 
Two said.  
Teacher One added that foreign aid was not beneficial for Afghans, because most 
of the schools never had any effective tracking system to monitor the performance of 
teachers and students. “The schooling system was more efficient in the 1960s, and Afghan 
universities had welcomed German and French scholars at that time,” Teacher One said. 
He mentioned there had been other challenges that the Afghan education sector faced. 
“There were not enough schools in remote villages, and there was not any reliable 
transportation. This made it difficult for Afghan families to send their children to schools, 
because it was not safe and it was time consuming for both parents and students,” Teacher 
One said. Other challenges were that most elementary school-aged students did not have 
access to schools, ineffective communication between local government and provincial 
government, a shortage of female teachers, and students had to study out of date curricula. 
The Administrator, who had worked with Afghanistan’s Ministry of Education, 
pointed out he observed over the years various conditions with regard to the education 
sector in Afghanistan. He stated that Afghans had suffered thirty years of violence and 
wars, and education in Afghanistan would remain weak without foreign help and long-term 
strategies. The Administrator added that the Afghan education system was very old and 
needed to be updated with new technology and other global educational standards. The 
Afghan government would have to do a better job to implement a tracking system for 
students and staff and protect aid that is earmarked for education. Teacher One commented 
that some Afghan government officials and teachers stole school supplies and the aid 
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allocated to education. He added that teachers received small salaries and most of them had 
more than one job. 
Farmer Three stated that education was better than before, but will remain weak 
without constant foreign funds and better educational policies. Farmer Two added that one 
of his sons was over 20 years old, and he barely knew how to read or write. He said that 
schools lacked good teachers, and most of the teachers had never trained or had college 
degrees. Farmer Four mentioned that the Afghan education sector suffered because there 
were corrupt Afghan officials and key leaders, who accepted bribes publicly. He said that 
locals talked negatively about how these powerful Afghan figures built schools in their 
favorite areas. “There were some teachers who got paid on a monthly basis without 
working because of the nepotism,” Farmer Four added. 
The security guard agreed with that point, and mentioned that the Afghan school 
system was outdated and that teachers were not capable of teaching, because most of them 
were working more than one job. His daughter complained to him that insurgents’ activities 
prevented students from walking back and forth to schools. 
Energy in Afghanistan 
With regard to the subject of energy, conversations during this Shura demonstrated 
that the energy sector was also still suffering and not improving, according to the members 
present. The security guard who lived in Kabul and worked in guarding the TPP mentioned 
that this project had not been in operation for years and years. He had witnessed Afghan 
officials involved in stealing some of the plant’s supplies and materials. The Administrator 
added that TPP was a wasteful project and a big example of how Afghan officials and 
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American contractors are corrupt. He said that TPP was not worth the money and effort, 
and he never believed that such a project could cost over 300 million US dollars.   
The Administrator lived in Kabul for a long time, and was familiar with the 
investigations run by SIGAR. He added that Afghan officials had never been honest in 
talking to Afghan citizens about how USAID was corrupt. “Afghan officials hesitated to 
tell the truth, because that would hurt the reputation of USAID and could cause the potential 
loss of projects in the future,” the Administrator stated.  
Farmer One indicated that TPP was a completely failed project, and the money 
would be better used to build small hydraulic power systems. He added that the energy 
infrastructure is not great as Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS or the Afghan utility 
agency) had talked about in the news. He said that his son had worked as a interpreter 
helping the utility company with communications with USAID. His son said that Afghan 
officials had been forced by USAID not to talk about any negative news publicly, otherwise 
they would eventually lose the funds. 
Teacher Two said that the energy sector was not improving in his town. He 
indicated that his family spent several years without any electricity or fuel resources. 
“Afghan officials were corrupt and informal leaders, called the shadow government16, 
played a major role in who was getting public services or not,” he stated.  He added that 
                                                                
16 Informal leaders are usually the war lords (the Mujahedeen) or Taliban, and are called the Shadow 
Government by local Afghans. It has been used for holy men (Imams) or can be local mayors (Mukhtars). 
They all influence the people in some manner.   
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people used dry animal dung to heat their homes in the cold weather and that the smoke 
was unhealthy to breathe.  
Teacher One said that the energy sector was struggling with many technical and 
operational problems such as no regular maintenance for energy plants, interrupted 
electricity, and unskilled technicians. He added that Afghan locals were still facing other 
energy related challenges or a lack of funding, theft of materials from power plants, dark 
streets,  unreliable power for pumping water from dams, expensive fuel, and a scarcity of 
energy resources. 
Data from Official Reports: USAID 
This section contains information from numerous reports from USAID, the media, 
scholars, and SIGAR concerning both education aid and energy with a focus on the 
Tarakhil Power Plant.  
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Figure 4.2: USAID spending per sector in Afghanistan, 2014-2016 
 
USAID “Dollars to Results Report”. 
https://results.usaid.gov/results/country/afghanistan 
For the three years documented in the table above, energy is by far the highest 
funded of the three, the other two being basic education and post-secondary education. 
Basic education funding decreased over the three-year period between 2014 and 2016, 
while post-secondary education funding increased, according to the “Dollars to Results” 
information from USAID.  
As explained in the “Notes to Data” file, these are the only years for which such 
data is available. It is considered a snapshot and represents only what was spent in a fiscal 
year in different sectors, but the figures showing the numbers of people served by that 
funding is unavailable. Therefore, information on the outcomes and success of the funding 
is not available from USAID. In other words, for the purposes of this dissertation study it 
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cannot be known exactly how the money was spent or the specific results. USAID spending 
in Afghanistan, especially in the highest category of “Government and Civil Society,” 
remains secret as much of it is classified.  
This quote from the data notes explains it further: 
“Due to the nature of foreign assistance programs, it can be difficult to link FY 
disbursements directly to FY results. There is often a time lag between the 
disbursement of a dollar and when a result is achieved from that investment. For 
example, if USAID builds a school, most of the spending takes place in the first 
several years of the project as construction begins. However, results may not be 
achieved until years later when the school opens and classes begin. The results 
shown for each mission are not comprehensive of all achievements through foreign 
assistance in any given country. Results shown on the website give a snapshot of 
the type of results achieved by USAID. The website is not a comprehensive 
reporting tool and should not be considered as such.”17 
 
This dissertation study covers from 2001 to 2017. It was not until 2014 that 
transparency and accountability became part of USAID’s dialogue. USAID’s commitment 
to transparency is evident in the following statement: “USAID is committed to upholding 
the values of transparency, open government, participation, and collaboration in tangible 
ways that benefit the American people.”18 However, transparency is not easy. Macdonald 
(2014) states that “One of the common deficiencies of many initial open data portal efforts 
is that they might provide extensive data files and tools for filtering and visualization, but 
they don’t necessarily go the “extra mile” by ensuring that data and data context are useful, 
available, and meaningful.”19 The data chosen to illustrate education efforts here meant to 
                                                                
17 Part of USAID’s open data policy. USAID Data Notes https://results.usaid.gov/NotesforDataUser.pdf. 
18 https://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/progress-data/transparency.  
19 https://dennis-mcdonald-58qa.squarespace.com/managing-technology/usaids-evolving-open-data-
culture.html 
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make meaning out of what was available through raw data. It is not possible at this time to 
put a dollar amount or cost per individual in any one project, which may be the subject of 
future studies.  .  
Education aid funding is a large part of USAID funding efforts. The following are 
the definitions used by USAID for the agency’s general funding education missions for 
education: 
Basic Education:  
“Improve early childhood education, primary education, and secondary education, 
delivered in formal or non-formal settings. It includes literacy, numeracy, and other 
basic skills programs for youth and adults.” 
 
Post-Secondary Education or Higher Education:  
“Improve the quality, contributions and accessibility of higher education. Higher 
education includes but is not limited to: teaching; training; curricula; degree 
programs; pedagogy; research; policy analysis and participation in policy 
development; workforce development; second chance learning opportunities; skills 
certification programs; community service; extension; applied technology; 
professional development; exchange programs; institutional linkages; program 
linkages; institutional governance; financial planning; administration; 
management; and policy that is developed, conducted, and/or implemented by 
universities, colleges, community colleges, upper secondary schools, public and 
private technical and vocational training institutions, public and privately led skills 
development programs, teacher training colleges and institutes, research institutes, 
and/or relevant ministries. This program area places a special emphasis on ensuring 
equitable access to tertiary education and workforce development programs, 
especially for youth from lower income and marginalized groups including girls 
and young women and students with disabilities.”20  
The information displayed graphically here demonstrates that USAID spends 
different amounts each year and serves different numbers of individuals each year. 
                                                                
20 From USAID’s online database in the “Notes for Data User” section. Retrieved Oct. 15, 2017. 
https://results.usaid.gov/NotesforDataUser.pdf   
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Although a grand total of dollars allocated for Basic Education 112 category is obtainable 
each year (2014 to 2016) the numbers of programs funded through that dollar amount is 
not stated.  
Figure 4.3: USAID Training numbers in Education 2014-2016 
USAID “Dollars to Results Report”. https://results.usaid.gov/results/country/afghanistan 
The above table illustrates the numbers of individuals trained in basic education by 
USAID funding for the years 2014-2016. This category is called Basic Education 112. It 
includes primary learners who attend schools where books and materials were provided by 
USAID. The disbursement amounts listed for Basic Education in Afghanistan for 2015 
were US dollars $71,770,663 and US dollars $49,047,817 in 2016.  
There were no school administrators and officials trained in 2016. There were more 
teachers trained in 2015 than either 2014 or 2015. Yet the education sector funding for 
USAID was the most for Basic Education in 2014. USAID numbers for training teachers, 
and school administrators for the years 2014-2016 show variances. In 2014, 10,354 
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administrators and officials and 72,211 teachers were trained. In 2015, with the largest 
numbers of the three years, 17,880 administrators and 156,179 teachers were trained. In 
2016, there were zero administrators trained and 81,635 teachers.21 As will be 
demonstrated in other parts of this dissertation as well by analysis of the reports, education 
projects tend to be disproportionately focused on administrators, consultants, and officials 
involved who earn high salaries, whereas the Afghan teachers and school administrators 
are often given far fewer benefits and compensations.  The number of higher education 
partnerships between the US and Afghanistan’s higher education institutions that addressed 
development needs were five in 2015 and 14 in 2016, respectively. The workforce training 
program was part of an effort to train adults in public finance management and anti-
corruption classes, and was implemented through Afghanistan’s Higher Education system.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
21  https://results.usaid.gov/results/country/afghanistan?fiscalYear=2016.. Data for all the 
nations served by USAID are included.  
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Figure 4.4: Individuals trained by USAID in workforce development 
USAID “Dollars to Results Report”. https://results.usaid.gov/results/country/afghanistan 
The number of individuals in workforce development programs influences human 
capital in Afghanistan. However, the overall numbers are quite low.  For the preparation 
of government officials, USAID data indicated that the number of government officials 
trained in public financial management in 2016 was 150, and the number of government 
officials that received anti-corruption training in 2014 was 287. This does indicate an 
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awareness by USAID of corruption and mismanagement. Another part of this program was 
to develop civil service employees to be more civic minded in their jobs through training 
funded by USAID. The number of Afghan people who completed assisted civic education 
programs in 2014 was 302,548. This data is an indicator of human capital development 
funded by USAID.  
The following USAID reports have been selected because they directly apply to the 
analysis in this dissertation study. Most of the evaluation reports are publicly available via 
USAID’s Development Clearinghouse.22 Two reports are on education.  
 Education – Basic Education and Teacher Training 
This report is a mid-term evaluation of a large-scale teacher training USAID funded 
mission called BESST (Building Education Support Systems for Teachers) in Afghanistan. 
This report reflects on the problems in the implementation of this teacher training program 
due to many factors, some of which include poor communication with Afghan officials, 
delays in completing materials, and the existence of materials that do not match the needs 
of the teachers and students.  
Education - Higher Education and the Academy for Education Development 
The document examined herein is the “Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's higher education 
project, USAID OIG Audit Report, USAID.” 23 
                                                                
22 https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/home/Default.aspx. 
23 Office of the Inspector General, Regional Inspector General for Audit. Manila (December 4, 2008, 
Document ID: PD-ACS-007). 
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This audit finds serious deficiencies in the implementation of this higher education 
mission to train faculty in Afghanistan. Problems found within the report include poor 
communication with Afghan officials and with university officials, delays in programming, 
and the misreporting of activities. Additionally, this press release relates directly to this 
mission: “USAID Suspends Academy for Educational Development from Receiving New 
US Government Awards” issued in December 2010.24 All aid deliveries were carried out 
by contractors or third parties. For the BESST education project the mid-term evaluation 
was carried out by Cheechi Consulting, Inc., who did not conduct the project and was not 
affiliated with the BESST project. Cheechi is contracted for evaluating and monitoring 
almost every USAID program associated with the government and/or judicial system, but 
typically not for projects involving education. Sayara Strategies, also known as Sayara 
Research and Sayara Media conducts numerous contracts throughout Afghanistan and the 
world and is affiliated with dozens of donor agencies and governments, including the 
Afghan government, military, and police. 
In the sphere of education, the Academy for Educational Development (AED), a 
non-profit organization headquartered in Washington D.C., was shut down in 2011 because 
in part of the $38-million-dollar Higher Education Project (HEP) shown in this report. The 
Inspector General’s Final Audit Report found egregious oversights in AED’s 
administration, including a lack of evaluation, poor planning, poor communication, lack of 
                                                                
24 USAID Press Office, December 8, 2010. https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/usaid-
suspends-academy-educational-development-receiving-new-us.  
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sustainability, lack of stability in staffing, mismanagement of funds, not meeting of the 
criteria for programming, dissatisfied faculty, and overall lack of integrity.   
In December 2010, USAID issued the press release “USAID Suspends Academy 
for Educational Development from Receiving New US Government Awards” for findings 
from the Inspector General that “reveal evidence of serious corporate misconduct, 
mismanagement, and a lack of internal controls, and raise serious concerns of corporate 
integrity.”25 By June 2011 AED no longer existed and was forced to pay millions in 
settlements to the US government for mismanagement of funds in projects in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan.  
Other USAID Data Reports  
The following USAID reports have been selected because they directly apply to the 
analysis in this dissertation study. Most of the evaluation reports are publicly available via 
USAID’s Development Clearinghouse.26 Two reports are on energy and two are on 
education. There is a table (4.1) following the reports revealing the investigation of these 
four projects and the outcomes.   
1) Energy – Tarakhil Power Plant  
The Tarakhil power plant is important as a case study of the aid directed at the 
energy infrastructure sector in Afghanistan. The first report examined is the “Final report 
from the Office of Inspector General, June 19, 2014,” which includes a memorandum to 
                                                                
25 https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/usaid-suspends-academy-educational-
development-receiving-new-us. 
26 https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/home/Default.aspx. 
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the USAID/Afghanistan Mission Director, William Hammink, from the Afghanistan 
Acting Country Office Director, Randall Ase. Its central focus is “Review of Sustainability 
of Operations at Afghanistan’s Tarakhil Power Plant.”27 This report finds Da Afghanistan 
Breshna Sherkat (DABS - the Afghan government’s utility agency) as being at fault for not 
maintaining the power plant and not using expensive equipment. Also, DABS is cited for 
not making an inventory of supplies. There are many packed containers with equipment 
and supplies, but no inventory, according to the report.  
2) Energy - DABS 
The second report examined is “Public campaign evaluation: Da Afghanistan 
Breshna Sherkat : post campaign survey report, Special Evaluation, Sayara Research,” 
issued by USAID Mission to Afghanistan. 28 The survey data contained in the report is 
useful in understanding the importance of electricity in the lives of the urban and rural 
people of Afghanistan. For many years they have been promised electricity and they still 
do not have it consistently, even in the large cities. The data indicates that many Afghans 
need information in order to understand what electricity options could be available in the 
future.  3) Education – Basic Education and Teacher Training 
This report is a mid-term evaluation of a large-scale teacher training USAID funded 
mission called BESST (Building Education Support Systems for Teachers) in Afghanistan. 
                                                                
27 Report No. F-306-14-002-S. 
28 USAID Mission to Afghanistan on 27 January 2015. Document ID: PA-00K-BDG 
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This report reflects on the problems in the implementation of this teacher training program 
due to many factors, some of which include poor communication with Afghan officials, 
delays in completing materials, and the existence of materials that do not match the needs 
of the teachers and students.  
4) Education - Higher Education and the Academy for Education Development 
The document examined herein is the “Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's higher 
education project, USAID OIG Audit Report, USAID,” issued by the Office of the 
Inspector General, Regional Inspector General for Audit, Manila.29 This audit is finds 
serious deficiencies in the implementation of this higher education mission to train faculty 
in Afghanistan. Problems that the report found include poor communication with Afghan 
officials and with university officials, delays in programming, and the misreporting of 
activities. Additionally, this press release relates directly to this mission: USAID Suspends 
Academy for Educational Development from Receiving New US Government Awards 
issued in December 2010.30  
Below is a table with the details from the four reports examined below. All four of 
the projects were funded by USAID. The figures are for monetary amounts in US dollars. 
(m=millions.) 
 
 
                                                                
29 December 4, 2008, Document ID: PD-ACS-007. 
30 December 8, 2010, USAID Press Office, https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/usaid-
suspends-academy-educational-development-receiving-new-us  
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Table 4.1 Investigative Data from the four projects listed above 
Reporting 
Agency 
Type/Da
te 
 
Title Sector/Target 
Population 
Keywords Recommendati
ons 
 
Cost 
OIG/Afghanis
tan 
Final 
Review 
June 19, 
2014 
Review of 
DABS & 
TPP 
Energy/Kabul Failure 
No outputs 
Lack of 
maintenance, 
inventory 
Re-training 
Alternative 
fuels 
Revised 
planning 
TPP 
355 m 
Sayara 
Strategies 
Cooperative 
Agreement 
Post-
Campaig
n Survey 
Report 
January 
20, 2015 
DABS 
Survey 
Energy/Nation 
Random 
Selection 
Lack of 
awareness 
Stealing 
electricity 
Little 
improvement 
More radio, cell 
phone, rural 
outreach 
More education 
about dangers 
of illegal 
electricity 
Surve
y 
1.8m 
Cheechi 
Consulting 
Mid-
Term 
Evaluati
on 
May 25, 
2009 
 
BESST 
Building 
Education 
Support 
Systems 
for 
   Teachers 
Education/Basi
c 
Education/Teac
her Training  
Largely rural 
population 
Too many 
organization
s 
Lack of fair 
pay 
Top-heavy 
Textbooks 
unfinished 
More 
communication 
with teachers 
More fair 
treatment of 
teachers 
Caution with 
overpaying 
consultants 
BESS
T 
100m 
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Dissatisfacti
on 
OIG/USAID Audit 
Final 
Report 
Decemb
er 4, 
2008 
Academy 
for 
Education 
Developme
nt (AED) 
Higher 
Education 
Program 
(HEP) 
Education/High
er 
Education/Facu
lty Training at 4 
year colleges 
throughout 
nation 
Failure 
No 
sustainability 
No proper 
planning 
Lack of 
communicati
on 
Need stable 
staff 
Need internal 
evaluations & 
reporting 
Need plan for 
after project 
ends 
38m 
USAID Office of Investigator General, Washington D.C., 
https://oig.usaid.gov/auditandspecialbyyear 
SIGAR Audit Conclusions 
Education: The Office of the Special Inspector General of Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR) conducted many audits and investigations concerning USAID’s 
education and energy funding projects. Audit results for education funding showed that 
USAID had complied with all rules and regulations concerning goals of expended money 
on projects and the employment of for-profit contractors to accomplish the projects. Any 
subsequent failures were not due to faulty construction or within parameters of goals for 
the funding agency.  Due diligence was exercised in the pre-construction reports on the 
number and locations of schools needed.  Other considerations of security, weather, roads, 
and local corruption were out of the scope of control for USAID. For the liability of any 
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corruption by contractors, SIGAR found several incidents and prosecution followed. 
Further allegations continued and a response to the SIGAR Inquire letter31, from USAID 
to SIGAR dated June 30, 2015 stated: “the Afghan media reports …are not accurate,” and 
“there is no specific evidence or allegation … that US assistance funds have been 
misappropriated, and we remain confident that education programs are among our most 
successful programs in Afghanistan.” 
Energy: A June 2014 USAID OIG review of the Tarakhil Power Plant found the 
plant to be severely underused, operating at just 2.2% of installed capacity, which USAID 
OIG attributed in part to the plant’s high operating cost—particularly the high cost of diesel 
fuel. In response to the OIG report and the accompanying recommendations, USAID stated 
that it had either already initiated, or would initiate, remedial measures to help the Afghan 
government and DABS (the national power utility) operate the plant on a more regular 
basis. USAID stated that all corrective measures would be implemented no later than 
December 31, 2014. 
SIGAR Inquiry Letter 15-65-SP: Tarakhil Power Plant 
SIGAR wrote to USAID to inquire about the Afghan government’s willingness and 
ability to operate the Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP) and to better understand actions 
undertaken to ensure the sustainability of the plant’s operation and maintenance. USAID 
replied that TPP was operating, provided energy output figures, and said the plant proved 
                                                                
31 SIGAR Inquiry Letter 15-62-SP to USAID: Afghanistan Education Data. 
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to be a vital component of Afghanistan’s northern energy grid. SIGAR’s analysis is 
ongoing.  
Allegations concerning the TPP led to initial investigations32 and audits. The 
quoted response from USAID states on June 26, 2015, “The agency has, “no indication 
that the Afghan power utility, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), failed to operate 
Tarakhil as was alleged in your letter.” SIGAR replied that “SIGAR will continue to 
monitor developments at the Tarakhil Power Plant to see if over time the Afghan 
government is able to better utilize this significant expenditure of US taxpayer funds.” 
SIGAR issued a report letter33 on August 7, 2015, from Donald L. “Larry” Sampler, 
Assistant Administrator for Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs to USAID, containing the 
following: 
“This letter provides the results of our analysis of the information provided by your 
office in response to our questions. Unfortunately, despite apparently being a “vital 
component” of the electrical grid serving Kabul, it appears that that this $335 
million power plant continues to be severely underutilized. In particular, data 
provided by your office and by Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS) show that 
the Tarakhil Power Plant continues to operate at only a fraction of its power 
production capacity. As you recall, the USAID Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
found previously that between July 2010 and December 2013, the plant only 
produced about 63,000 megawatt hours of power, just 2.2 percent of its production 
capacity during that period.2 Our analysis of the more recent data provided by your 
office shows that the rate of power production has actually declined over time. 
Specifically, from February 2014 through April 2015, the plant exported just 8,846 
megawatt hours of power to the Kabul grid, which is less than one percent of 
Tarakhil’s production capacity during that period…….  
In addition to running far below its full capacity, the plant contributes a 
relatively small amount of electricity to the power grid serving Kabul. From 
February 2014 through April 2015, the Tarakhil Power Plant produced only 0.34 
percent of the total power on the Kabul grid. Figure 1 shows the percentage of 
                                                                
32 SIGAR Inquiry Letter 15-65-SP to USAID, concerning TPP efficiency. 
33 SIGAR Inquiry Letter 15-80-65=SP. 
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power on the Kabul grid derived from the Tarakhil power plant compared to the 
total amount of power on the grid from all sources. 
Your response characterized the plant as a “means of providing insurance 
against disruption of power supplies from Central Asia and as backup during peak 
demand.” However, that characterization is contradicted by other information 
obtained by my office. For instance, the USAID contractor hired to evaluate 
alternative fuel supplies for the power plant stated that, “the TPP (Tarakhil Power 
Plant) was designed as a base load plant, operating 24 hours/day. 7 days/week, but 
was being operated to support peak loading only.” USAID OIG also noted that “the 
plant was also not used regularly… and therefore was not increasing Kabul’s power 
supply to help reduce its energy deficit… as intended.” and , “the plant is not 
regularly contributing additional electricity to increase the power supply in the 
Kabul area as envisioned.”  These statements strongly suggest that, rather than 
“providing insurance against disruption”, the Tarakhil Power Plant was originally 
intended to provide electrical power to Kabul on a continuous basis. 
  In fact, according to the USAID, OIG, the use of the Tarakhil Power Plant 
only on an intermittent basis caused damage to the plant. USAID OIG observed 
that “operating on an intermittent- rather than a continuous- basis has resulted in 
more frequent starts and stops- which place greater wear and tear on the engines 
and electrical components.” This underutilization of the plant has apparently 
already resulted in the premature failure of equipment, which is expected to raise 
already high operation and maintenance costs, and could result in a “catastrophic” 
failure. This information also supports the conclusion that the Tarakhil Power Plant 
was intended to operate on a continuous basis.”   
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Figure 4.5: SIGAR’s findings on TPP output, 8/7/15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIGAR Inquiry Letter 15-80-65 
 Other Research on USAID Aid to Afghanistan: 
O’Brien (2017) outlines the progress of contracting with other aid agencies to do 
work in Afghanistan, thus distancing USAID from on the ground involvement and 
accountability. O’Brien states that while the main purpose of the Afghanistan 
reconstruction aid had been to stabilize the war-torn nation, the Bush administration had 
also sought to utilize USAID to advance US security and political objectives. This had 
presented significant challenges for the Agency, O’Brien argues, and had forced USAID 
to look to NGOs, such as AED and IRD, in order to implement major programs by 
awarding cooperative agreements. However, as O’Brien has posited, what is very 
important is that after awarding these cooperative agreements, USAID failed to participate 
substantially in the programs.  
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USAID's consistent disregard for its "operational policy," which is contained in the 
ADS, contributed to the projects' failure to meet critical objectives and the mismanagement 
of millions of dollars, the report states. In response to growing pressure from the OIG, 
SIGAR, Congress, and the media calling for "accountability," USAID had suspended two 
of its largest implementing partners, in an improper fashion. To prevent these problems in 
the future, agencies would need to be held to government-wide regulations with the force 
and effect of law, according to O’Brien’s analysis (2017: 23). 
In order to find a solution, the O’Brien’s work makes a recommendation, which 
includes amending Title 2 of the US Code of Federal Regulations, in order to better define 
what it means to be “substantially involved” and to created binding legal requirements on 
agencies to remain involved during performance. The ultimate goal is to ensure the proper 
utilization of cooperative agreements by all federal agencies (2017:11). 
 Corneille (2001)’s work addresses accountability for aid agencies to stakeholders, 
especially when they are a top down organization. She defines the usages of accountable: 
“The concept of accountability must be introduced and then described within the context 
of development.” Corneille goes on to explain there are different types of accountability. 
Professional accountability is a low degree of control and high degrees of discretion. It is 
a horizontal relationship, because individuals are empowered by the administrator to make 
decisions.  (Corneille, 2001, 2) 
 Hierarchal relationships are closed and the dynamics create high degrees of control 
and scrutiny. Performance is based on obedience to expectations of persons or the 
organization. Finally political accountability comes from external sources with low levels 
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of direct control. (Corneille 2001, 2) USAID as a government agency is held accountable 
to the government and citizens. Other multilateral organizations, like the World Bank, 
answer to their member countries that own and govern them.  Other distinctions between 
national development agencies and multilateral banks is that development agencies follow 
a direct linkage between governmental foreign policy goals and foreign aid. The 
multilateral banks do not reflect any government policy in their programs. (Corneille, 2001, 
3) 
Historical USAID accountability in the past was to its government and the 
American taxpayers to promote US national interests. (Corneille, 2001, 12) These past 
criteria guided USAID operations in Afghanistan. However, this narrow connection for 
accountability was not always viewed by the US Government or USAID as being in 
compliance with government standards and regulations.  
Traditionally, development agencies or aid agencies were top-down and involved 
strict control and thus were closed systems. However, it should be understood that placing 
American systems in other societies won’t work.  “What will work is to address local 
problems and develop indigenous systems.” (Corneille, 2001, 13)) Now agency directives 
require that aid beneficiaries must be “actively consulted in developing, updating, and 
monitoring strategic plans, and involved in monitoring performance.” Thus there are two 
major types of stakeholders, or the sponsoring government and the indigenous beneficiaries 
of the aid. Sustainability of projects depend on both stakeholders, and so all must 
participate in the process. Participation in projects by indigenous stakeholders will 
strengthening their commitment, due to involvement also creates new opportunities for 
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developing nations or LDCs to express their views and influence the programs that affect 
their lives. Therefore aid programs delivery become accountable to both stakeholders. 
(Corneille, 2001, 3) 
Yet it is unclear on how policy is to proceed. Diane La Voy, former Senior Policy 
Advisor for Participatory Development at USAID, described the relationship with 
stakeholders as a statistical Venn diagrams in which USAID tries to “find the biggest 
amount of overlap – the most honorable and feasible space” between the goals of the 
agency and its counterparts. (Corneille, 2001, 14)  Also how are successes measured? 
USAID’s operating units were required to prepare a Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP), 
a management technique of the private sector. (Corneille, 2001, 15)  
Problems arise when performance indicators to measure results do not always 
capture qualitative values such as empowerment, learning, inclusion, partnership, and 
ownership.  Furthermore, when priorities clash between aid agencies and their 
stakeholders, it is the agency and their own government they will consider first. Trying to 
maintain some kind of balance in working with government controls is “almost more 
challenging than working with the Congress.” (Corneille, 2001, 15) 
The indigenous stakeholders must be considered as paramount because the 
sustainability of the project depends on them. They are the touted reason for the efforts in 
the first place. Ownership of projects creates change that occurs from the bottom up, and 
it is these indigenous stakeholders that will benefit or suffer. Their future beliefs may derive 
from the results of their relationships with USAID as a representative of the US 
government politically, socially, and economically.   
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 For USAID, the most important stakeholder through accountability is the US 
government as they have the power to cut funding, and so USAID has to comply with 
broader agency goals.  Therefore, new indigenous partners formally may have less power 
to influence development programming. (Corneille, 2001, 15) 
Individual Reports on Failures of USAID Projects 
To accomplish education goals in Afghanistan, USAID funded the Academy for 
Educational Development (AED) in Afghanistan under a cooperative agreement, which 
was essentially for-profit contractors. The Academy for Educational Development (AED), 
once a non-profit global development agency with hundreds of millions of dollars in 
funding, mostly from the US government, was audited in 2009 for its work in education 
and shortly thereafter controversy ensued (O’Brien 2017). AED had overpaid its 
executives, did not complete or even implement projects or programs, overcharged 
USAID, and generally mismanaged funds, and it was dismantled in 2011. In O’Brien’s 
(2017) article the focus is on the culpability of USAID in allegations of fraud, waste, and 
failure, and AED’s mismanagement of over $ 38 million US dollars is addressed. O’Brien, 
a lawyer, investigated USAID’s responsibility for such waste, fraud, and failure in 
Afghanistan. Cooperative agreements ask contractors and consultants to follow the 
protocols of reporting and assessment. When they do not follow procedures, it is difficult 
to hold them accountable. However in some cases, such as with AED, they can be shut 
down.  
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Pratap Chatterjee, a journalist for CorpWatch34 wrote the following in an article 
entitled “Black and Veatch's Tarakhil Power Plant: White Elephant in Kabul” (2009): 
“Two weeks before the August 20 vote, at an opening ceremony for the unfinished plant, 
Karzai stood beside Karl Eikenberry, the current US ambassador, who told the assembled 
media: ‘I would ask the citizens of Kabul when you turn on your lights at night, remember 
that the United States of America stands with you – optimistic of our combined prospects 
for success, and confident in you and our mission.’ But not much went according to plan. 
The $280 million-a-year cost to run the power plant at full capacity was more than a third 
of total tax revenues for the entire country; the plant would supply electricity to less than 
two percent of the population; and the plant's cost – already more than $300 million – was 
roughly three times that of any similar plant in the region” (Chatterjee, 2009). 
Media Reports of USAID Projects 
This dissertation examines the details of U.S .government spending in the 
Afghanistan reconstruction process, and media reports are an important part of that 
analysis. The media plays a major role in reporting on aid projects, and thus has watchdog 
status when it comes to government spending. The money spent by USAID in Afghanistan 
is US taxpayer money. The public has a right to know why there has been so much waste.  
Anne Simmons in her article in the Los Angeles Times, entitled: “US foreign aid: 
A waste of money or a boost to world stability? Here are the facts” (May 10, 2017) quotes 
from the 2014 SIGAR report. Afghanistan is a fragile state, she argues, maybe even a failed 
                                                                
34 CorpWatch is a global nonprofit promoter of human rights based in San Francisco.  
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one. “Perhaps the largest reason is corruption,” James M. Roberts, a research fellow at the 
Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank that has called for a scaling back of USAID 
funding, wrote in 2014 “It’s the ‘pre-existing condition’ that keeps many aid recipients 
from ever recovering. It’s a major obstacle to economic growth” (as quoted in Simmons 
2017). Another often quoted statement is the 2014 report from the office of special 
inspector general, John Sopko, for Afghanistan reconstruction is: “evidence strongly 
suggests that Afghanistan lacks the capacity — financial, technical, managerial or 
otherwise — to maintain, support and execute much of what has been built or established 
during more than a decade of international assistance" (Ibid). How could so much money 
be spent with so little progress? The media asks this question for the American taxpayer, 
but it is also the lived experience of myself as an HTS social scientist and the people of 
Afghanistan.  
Aikens in an article in The New Yorker, “The Bidding War How a young Afghan 
military contractor became spectacularly rich” (March 7, 2016) calls the US government’s 
spending in Afghanistan self-defeating. Self-defeating, but also, it can be added, 
devastating for the Afghan people. Aikens quotes General Petraeus, who wrote in 2008: 
“Employ money as a weapons system. Money can be ‘ammunition.” Aikens continues: 
“The result was a war waged as much by for-profit companies as by the military. Political 
debate in Washington has focused on the number of troops deployed in Afghanistan and 
the losses that they have sustained. To minimize casualties, the military outsourced any 
task that it could: maintenance, cooking and laundry, overland logistics, even security. 
Since 2007, there have regularly been more contractors than US forces in Afghanistan; 
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today, they outnumber them three to one” (Aikens, 2016). From the multiple official audits, 
investigations and the scholarly and media reports, it becomes clear that the TPP is a failed 
project. However, the liability for its failure will be addressed in the next chapter through 
data analysis.  
            All aid deliveries were carried out by contractors or third-parties and in the case of 
the DABS energy survey35, the survey and the post-survey analysis were carried out by the 
same contractor. The cost column in the above table indicates the cost of the project itself. 
In the case of TPP/DABS, the cost of the construction of TPP was $355 million USD, but 
reports of $245 million a year just to purchase diesel fuel to run at capacity exist. TPP has 
not been operating at capacity. Although DABS took over TPP in 2010, USAID continued 
to provide aid. DABS has failed to operate the plant above 3% capacity, therefore leaving 
97% of its capacity unused.  
Eyewitness Account by Abdullah Bataineh from HTS Research  
The impact of three decades of conflict have devastated Afghanistan’s physical 
infrastructures, institutions, and people bringing hardships and traumas to many locals. As 
the impetus for this dissertation research study, my first-hand experiences working in 
Helmand Province, Afghanistan for the US Army reveal insights into the people’s 
experiences. 
                                                                
35 “Public campaign evaluation: Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat : post campaign survey report, Special 
Evaluation, Sayara Research,” (2015) issued by USAID Mission to Afghanistan.  
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             As a Social Scientist, I interviewed dozens of Afghan officials and held several 
Shuras with locals and their key leaders. During these interviews and meetings, I 
documented the experiences of those with education and energy aid delivery problems first 
hand. I saw what a LCD nation like Afghanistan experiences when aid delivery was 
insufficient. I saw a school built by USAID that was damaged from conflict. There were 
only a few students, who still continued to come, but I realized that despite the possible 
danger, the dire look of the building, and the lack of supplies that the students braved all 
of this for any benefit of education they could receive.  
I experienced discomforts from the lack of available energy, while on missions in 
Afghanistan. I took statements from those who lived with the reality of no available energy, 
and their descriptions of cold, isolation, and no cooking fuel. I learned that aid delivery 
from USAID was diverted to the large projects, specifically the TPP, rather than helping 
with smaller beneficial projects. In Kabul, I heard official statements at a USAID 
conference addressing questions about the validity of USAID aid on the workings of TPP 
and the exaggerated benefits of schools built.  
From a political science viewpoint, the locals and their leaders often were 
politically powerless because of the Taliban’s stronghold. The Taliban run what is called a 
shadow government, where they control certain areas and use violence and threats of 
violence to limit the power of the legitimate government agents.  
As part of my duties as a social scientist with the US Army’s Human Terrain 
System, I had the opportunity to interview local Afghans, their key leaders, officials, aid 
workers, experts, and other military personnel from both US and the Government of 
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Afghanistan. Below I describe a Shura council meeting (a key leader meeting) at a 
compound, a visit to a medical clinic, and then I focus on my account of USAID’s 
involvement.   
My months in Helmand province, an area of Taliban stronghold, gave me the 
chance to witness the poverty and injustice first hand. Basic needs were lacking: there was 
little or no fuel for lighting, cooking, and heating, and limited or no access to education. 
There was limited food sometimes, and a lack of basic medical supplies. In February 2012, 
I conducted a 10-day mission in a semi-permissive area of Nowzad district in Helmand 
province. Face-face field interviews were conducted with a few national government 
officials. I also held a meeting with a Shura council, consisting of 18 members, to help my 
team members identify the perception of key tribal leaders about many important social 
and cultural issues, and to improve relations between locals and the International Security 
Assistance Forces (ISAF). 
  This ten-day mission was designated in support of II MEF (Marines Expeditionary 
Forces) and ISAF’s efforts to improve their understanding of the population’s needs, 
concerns, and aspirations in Nowzad District. During my documented interviews with key 
leaders in the Shura meeting, everyone agreed about the top four major issues: lack of 
security, a poor educational system, no fuel for cooking and heating, and limited or no 
access to health care.  
Most complained about how the Taliban and other insurgents made it difficult for 
the locals to travel or take their children to school. Many of the key leaders stated that lack 
of security forced many locals to leave the district of Nowzad for other villages or other 
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provinces. An older man in his late 60s indicated that the Taliban prevented him and his 
family from traveling outside the district to bring in food and other necessities. He further 
explained that many people had become dependent on the aid organizations and the US 
military to provide basic needs. Another local leader, who worked as a security guard in 
several provinces, revealed the story of an Afghan local soldier and his son, who had been 
abducted and killed by the Taliban. The insurgents killed them for no reason other than to 
send a message to military personnel and other government officials to not support or work 
for the government of Afghanistan, otherwise they would face the same fate as this local 
soldier and his son. The shadow government influences every aspect of life for the Afghan 
people in Helmand province, including education.  
“A poor educational system” was a common complaint in most of the interviews I 
conducted with Afghan locals. In Nowzad, an Imam (Holy man) who spoke good Arabic 
and served for almost 20 years in the province of Helmand, insisted that the Afghan 
educational system was not only traditional, but also suffered from major challenges. When 
I asked him about these challenges, the Imam complained that the lack of furnished schools 
didn’t matter because there was a scarcity of teachers to teach. Most teachers had 
abandoned the district of Nowzad years previous because of the deteriorating security 
situation and low wages. The Imam explained that they only had two teachers who can 
teach all subjects and when they are absent for any reason, the school shuts down. Students 
lack reading and writing skills and are unmotivated to learn. He said, “We keep sending 
complaints to the provincial government about the lack of staff, but we rarely get any 
response.”  
123 
 
 
 
I personally had the opportunity to visit a school in Nowzad district during the 
winter season. The visit was arranged by US marines, who provided a safety guard for the 
Imam, one interpreter, and me. As we entered the school compound, I thought the school 
had been shut down because of the quiet and rubbish all over the place. I noticed a big hole 
in the wall of the main office and most of the windows were broken or without any frames. 
I asked the Imam about the reasons for such damage. He explained that this school 
experienced big clashes between the insurgents and the Afghan National Army (ANA) a 
few months prior. “Unfortunately, the school is only open for a few days during the week, 
but not that many students attend”, the Imam stated. Besides going against education, the 
shadow government also controlled the roads and fuel supplies.  
A major issue addressed during the Shura meeting was the scarcity of fuel for 
cooking and heating. According to the majority of the Shura council members the lack of 
fuel is a major challenge in the Nowzad district, which caused continuous suffering for all 
residents. The Makhtar (local leader) an influential figure in the district, started his speech 
by asking for forgiveness because of the cold room, where we were holding a large key 
leader meeting, while draping a blanket over his shoulder. He directed his speech to my 
team and apologized for meeting us in such a cold room, but “unfortunately, all rooms in 
this governmental compound have no type of heat,” he said. The Makhtar added that it took 
him at least 45 minutes to walk to this meeting, because of the unavailability of 
transportation throughout the district.  
During the meeting, I asked others about their mode of transportation. One key 
leader who had worked as a policeman explained that a local police captain brought him 
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and another Shura council member there because they were afraid of walking in the district. 
This retired policeman said that “if insurgents or anyone affiliated with the Taliban 
observed him walking outside his neighborhood, he would be killed right away.” He added 
“I served in Helmand for years and I know all bad guys and they know me. These insurgents 
tried to kidnap my daughter on more than one occasion. They destroyed my shop and killed 
two of my workmates in the past. I cannot send my kids to school anymore.” 
I remember it was about that time that the Chef entered the room and said loudly 
that the food was ready. Eating Afghan food is a fond memory, one I will never forget 
because I found it delicious. Everyone seemed to enjoy the rice and lamb meat. “Refusing 
to eat local food is viewed as an insult,” exclaimed the Makhtar. Afghans are big-hearted 
people and often invite guests to their homes to share food and smiles. I asked the Pashtu 
interpreter about the way the food was cooked for this meeting. He explained that Chef 
cooked the meal in a wood-fired oven. Using the primus stove that uses kerosene can 
prepare the food quickly for the whole compound, but the chef used the wood oven that 
day because kerosene was unavailable throughout the district due to the dangerous security 
situation. The interpreter added that some key leaders were complaining to the US military 
personnel about the unavailability of fuel for cooking and heating their homes during the 
harsh cold weather. These key leaders also complained about how some of the government 
officials were corrupt and were stealing people’s humanitarian aid.  
The lack of fuel for heating was also noticeable during our visits to a medical center 
that was almost empty during noon time on a Wednesday. All rooms were cold except a 
room for the medical staff, where I noticed two nurses heating their hands around a dusty 
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kerosene heater. With the help from the interpreter, I asked one of the nurses about her 
daily activities in the medical center. She revealed very sad stories about the unavailability 
of medicine and lack of qualified physicians to serve sick people. “I witnessed many kids 
who died because of the pneumonia and we couldn’t help them due to lack of antibiotics,” 
she said.  
Work with USAID 
Three weeks after I arrived in Helmand province, I was called to travel to Kabul to 
attend a military conference and workshop concerning counterinsurgency and courses 
related to the new District Stability Framework. During my three-week mission in Kabul, 
I had the opportunity to attend workshops focused on a variety of topics including USAID’s 
development projects. 
This was my first opportunity to meet with representatives from USAID. The one-
week workshop was presented by USAID aimed to educate ISAF military personnel and 
other contractors about the aid agency’s projects in Afghanistan. USAID’s lecturers were 
very organized and talked a lot about what the aid agency had achieved during the last ten 
years. They presented statistics about the number of schools they had built, the millions of 
students (including girls) attending schools, the number of development projects they had 
achieved throughout 32 Afghan provinces, and the improvements of public services in 
different towns and villages.  
Questions were allowed throughout the lectures. An Afghan administrator, who 
worked for the Afghan Ministry of Education (MoE), asked USAID’s representative if he 
had ever visited any school in Afghanistan. The answer was negative. The Afghan 
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administrator replied by saying that he worked for MoE for almost ten years and worked 
before as a teacher in different schools for another ten years. His views differed from 
USAID’s. This administrator said that it is true that USAID has built hundreds of schools 
in all provinces in Afghanistan, but most of these schools were not functioning for different 
reasons. Some of these schools were abandoned by students and teachers because of 
security threats from insurgents or lack of funding from the government. The unhealthy 
economy negatively impacted on the attendance of students and the performance of 
teachers. Students left the schools to help their family on their farms and teachers worked 
extra jobs because of the living conditions, which were deplorable. The worst thing was 
most of the students that were enrolled in schools did not show up, and teachers were taking 
salaries but not coming to work, he added. He called them ghost schools and ghost teachers.  
Another officer with the rank of major in the Afghan Army criticized USAID and 
its aid projects. He stated that USAID had done a great deal in Afghanistan but, 
unfortunately, not all projects were functioning anymore because of the unavailability of 
the funds, or lack of qualified staff to keep maintain them. The major gave an example of 
how USAID had spent millions of dollars on Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP) and left it to the 
Afghan government, which had no experience in keeping it working or maintaining it. It 
was so sad that these millions of dollars had not been spent on other small projects that 
could benefit residents of Kabul. He added. “I am living in Kabul and I am struggling with 
heating my home in this severe cold weather. Yesterday, my daughter was sick, and I spent 
four hours to find anyone to take her to the hospital because I don’t have a car, and it is 
difficult to find a cheap taxi during the night. After I arrived in the hospital, it was over 
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crowded. Patients and their families were sitting on the cold floors. After I spent five hours 
waiting, the physician told me that I had to wait longer because they were out of medicine 
and were waiting for a nonprofit health organization to deliver it.  
As he directed his speech to the USAID representative, the major said “Please don’t 
take me the wrong way, but USAID is selling propaganda and exaggerating a lot when you 
are saying that you spent billions of dollars on successful development projects. People 
don’t see that and I am one of them. Our schools are shut down or poorly performing, 
streets are dangerous to walk on during the day because of the explosions and during night 
because there are not enough lights. Prices of basic supplies are skyrocketing, hospitals are 
lacking in staff and medicine, and we do not see things getting better because of USAID. 
Please go to the hospital and see how families and physicians are struggling to cure their 
sick people.” 
USAID does not typically send officials out into the field. I had the opportunity as 
an HTS team member to be in the field and participated in about 100 missions in 300 days, 
where I talked, observed, documented, and disseminated information about the conditions 
and concerns of the local people, including Afghan government officials at all levels. I 
think that the problems may stem from a lack of integration of power and control between 
the shadow government and the legitimate government. Most of the key leaders I met 
during my ten months in Afghanistan were deeply frustrated and unaware of how to resolve 
the problems they and their people were facing. And they still face those same problems 
today. In my opinion, until the shadow government leaders are included in diplomatic 
meetings with legitimate leaders, Afghanistan will remain devastated.  
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Conclusions  
The data from the questionnaires, focus group, official reports, and the self-
reflections from the experiences of the writer of this dissertation were gathered to reveal 
the answer to the original research questions about the barriers to funding for Afghanistan’s 
Tarakhil Power Plant and projects to enhance education for modernization in Afghanistan. 
Other information revealed will be the perceptions of those impacted by the projects, and 
what strategies could improve aid delivery and efficacy to Afghanistan. These questions 
are addressed in the next chapter though data analysis, descriptive statistics, and eyewitness 
accounts. The findings will be informed by the theoretical frameworks of modernization 
theory and human capital theory.   
In summary to reiterate, the exact research questions guiding this study are: 
1.  What are the barriers or factors preventing the effective delivery of USAID 
funding 
     in Afghanistan for the project of the Tarakhil Power Plant and in the sphere 
of 
     education? 
2. How are project factors perceived by individual stakeholders, government 
agencies, government watchdogs, the media, and scholars? 
3. If needed, what are some strategies that could improve aid delivery and 
address any lack of efficiency and efficacy of aid in Afghanistan? 
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CHAPTER 5 DATA ANALYSIS  
“Unfortunately, in the nearly five years I’ve been traveling to Afghanistan, I first 
witnessed the United States put in way too much, way too fast. More recently, I’ve 
watched the US remove way too much, way too fast. Policy makers both in Congress 
and the new Trump Administration should take note of this.” 
—Inspector General John Sopko, SIGAR 
Respondent Coding, Themes, and Descriptive Statistics 
Data analysis categories defined respondent data from the twenty questionnaires, 
the Shura focus group, the HTS Eyewitness Account, and the USAID Reports and Related 
Reports. Analyses found meaning in the qualitative data through patterns, frequencies, 
magnitudes, processes, causes, and consequences (Creswell, 2006, 29). The first measures 
were coding of the concepts and themes emphasized by the respondents. Then word counts 
of respondent word choices were accomplished from their narratives to access any cross-
cultural subconscious concerns, which were revealed and compared with coded themes. 
The coding interpretive technique provided ways to organize and interpret the data. 
Coding for this research began with transcribing and reading each questionnaire and all the 
notes made from the focus group. The next step was to organize key concepts into two 
categories: Energy and Education. Then clusters of themes were derived within each 
category and common comments linked to those theme clusters. The data sorting from the 
qualitative research included theme building, as outlined below, based on this clustering. 
This process was modified from several sources, including exercises in how to write a 
research paper, and adapted from conceptual mapping found in Ryan Gery and Bernard 
(2017) and Denzin (1997). The themes were derived from the original data collected for 
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this dissertation and presented in Chapter 4. The charts of systematic thematic data counts 
and word counts are located in Appendix F. 
These themes demonstrated related concepts, categories, and key words found in 
the data. This organization helped to signify what was important in the perceptions of those 
questioned. First the thematic concepts were sorted as purposeful thoughts shared by 
respondents. Then a word count for relevant and multiple occurrences were counted to 
understand underlying thought paradigms (Johnson and Waterfield, 2004, 21). These two 
types of analyses were important in shaping the analysis for an interpretive approach. The 
open-ended questionnaire questions allowed respondents to convey their own concepts and 
make their own interpretations. Some of the respondents answered with more lengthy 
responses, while others kept answers shorter. Some added information and others did not 
answer some questions. The majority had familiarity with TPP and had an opinion about 
aid for education, even if their work did not involve education directly.   
Table 5.1: Thematic Conditions Concerning Energy Projects, and specifically the  
       TPP.  Data Obtained through 20 Questionnaires and the Focus Group  
       Interviews.  There were no positive themes to record.   
 
Themes and 
Conditions 
 Comments 
Insufficiency ● Not enough workers, locals not used enough 
● Lack of understanding for locals and their culture  
● Poor quality of materials 
● Unreasonable time tables 
131 
 
 
 
● Poor safety measures on project 
● Poor security 
● No trust between Afghans and non-Afghans 
● Lack of access to water supply 
● Low energy production upon completion of project 
● Not enough fuel for plant, due to cost and security issues 
● Not enough electrical grid systems 
● No replacement parts 
● No waste management or oversight 
● No system in place for sustainable operations, post-
funding and post-construction 
Lack of Training ● Little or no training for Operational, Mechanical, and 
Technical Problems with locals during construction 
● No regular maintenance training 
● No training in place for sustainable operations post-
funding and post-construction 
● No accountability mechanisms or training for Afghans 
Poor 
Communication 
● Top down implementation of project 
● Lack of language skills between contractors and workers 
and locals 
132 
 
 
 
● Lack of coordination, communication, and cooperation 
(USAID, Afghan officials, and local people) 
● Shadow government (unofficial leaders) not consulted 
● Hydraulic power more beneficial, plenty of rivers 
● No Emergency Plan 
● No communication or coordination with international 
donors  
● No media coverage for locals to understand project 
● NGOs, who could have helped, were left out of 
communications and partnerships 
Corruption and 
Theft 
● Corrupt Afghan officials and contractors  
● No tracking, audit, or accountability system 
● Shadow government (informal leaders) intrusions 
● Nepotism 
● High costs for materials used only one time 
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Figure 5.1: Descriptive Statistical Graph of Energy Themes 
 
Original Descriptive Statistics from Respondent Data 
Discussion on Energy Themes:  
A common consensus was a lack of energy infrastructure in the rural areas, and 
except for the wealthy and elite, consistent energy accessibility was not complete in urban 
areas. Most respondents complained about the lack of fuel for heating and cooking, and 
about transportation issues as there was no gas available for cars. The TPP project was not 
operational, or was barely functioning for years. Most respondents simply perceived the 
335 million US dollars spent as ineffective and a shameful waste of money and time. 
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Table 5.2: Thematic Conditions Concerning Education Funding Efforts. Obtained  
                   through 20 Questionnaires and the Focus Group Interviews.  
      Positive themes are in italics. 
 
Condition Comments 
Aid Efficacy ● Education is better with aid, even if results are minimal 
● Education aid focused on female education 
● Vo-tech education highly valuable. Several programs for 
women to support themselves or help others.  
● Some higher education and training offered in anti-
corruption and civil duties. Only a few attended.  
● Other International Donors of Educational Aid was 
available if coordinated 
● Many schools were built 
● Education aid was not enough nor sustainable 
● Education is outdated 
● Education is still sub-standard  
● NGOs, who could have helped, were left out of 
communications and partnerships 
Urban Bias ● Education is better in large cities 
● Rural areas suffer high illiteracy rates, which contributes to 
an insurgency 
Challenges ● Support and desire for education by locals was documented 
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● Not enough or poor training for administrators 
● Not enough or poor training for teachers 
● Lack of financial, organizational, or public support from 
GIRoA 
● Lack of financial, organizational, or public support from 
religious leaders 
● Lack of financial, organizational, or public support from 
local officials 
● Lack of financial, organizational, or public support from 
local unofficial leaders   
● Corruption of contractors and Afghans at all levels 
● Poor management and planning for logistics 
● Some girls were not allowed to attend by their parents 
● No training options for aged youth 
Lack of 
Resources 
● Due to lack of heat, transportation, and teachers, school 
buildings created by aid funding are empty or used for other 
purposes. (Ghost schools) 
● Not enough supplies, textbooks, technology, health care, or 
food for lunches.  
● No sports programs or equipment 
● Teachers were not qualified 
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Communication ● HTS did a good job of cultural integration reports 
● HTS either failed to make reports, or their reports were not 
accepted. Therefore, HTS was not effective for cultural 
understandings. 
● Due to lack of communication and information, parents 
would not send their children to school 
● Needed media information, support, and education about 
education aid projects. Public unaware.  
● Language barriers with text books 
● No understanding of the cultural needs in education.  
● Top down approach is impractical  
Security ● Locals are not happy about the lack of security and they 
want the US to help 
● Due to lack of security, school buildings created from aid 
are empty or used for other purposes. (Ghost schools) 
● Taliban and insurgents are threats to roads and schools 
● Girls were targeted and harmed 
● Insurgents most active in rural areas 
● No training options for aged youth, which contributes to 
insurgency 
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Figure 5.2: Descriptive Statistical Graph of Education Themes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Original Descriptive Statistics from Respondent Data Themes 
Discussion on Education Themes  
Overall, there is a consensus among the respondents that although many schools 
have been built, most in rural areas no longer function as schools. Some are shut down or 
destroyed; others are used by Afghan military or security, or by insurgents for outposts. 
Three respondents mentioned ghost schools. Ghost schools were defined by respondents 
as school building no longer in use. Some continued to get funding for the local province 
for teachers and supplies, but few or none of these schools actually operated for the 
intended purpose. This was a form of corruption and criminality that has been hard to 
control, especially when the local officials were involved. The respondents said that 
education improved over the last 16 years for many Afghans, but access to schooling for 
elementary aged students in rural areas remained very difficult, especially as the Taliban 
increased their strongholds. 
05
1015
1
Education Issues 
No training Not enough training Schools shut downLack of resources Lack of books Few teachersInsurgent threats Few female students Ghost schoolsLack of security Gov't incompetence Many suffering
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Planning and implementation for different types of education program had 
shortcomings as well. Aged youth had no education to obtain jobs, and the insurgents 
offered to pay youth a living and support for their families. To combat this, vocational 
education would have been paramount to building human capital, but the funding went into 
school buildings that became inoperable instead.  
Cultural differences were cited as a problem within education. Female’s or girl’s inability 
to attend school, because of the insurgent influences, was viewed as a problem by 50% of 
the American respondents, but only by 10% of the Afghan respondents. This difference 
could be attributed to the fact that girl’s education is a very divisive issue in Afghanistan, 
and one that many Americans cannot fully understand within the Afghan cultural context. 
The respondents were not opposed to female education, but separate educational facilities 
was suggested as being optimal for their culture.  
Discussion on Specific Themes: Communication, Security, and Corruption 
Lack of Communication: Poor communication and cultural misunderstandings prevented 
modernization in Afghanistan. This was a common observation claimed by the 
questionnaire experts. A top down approach to any large-scale development project is 
vulnerable to criticisms. The lack of cultural understanding created tension among locals 
and the aid workers. Absence of communication prevented successful projects, and 
presented negative consequences instead. Most local Afghans were perceived as not liking 
outsiders coming into their villages and telling them what to do, even if the outsiders 
brought resources and money. Some respondents heard negative comments by contractors 
about the Afghan people and their ways. The results were impressions developed by locals 
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that contractors, particularly those working on the TPP project, did not respect the Afghan 
people. The respondents noted that it was evident that workers for the US Army and 
USAID usually do not suffer while in Afghanistan, since their comfort is ensured by the 
US government.  
The USAID project of the Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP) was a failed effort. In a 
nation so poor that food, medical care, heat, transportation, and electricity are lacking, the 
large sum to build the TPP seemed an insult. The project itself was plagued with a 
misguided attempt to work within a foreign country without communication with the 
people in that country. Language barriers prevented communications and training to 
operate TPP once the USAID project was complete. This top down approach from USAID 
for the large-scale development project created a plethora of missteps, plus corruption and 
ultimately failure.  
Discussion of Security Issues: The lack of security, or a war zone that was not 
stable, furthered hastened the TPP’s ultimate failure. The majority of respondents cited 
issues related to the Taliban or insurgents as paramount to the failure of both energy and 
educational aid projects. Most questionnaire respondents viewed security as a major 
obstacle to development, which hindered the implementation of aid projects. In 
Afghanistan nothing can take place without consideration of the war and violence. The 
Taliban have increased their strongholds, where the media can barely keep up with the 
changes since the withdrawal of US troops at the end of 2014. Kabul, once considered safe 
as the most urban city in the nation, now is the most dangerous. Whole provinces are 
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becoming under Taliban control. HTS and foreign aid workers complain they cannot go 
“outside the wire” because of the dangers. The majority viewed insurgent threats to roads, 
schools, and fuel deliveries as major obstacles to modernization. Most areas surrounding 
the insurgent controlled roads were unable to have deliveries of supplies or allow children 
to attend schools. 
Figure 5.3: Descriptive Statistical Graph of Security Themes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Original Descriptive Statistics from Respondent Data Themes 
Discussion of Corruption: Most respondents saw the corruption of Afghan officials 
and USAID contractors as a problem for development, stating that much of the money 
designated for development never reached the intended recipients.  Corruption included 
theft, bribery, stealing, and other criminal acts. During the planning stages of TPP too many 
corrupt individuals – on both sides – were motivated by greed and during the different 
stages of construction and development, some stole fuel and parts and others never got 
paid.  
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There were no accountability tools or measures implemented before or during 
projects. Checks and balances for both sides were not addressed in the planning stages. 
Transparency-seeking and audit measures were implemented by SIGAR and the Office of 
the Inspector General (OIG), but after the fact. The failure of schools, the failed TPP 
project, and the lack of buy-in by the government at all levels created inroads for 
insurgency activities.  Corruption and lack of security go hand and hand.  
Other Data Analyses 
Cross-Cultural Analysis, Word Count Method: A Word count of the narratives from 
the 20 respondents and the focus group was accomplished to support the thematic results. 
This method counts the number of times one or more words in a phrase are used within the 
narratives and considers them as important or relevant within the reality of the respondents. 
It provides cross-cultural understanding for sub-conscious meanings. This word count 
method was used extensively in the field of research in Iraq by HTS researchers for military 
reports to understand cross-cultural meanings (Kautz, 2017, personal interview). Added to 
the thematic analysis of the respondent narratives, the word count results can reveal both 
supporting and conflicting evidence and new realizations.  
The word count method is a tool of research within qualitative methods and is 
explained by Johnson and Waterfield (2004, 21):  
“Qualitative research methods are able to explore the complexity of human 
behavior and generate deeper understanding… Theme identification is one of the 
most fundamental tasks in qualitative research. Techniques are shared among small 
groups of social scientists and are often impeded by disciplinary or epistemological 
boundaries. [There are] a dozen techniques that social scientists have used to 
discover themes in texts. They range from quick word counts to laborious, in-depth, 
line-by-line scrutiny.” 
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Table 5.3: Word Counts from Respondents: 20 Questionnaires and Eight Focus 
Group Members. Categories: General Phrases, Remarks about TPP, and 
Remarks about Education 
 
General Phrases Overall Occurrences 
USAID Positive remarks 19 
USAID Negative Remarks 21 
Afghanistan is a Failed State 14 
Word Count concerning respondents remarks about TPP 
Word or Phrases Counted Number of counted occurrences for all 
respondents 
Failed TPP 18 
Hydraulic plants were not used 5 
Poor Management 5 
Locals Still Need energy 24 
Lack of Security 21 
Corruption 14 
Cultural Misunderstandings 6 
Poor Afghan Leadership 12 
 Poor Afghan/US Contractor 
Coordination 
12 
 Costs too high 11 
 No media or public awareness 3 
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 No Trust between cultures 3 
 NGOs Left out 6 
 No Water 2 
 Wasteful 13 
 No fuel to run TPP 12 
 No Accountability 5 
 Other International Donors Ignored 8 
  Word Count concerning respondent remarks about Education 
 School 51 
 Education 64 
 Ghost schools 8 
 Shadow Government (Informal Leaders)  3 
 Training needed for Afghans 
(Vocational)  
8 
 Corruption/nepotism/stealing 31 
 Language Barrier 4 
 Need school supplies 15 
 Teacher issues, training, absent, not 
qualified  
46 
 Administrator concerns 3 
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Indications of the Word Count: The overall remarks about USAID seemed 
consistent among the respondents, or they were appreciative of USAID and recognized 
their efforts to provide schools and train teachers. Many respondents had positive things to 
say about USAID and their attempts for education projects.  They were impressed that 
USAID had tried and that the agency had good intentions. Respondents recognized the 
bureaucratic nature of the organization and lamented that the outcome had not been better. 
With their insider perceptions, the respondents knew what went wrong, but insisted that ‘if 
only’ there had been no corruption, good security, and better communications and 
organization, then the education projects would have been worthwhile. There was a general 
consensus that Afghanistan needed education for all ages.  The negatives comments 
outnumbered the positive ones about USAID by only a few words, and therefore, it seemed 
the respondents wanted to say that USAID had at least tried, but failed. Overall, half of the 
28 stated firmly that Afghanistan is a failed state. Their concept of a good state of living 
measured up to the indicators of infrastructure and educational characteristic of a modern 
state. 
Analysis of the Shura Focus Group Responses: The focus group represented further 
qualitative research by supporting the questionnaire respondent’s analysis and adding 
narratives of specific experiences. Lack of security, lack of communication, and lack of 
education plus corruption affected the respondent’s families and themselves. There was an 
overarching fear of speaking the truth about the problems with aid delivery. This was a 
common theme throughout this research for fear that USAID could lose funding, if too 
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many problems were brought forth as the US Congress monitors what is going on, 
especially in Afghanistan. However, some aid is better than none.  
Points made by the focus group concerned issues of corruption were deeply 
intertwined in the implementation of aid, and they said that both the Afghan and American 
sides were guilty of some form of corruption. Why and how the corruption existed and 
continued to exist was difficult to explain as the relationships differed depending on the 
project and individuals involved. However, the lack of accountability continued to allow 
corruption to endure.  
     It cannot be overlooked that the Americans and USAID were viewed as wealthy from 
the Afghan perspective. There was a common theme among the respondents that 
Americans and USAID can afford to lose money through overcharging, theft, or other 
forms of corruption. Furthermore, there was fear that Afghan officials may have alliances 
to groups that are anti-American, or they may choose to undermine the aid process for their 
own political reasons. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) 
leaders were more likely to promote the alliance with the US, which brought funding and 
power to their own political position. Whereas local officials at the provincial levels were 
more likely to have ethnic ties and be wary of large-scale top-down development 
approaches. Without regulation and monitoring, officials were often free to commit acts of 
bribery and corruption without being held accountable.  
 The respondents pointed out that the typical Afghan worker does not make enough 
money in many situations to make ends meet. If teachers, utility workers, farmers, truck 
drivers, and health care workers, for example, were paid higher wages then there would be 
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less of an incentive to become involved in corrupt practices. The Afghan men in the focus 
group all sought positions with the United States military, even though most of them had 
other occupations. Instead of becoming corrupt or aligned with the Taliban or other militant 
forces, they chose to help the Americans. That choice led to sometimes serious 
ramifications in terms of their security, and some became targets of the Taliban. Eventually 
this led, at least in part, to their leaving Afghanistan. Many Afghans have left Afghanistan 
and some of them will never live there again, while others became refugees or displaced.  
 The respondents felt that with such a long, rather unsuccessful presence that the 
United States needs to carefully reconsider their strategies. The tension created by wanting 
to modernize Afghanistan through infrastructure and education projects stands in contrast 
to what the Taliban want for their people, which is for all foreigners to leave the country.36 
What is happening in Afghanistan today is complex politically, and the Taliban do not want 
Western influences in their educational and social systems. They are willing to negate all 
infrastructure and modern amenities if it means they would have more control over all 
cultural and social lives.  
The Shura participants indicated a dislike for corruption and an extreme fear of the 
Taliban. Yet, each of them benefited directly from higher wages and even eventually a 
chance at citizenship in America, which only a few Afghans can experience. The majority 
of Afghans try to live in their homeland despite the contradictions and struggles. Pouring 
                                                                
36 Also, the Taliban are ethnically and linguistically connected to parts of the Pashtun population as they 
are Pashtun. The Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group of Afghanistan and the second largest in Pakistan. 
Pashtuns speak the Pashto language.  
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money into Afghanistan was not a sound policy approach, which should lead to evaluation 
for better disbursements of that aid in the future.  
Summary of Respondent Themes 
Major concerns for aid funding efficacy in Afghanistan were poor communications 
with local people and a lack of media for public awareness, leading to corruption on many 
sides. A lack of security during and after funding projects were implemented was prevalent 
in comments with suggestions hinting of a lack of understanding the insurgent genre in the 
first place. With a top down planning modal for aid projects, there was a lack of support 
from Afghan officials. This was implemented with a lack of planning for sustainability 
through training or future funding of projects after the funding agencies left. Furthermore, 
there was a lack of supporting resources, whether they be parts for the TPP project or 
school supplies and language appropriate textbooks. Finally, the cultural gap was 
considerable, for which any productive efforts by HTS were negated or inefficiently 
managed at the hiring and implementation stages. The number of times this paragraph uses 
the word ‘lack’ is six, but there was not a concern for a lack of money for funding before 
or during projects. Overall, the United States Agency for Development (USAID) allocated 
over 100 billion US dollars since 2001 to the development of Afghanistan and the United 
States invested over 700 billion US dollars. 
Analysis of the Eyewitness Account of the HTS Social Scientist: The 2012 
eyewitness account from the HTS social scientist, who is writing this dissertation, gives an 
autobiographical account in line with the method of phenomenology. The definition of 
phenomenology as a method of research is from the Stanford Philosophical 
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Encyclopedia.37 “Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as 
experienced from the first-person point of view. The central structure of an experience is 
its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about 
some object.”  This first-person account data is considered in the data for the observations 
and experiences and application of adding to the research data, and therefore adds to the 
triangulation of the data.  
 This eyewitness account revealed data supporting the data already given to enhance 
the reliability and validity of the study. In a Shura meeting in Afghanistan, my documented 
interviews with key leaders showed everyone agreed about the top four major issues: “lack 
of security, poor educational system, no fuel for cooking and heating, and limited or no 
access to health care.”  
Furthermore, my months in Helmand province, an area of Taliban stronghold, gave 
me the chance to witness the poverty and injustice first hand. Basic needs are lacking: 
“there is little or no fuel for lighting, cooking, and heating, and limited or no access to 
education.” I personally had the opportunity to visit a school in Nowzad district during the 
winter season. “Poor education system” was a common complaint from most of 
respondents from the interviews I conducted with Afghan locals. Those experiences are 
discussed in depth in Chapter 4. 
 
 
                                                                
37 Stanford Philosophical Encyclopedia. Accessed on-line October 1, 2016. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/  
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Conclusions of the Respondent Data Analysis 
 In this analysis, it was demonstrated that the 20 respondents and the eight Afghan 
Shura members rarely disagreed about the problems or issues involved. Security and 
corruption were huge barriers to aid delivery. Lack of energy and education for the Afghan 
people put them in dire situations that affected their health and ability to survive. USAID 
had many barriers to effective aid delivery in Afghanistan and the presence of ongoing 
conflict was the top variable. It was almost impossible to build schools, for example, in the 
middle of a war when the very act of building schools was viewed as an act of war against 
the Taliban. That is why many of the American-built schools no longer operate as schools 
or have been destroyed.  
According to their mission statement, the aim of USAID is to alleviate poverty. In 
the next section first-hand reports from USAID, SIGAR, academia, and the media will 
illustrate how USAID planning and goals were implemented, money spent, and subsequent 
investigations on their aid funding. It is important to know where the barriers to efficacy 
in aid delivery exist from the funding agency points of view.   
USAID Report Data Analysis on Education and Energy 
The US Congress appropriated taxpayer funding for USAID, which was created by 
President Kennedy in 1962 as part of the US executive branch. Its mission included 
primarily administering US civilian foreign aid. The gist of the following reports explain 
the relationship USAID had with contracting out the work, the money spent, and why their 
narrow goals were accomplished, while the larger projects failed.  
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USAID began to contract out projects from the start of the Afghanistan 
reconstruction. As early as 2001, Corneille’s report called for accountability on aid 
funding. In 2012, SIGAR began to make inquiries due to complaints and lack of 
productivity of the aid projects. By 2014, it was apparent that transparency, accountability, 
and checks and balances were not in place. USAID still maintained the TPP was working 
as late as 2015.  
However, there really was not a model in place for accountability in past aid efforts 
with USAID or other national aid funding according to several of the questionnaire 
respondents. Transparency Internationale’s website reports that the development of aid 
projects in African nations and other LDCs have not included such measures. This means 
that USAID was working within their expected parameters. Their constant statements 
claiming goal attainments even when faced with the corruption of the contractors of the 
Academy for Educational Development (which was shut down in 2011), did not change 
USAID’s modus operandi. The New Yorker reported “All aid deliveries were carried out 
by contractors or third-parties and in the case of the DABS energy survey, the survey and 
the post-survey analysis [for TPP] were carried out by the same contractor” (Aikens, March 
7, 2016). 
Theoretical Application of the Data 
 The first research question, “What are the barriers or factors preventing the 
effective delivery of USAID funding in Afghanistan in the projects of Tarakhil Power Plant 
and Education?”  The barriers are listed from frequencies within the thematic codes and 
word counts. They are numerous, yet, careful analysis may reveal certain perspectives..  
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Barriers to successful funding for Education in Afghanistan: 
● Lack of security and insurgent threats 
● Schools were built, but soon shut down 
● Corruption/stealing/nepotism/lack of transparency, accountability, and audits 
● Lack of teachers and teacher training 
● Lack of resources or supplies, heat, and health needs 
● Cultural misunderstandings and language barriers 
● Lack of coordination with locals, top down model 
Barriers to successful funding for energy in Afghanistan, with a focus on TPP: 
● Three-way tie for Corruption, Security, and locals not consulted or involved.  
● Lack of communication, top down model  
● Unbeneficial for the cost, costly to operate  
● Lack of training for locals to maintain and run post-construction 
● Insurgent threats for transporting fuel on the roads 
●  Fuel, parts, and supplies unavailable 
The list of problems were numerous. Much data were analyzed in this chapter, but 
application of theories to inform the data within the research questions was needed.  
Modernization and Human Capital Theories Informs the Data: The second research 
question was: “How are those factors perceived by individual stakeholders, government 
agencies, government watchdogs, the media, and scholars?” Concerning those impacted 
directly by the education and energy aid funding, the obvious sentiments were very 
negative. However, it was noteworthy that USAID reports and early SIGAR audits stated 
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that USAID met their original goals. Taking a step back to examine USAID goals, it is 
evident that their perspective was that of accomplishment. Concerning the two sample 
projects for energy and education, the USAID goals were to build the TPP and to build 
schools and train teachers. From the standpoint of this large funding agency, their goals 
reflected that they were not in the business of nation building, but only funded 
modernization projects.  
The media, academics, and the public were highly critical of the funding agency, 
USAID, for not being more productive in their designs for the TPP and their visions for 
education. The ideas of coordination with locals and accountability did not reflect USAID 
goals until the Transparency Act in 2016  38 surfaced due to media criticism.  
We can look at the definitions of modernization and human capital theories again 
to clarify points within the data. For modernization, there are a variety of different ways to 
define projects designed to transform societies within social, political, or economic 
parameters. Earlier definitions saw a linear progression of modernization. Rostow (1960, 
4) said modernization was part of the economic continuum through which most societies 
progress, moving from traditional conditions to those sparked by the move to mass 
consumption. This was a “syndrome of social changes” that was inherently linked to the 
expanse of industry, including occupational skill development/specialization and urban 
development (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009). Inglehart and Wetzel also link modernization 
less evidently to increases in education, improved life expectancy, and economic expansion 
                                                                
38 H.R. 3766 (114th): Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 to become Public Law 
114-191. 
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in LDCs. The link between modernization and human and social capital extended from the 
belief that investments in these elements could support progress and benefit change in 
underdeveloped nations.  
Human capital theory is based on the premise that there are economic gains that 
can be secured through investment in people (Sweetland 1996, 341), which is a segment 
of modernization theory. It seeks to theorize about how to build better societies by infusing 
investment in the education of people within a nation to create a strong future for all. 
Human capital refers to the resources that are embodied within humans, such as knowledge, 
skills, experience, abilities, intelligence, and talent (Benhabib and Speigel 1994, 143). 
Chaudhary (2013, 34) emphasizes the importance of understanding the connection between 
modernization and any supporting essential skill development, institutions, curriculum, and 
normative values. Therefore, understanding the social and cultural side of the development 
of education is essential to create modernization as well as the presence of monetary funds 
needed for capital developments. Chaudhary (2013, 38) also states that modernization does 
not radically change cultures or destroy values. 
Skills and knowledge are measurable assets, which are argued to have an aggregate 
impact on the economic status of communities and nations. Tilak (2002,7) asserted that 
“investments in education (human capital) created a higher return than investments in 
infrastructure or physical capital projects for the purpose of nation building and 
modernization.” Son (2010, 2) argues that human capital plays a critical role in methods to 
reduce poverty and improve economic conditions in developing nations. When assessing 
the measurability of human capital investment, there are two methods: 1) to identify the 
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monetary expenditures that are allocated for human capital education; or 2) to measure the 
outcomes related to worker productivity (Son 2010, 2-4).       
How did the modernization and human capital theories enlighten the funding of 
projects? USAID’s goals reflected a partial responsibility to provide funds, which they met. 
The larger scheme of modernization and human capital building was beyond their focus, 
and indeed had been the norm with other funding agencies in other LDCs. A few of the 
respondents voiced that in other LDC locations, the funding of modernization and human 
capital building had been no more successful than in Afghanistan. Thus a pattern of 
diffused responsibility emerged in regard to successful modernization and human capital 
building. It is the US taxpayer that continues to pay for such mismatched aid activities.  
Conclusions  
The data informed by modernization and human capital theories show that the 
USAID project goals addressed modernization and human capital, but not to the fruition of 
the theories. They were mainly concerned with the building of structures and the training 
of teachers. The first part was accomplished, however, with a top-down model. The 
evidence seems to indicate a lack of cultural understanding to create well trained teachers 
within their cultural needs or local technicians for running the TPP. Everything from 
language barriers to lack of cultural knowledge seemed to prohibit successful teacher and 
technician training. These elements were not in the budget at all for TPP. They were in the 
budget for teacher and administrator training, but not successful due to lack of cultural 
awareness. There were some small successes, for instance with the mid-wife program and 
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the solar panel installations, but flexibility to examine what worked and what did not work 
was not built into the USAID planning stages.  
This chapter examined all the data results through several methods of analysis. 
Coding, pile sorting, and word counts were undertaken to find patterns and themes in the 
respondent data, including the firsthand experience of the eyewitness account. The 
experience of the eyewitness through working in the HTS program highlighted issues of 
comprehensive Western model shortcomings for modernization aid delivery. Because the 
HTS social science research informed Westerners about Afghanistan’s culture, HTS should 
have been in the forefront of strategic planning for Afghanistan reconstruction. However, 
the program was placed with the military instead, and even then program was underutilized. 
HTS social scientist common complaints were that their work was ignored as not relevant 
to military strategies. Many were told to concentrate on tactical military maneuvers only.  
The difference was that strategic planning is long-range, and tactical planning is getting 
through each day or each mission, thus only for the short-range.  
From the perspective of USAID, they too had only minor strategic planning, and 
stayed in the realm of tactical planning too. USAID’s mission was only focused on 
building, not maintaining post-construction.  USAID expected the remainder of 
modernization and human capital issues to be handled by the political, social and economic 
sectors within Afghanistan. The fact that there was no firm culture of individualistic 
capitalism in Afghanistan was not even considered. I realized that Afghanistan’s culture 
resides in the ancient boundaries of Pashtunwali instead, which is a system of social 
constraints enveloping the social, political, and economic lives of Afghans.  
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 Indeed, Western cultural concepts are based on individualistic capitalism found in 
attitudes of ‘build it and they will come’ and ‘not my job’. Sack (1997) warns that most 
Western or modern projects, scientific research, and business efforts are designed as short 
range, instead of being long-range. Projects are compartmentalized so that the larger 
picture is never taken into account. This creates fragmentation and diffusion of 
responsibility, which is then trundled into a ‘future problems’ category. Modern 
bureaucracies, organizations, and institutions concentrate on top down models. These 
models and the assumptions on which they are premised are where core problems are found 
within Western aid projects, when dealing with LDC issues. Furthermore, cultural 
misunderstandings, lack of security, and corruption put a veneer of failure over the majority 
of aid projects in LDCs within Robert Sack’s model (1997).    
It was important to know where the barriers to efficacy in aid delivery exist and the 
perspectives of the stakeholders. It was the perspectives of USAID aid funding efforts and 
the for-profit contractors that stand out. Therefore the data analyses have revealed there 
was a major issue of fragmentation and diffusion of responsibility in Western aid models. 
This will be further explored in the next chapter regarding conclusions and 
recommendations.     
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND 
                        RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Discussion 
The reconstruction program created in November 2001 by international consensus 
or the Bonn Agreement39 for Afghanistan was highly ambitious. Along with a variety of 
development and modernization for the Government of Afghanistan came tenets of social 
change, which have triggered relentless tensions (Suhrke 2007). Winning the hearts and 
minds of the Afghan people has proven to be difficult at best. Now, over 16 years later, the 
conditions in this landlocked nation remain harsh. Foreign aid made some improvements 
in lives, but the pervasive corruption and problems with aid delivery remain.  
The United States’ efforts at modernization in Afghanistan are now considered 
failures by most (Klinger 2016), perhaps because the social and economic indicators 
remain low overall. Or maybe it is because the war has not yet ended. The United States 
dollars continued to be disbursed in energy and education sectors in hopes of yielding 
success. As success is a relative term, USAID and the World Bank celebrate even the most 
incremental signs of what could be considered improvement. For example, USAID refused 
to accept that the Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP) was an unsuccessful project. Yet, SIGAR 
announced in its 2016 report that diesel fuel for the TPP was the wrong choice. It is 
inappropriate for the region and prevents the 335-million-US dollar power plant from full 
utilization.  
                                                                
39Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent 
Government Institutions. . (2001) http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm 
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The respondents to the questionnaires distributed for this research, as well as the 
Shura participants, often commented on how much they wanted modernization 
components of electricity, food and shelter, education, heat, good transportation, and 
medical care. Mostly the elite profited from US modernization efforts, and many other 
Afghans looked for their own benefits too, but were sorely disappointed. Development is 
always political and USAID is an apparatus of the US government (UN 2001). The US 
Congress intended for the funding allocated to USAID for the betterment of the Afghan 
people to reach them through improved services and resources. They were in a bid to 
support the local people, which would help in receiving more support from Afghans in 
fighting the Taliban, according to the rationale.  
Chaudhary (2013, 34) also asserted that modernization is a process of socio-cultural 
change involving values, norms, culture, institutions and structures. The Afghan people, 
who live in an Islamic republic, are divided and do not know which way to proceed with 
their culture. The very culture of Afghans is tearing. Respondents acknowledged their fear 
of the Taliban and told of the atrocities by the Taliban on groups of people and villages. 
Yet, their reactions are to hide from them. Historically, the only time the Afghan people 
joined together to resist was through the Mujahedeen to defeat the Russians after the 1979 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  Now, Afghans seem divided on how to deal with the US 
and the Taliban.  
Today in Afghanistan, USAID has decreased the scale of their projects to ones like 
the small solar energy and community-based literacy programs. President Trump 
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announced that the future focus of efforts in Afghanistan will now be military40. 
Modernization for the nation seems farther away than ever. As a least developed country 
and high on the list of failed states, Afghanistan’s people live directly with the economic 
and political circumstances that a failed state entails.  
Limitations of the Study 
To answer the research questions, this study was limited by space and time as 
Afghanistan is still in part a war zone. Much first-hand or primary data were available, but 
not within an immediate timeframe or in close proximity to the location of Afghanistan. 
The results and conclusions apply to foreign aid directed to the energy sector or specifically 
the TPP project and funding for education within Afghanistan. Therefore generalizations 
cannot be made to other locations or their timeframes due to contextual findings. However, 
the findings of this dissertation can be considered in informing future research questions 
and studies.  
Implications for Future Research  
Answering the research questions was fulfilled by research data for this 
dissertation. However, the data created more questions and future research implications. 
The initial purpose of the US entering Afghanistan were the 9/11 bombings, and the 
Taliban’s harboring of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. The data found that one of the major 
                                                                
40 Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan, Aug. 21, 2017.... 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/...statements/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan. 
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barriers to the success of aid delivery were the Taliban militias and hence the lack of 
security in certain areas.  
The US assumed that aid given to Afghanistan was necessary to end Taliban control 
through modernization efforts. Yet, what are Afghan views of how the Taliban fit into their 
religious goals? Afghanistan was a theocracy under the Taliban, but they were overthrown 
in 2001. We do know that when the US entered Afghanistan and began to combat the 
Taliban, then urban people often sided with the US. However, they were promised 
modernization through cash rewards and aid projects. What about the common or rural 
Afghan people? The ‘winning the hearts and minds of the people’ campaign was intended 
to reach out to all, but basically only the elite benefited directly as noted by the respondents. 
The education projects were to help all, but they failed too.  
In rural areas, the Taliban continued to control through violence and fear, and 
especially in areas where the US pulled out. A beneficial research study would focus on 
Taliban control in tandem with the patterns of Afghan identity. Considering all the Afghan 
people had known under the Taliban was a theocracy, what percent of Afghans agree with 
the Taliban ideology or their way of thinking? Do the Afghan people have concerns about 
whether to oppose them or not? Are there different views according to provinces, urban 
versus rural, and among Afghan tribes concerning the power of the Taliban?  
Justification for such a study is that the ‘winning the hearts and minds of the people’ 
campaign indicates an agenda to convince the Afghan people to not follow the Taliban. 
This agenda is played out through millions of dollars of aid within the US Counter-
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insurgency effort.41 A concern of the US is also the violation of human rights by the 
Taliban.  Yet, this is a decision based on US social, economic, and political beliefs. There 
are no doubts that the Taliban and other affiliated militias violate human rights. However, 
without a total Afghan buy-in, both urban and rural, the War on Terrorism and winning the 
hearts and minds of Afghans has not come to fruition. Therefore, future research on topics 
addressing cultural beliefs and perspectives should transpire before any ideas are 
formulated for aid for modernization in least developed countries (LDCs).  
Recommendations 
It is paramount that the developmental goals and aid implementation should include 
a better understanding of the cultural and political structures of Afghanistan. It is 
recommended that the HTS program be reconfigured, renamed, and re-implemented under 
USAID or the US State Department for this purpose. US efforts, which use taxpayer’s 
contributions, are misguided by ignorance of other cultures, ethnic identities, and views of 
life. Social science academic researchers using scientific methods, ethical guidelines, 
cultural immersion, and ethnic and cultural relativity methods and procedures can possibly 
make effective strategic recommendations for the delivery of foreign aid in any LDC. Other 
measures are needed as well concerning the organizational shortcomings of USAID and 
any funding agency dealing with LDCs.  
Afghanistan urgently needs collaborative efforts amongst stakeholders and not top 
down models. All recipient and donor governments, USAID, contractors, and local people 
                                                                
41 The Counterinsurgency efforts by the US military started in 2001 after 9/11 bombings, and continued up 
through Aug. 21, 2017 when President Trump announced new military plans for Afghanistan.  
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should work together to understand project goals, and project implementation should be 
enhanced by checks and balances. This research found that the top down approach used by 
USAID and hiring for-profit contractors are dire drawbacks to aid delivery.  Top-down, 
large scale projects do not work because there is a lack of coordination and communication, 
and there is also a lack of trust. As a least developed country and one of the ten most fragile 
states in the world, Afghanistan needs to strengthen its local governance to empower the 
people across the nation. This would do more than the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. 
Development requires collaborative efforts among the state, the market, and civil society 
both from the top (USAID and the Government of Afghanistan) and the bottom (local 
people and key local leaders). With elections slated for July 2018 in Afghanistan, it would 
behoove the United States to ensure that fair and equitable elections take place regardless 
of the obstacles.   
If the country were secure, then realization could only happen if USAID creates a 
sustainable modernization model based on the empowerment of the Afghan people. 
Strategies for the improvement of development by USAID include more community-based 
projects, the integration of local knowledge in the planning and implementation of projects, 
follow-through with long-term sustainability, and an increase of transparency, integrity and 
ethics. Overall, despite a new law for foreign aid transparency and accountability, USAID 
has a long way to go before the Afghan people get the most out of the US taxpayers’ 
investments. Modernization cannot succeed just by USAID money alone.  
To achieve greater aid effectiveness in Afghanistan, all actors involved in 
delivering aid should be held accountable. Based on the data from official reports and 
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questionnaire respondents, there are large numbers of actors and many challenges, 
including corruption, bribing, and other fraudulent practices conducted by all parties 
having a vested interest involved in and /or delivering aid to Afghanistan. Checks and 
balances are even more critical than transparency. It is understood that secrecy is part of 
war operations, but that does not exclude checks and balances to prevent corruption on 
both sides.   
The presence of war is detrimental to modernization as well. What is the precedent 
for trying to modernize a nation in the middle of a war? War attacks and destroys clean 
water, food and shelter, electricity, access to education and jobs.  Fair and equitable 
elections are difficult to administer in wartime. To end the war, diplomacy may be the 
answer, if at all possible. It is clear that the Taliban insurgency is becoming increasingly 
strong. Until the United States and the Taliban can have diplomatic negotiations, it will be 
difficult, if not impossible to move forward peacefully. Lack of security and the high rate 
of violence, even in Kabul, prevents modernization from occurring.  
To recap, the third research question addressed recommendations, or “What are 
some strategies that could improve aid delivery and address the lack of efficiency and 
efficacy in Afghanistan?” The recommendations of this study are listed in order of 
importance for implementation: 
o Understand the physical, political, and security environments, and do a 
security risk assessment for possible negative outcomes in the planning 
stage. Set up risk assessment guidelines before proceeding with aid 
planning to enhance success for aid delivery.   
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o Obtain strong academic data concerning local needs and desires. It is 
recommended a program such as the HTS be designed, funded, and 
implemented in the planning stages of aid.  
o Plan for more community-based small-scale projects for a better productive 
return on funding. 
o Inform and work with locals at all levels on project designs, 
implementations, and plans for future sustainability.  
o Funding agencies should be involved on the ground for all projects, and 
reduce the power and scope of using for-profit contractors.  
o Aid agencies should plan follow-through and long-term planning for 
supplies, technology, and training of administrators and workers after the 
agencies leave. 
o Checks and balances and allowable transparency should be implemented 
for all stakeholders on all projects at all stages. 
Conclusion  
 This dissertation, which focused on problems with USAID aid delivery in 
Afghanistan further sought to understand if USAID was able to impact modernization in 
Afghanistan. The data show the answer is overwhelmingly “no” as USAID aid impacts 
were either small and/or temporary in Afghanistan. Indicators may point to a failed state, 
although that determination is outside of the scope of this dissertation. The 
recommendations of this dissertation to facilitate the efficacy and efficiency of aid should, 
in the author’s view, be followed if the US Congress, USAID, and the US military, wish 
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to continue their agendas and turn around the 16 years of frustrations and suffering by all 
stakeholders involved.  
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APPENDIX A 
Political Map of Afghanistan 
 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/afghanistan.html 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Photo of Tarakhil Power Plant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo of Tarakhil Power Plant, from SIGAR report, August 7, 2015 
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APPENDIX C   
Ethnicity in Afghanistan 
 
 
 
https://chellaney.net/2013/03/01/afghanistans-partition-might-be-unpreventable/ 
Brahma Chellaney, “Afghanistan’s partition might be unpreventable”  The National, 
March 1, 2013. 
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APPENDIX D 
Informed Consent Form 
“Delivery of USAID Aid in Afghanistan, 2001-2017.” 
Behavioral Research Informed Consent 
Abdullah Bataineh, Political Science Department 
(734)680-0415 
Purpose 
Today Afghanistan continues to be aid dependent for health care, education, civil services, 
infrastructure, and economic development. A significant amount of aid to Afghanistan may 
have been wasted due to poor governance and corruption on both sides (Afghan 
Government and USAID). You are being asked to be in the research study, because you 
have knowledge about the delivery of foreign aid or you lived or worked in Afghanistan. 
This study is being conducted at Wayne State University.  The estimated number of study 
participants to be enrolled at Wayne State University and/or the proposed site(s) is about 1 
as well as about 30 throughout US  
Please read this form and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in 
the study. 
The aim of this research is to examine what political and social barriers exist that hinder 
the effective use of American foreign aid and funding in Afghanistan. The scope of 
governance will include Afghan national, regional, provincial, and local governments, and 
also the United States federal involvement through USAID, the US Army’s HTS, and the 
practice of using contractors in Afghanistan. 
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Study Procedures 
If you agree to take part in this research study, you may be asked to do one or more of these 
study activities: 
1. Fill out surveys and answer questions. 
2. Surveys will be given in a paper format and they will be disseminated through 
mail or hand delivered. They will contain multiple choices, opinions on a scale of 
1 to 5 for true/false, and short answer questions, which will require approximately 
30 minutes to complete.  
3. You do not have to answer any question you prefer not to answer and you may 
still remain in the study. Also, you may also choose to opt-out of the study 
completely at any time. Survey questions will cover the material for the study and 
personal data will not be collected other than related to involvement with 
Afghanistan or aid.  
4. You will be given a code name or number for the study and no identifying 
information will be released. As an example, your location or within an aid 
agency, your occupation, tribe or physical age will not be included in the 
information. Once the report (dissertation) is accepted, all respondent information 
will be destroyed. Until that time, the information will be kept on a disc and not 
on a computer, and then stored in a safety deposit box until the completion of the 
dissertation.  
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Benefits  
As a participant in this research study, there will be no direct benefit for you; however, 
information from this study may benefit other people now or in the future. This research 
will be beneficial for scholars, policy makers and different governmental agencies. 
Additionally, this research study will propose strategies that could improve government 
structures and address the lack of efficiency and efficacy in delivering aid in Afghanistan. 
Results may have direct benefit to aid policies and practices in Afghanistan. Results may 
also be useful in other areas where aid is supporting state (re)building. 
Risks  
There are no known risks to participation in this study.   
Study Costs  
Participation in this study will be of no cost to you. 
Compensation   
You will not be paid for taking part in this study. 
Confidentiality  
All information collected about you during the course of this study will be kept confidential 
to the extent permitted by law. You will be identified in the research records by a code 
name or number. Information that identifies you personally will not be released without 
your written permission. However, the study sponsor, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
at Wayne State University, or federal agencies with appropriate regulatory oversight [e.g., 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), 
Office of Civil Rights (OCR), etc.) may review your records. 
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When the results of this research are published or discussed in conferences, no information 
will be included that would reveal your identity.  
  I will use nicknames and positions to identify participants such as Afghan-American 
living in USA, a former USAID employee, an American expert on aid. Individuals' real 
names will not be identified and all information will be kept confidential. No one else will 
have access to the data or code keys. The data will be collected, analyzed, and reported in 
the aggregated form. 
 Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal 
Taking part in this study is voluntary.  You have the right to choose not to take part in this 
study. If you decide to take part in the study you can later change your mind and withdraw 
from the study.  You are free to only answer questions that you want to answer.  You are 
free to withdraw from participation in this study at any time.    
Questions 
If you have any questions about this study now or in the future, you may contact Abdullah 
Bataineh 
or one of his research team members at the following phone number, (734) 680-0415. If 
you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, the Chair of the 
Institutional Review Board can be contacted at (313) 577-1628. If you are unable to contact 
the research staff, or if you want to talk to someone other than the research staff, you may 
also call the Wayne State Research Subject Advocate at (313) 577-1628 to discuss 
problems, obtain information, or offer input.  
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Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
If you choose to take part in this study you may withdraw at any time. You will be given a 
copy of this consent form. 
 
 
  
**Use when participant has had this consent form read to them (i.e., illiterate, legally blind, 
translated into foreign language). 
The PI, co-investigators, and key personnel of WSU associated with the research project:  
o WSU’s Institutional Review Boards (IRB)   
o Authorized members of WSU’s workforce who may need to access your 
information in the performance of their duties. Department of Political Science at 
WSU (My committee members: Prof. Nadejda K. Marinova; Prof. Alisa 
Moldavanova; Prof. Sharon Lean; Prof. Vanessa Jill DeGifis.  
o  Other collaborating academic research institutions, which include: Not Applicable. 
o The study Sponsor or representative, including companies it hires to provide study 
related services, which include: Not Applicable. 
o Federal agencies with appropriate regulatory oversight (e.g., FDA, OHRP, OCR, 
etc.) may review your records. 
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This Authorization does not expire. The research team may need to correct it or provide 
missing information about you even after the study has ended. 
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APPENDIX E 
Questionnaire Questions 
Energy and Education Development through Aid Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions in as much detail as possible. 
1. What kinds of training have you had and what kind of work have you done in 
Afghanistan in relation to the energy industry or education development? 
2. Over time, how has your opinion changed about your work in Afghanistan?  
3. What knowledge do you have of energy infrastructure sources created by foreign aid, 
such as the Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP)? 
4. What knowledge do you have of the impact of foreign aid on the education system in 
Afghanistan? 
5. What were some of the benefits of aid delivered for a) energy infrastructure and b) for 
education in Afghanistan?  
6. What were some of the failures in aid delivery for a) energy infrastructure and b) 
education in Afghanistan? 
7. How do you think the TPP and other energy sources were funded?  
8. What was the role of the USAID, US, or HTS workers with the TPP, energy projects, 
and education projects in Afghanistan, if any?  
9. Did you have a direct role with the energy infrastructures like the TPP or in the 
development of educational sources? 
10. Indirectly, did you hear of any evaluations or assessments of energy infrastructure like 
the TPP or on the creation of education components (i.e. building of schools, funding for 
school curricula, etc.)?  
11. What were some challenges you faced while in Afghanistan with the delivery of energy 
and the energy infrastructure (in provision of electricity, heat, fuel for cooking)? 
12. How did you cope with energy challenges? Can you give examples? 
13. What activities did you find most successful in achieving your energy Government of 
Afghanistan in Afghanistan? Why? 
14. Did you have direct involvement with any USAID or HTS funded project? If so, 
describe in detail your most vivid memories. 
15. What else would you like to share about economic, energy infrastructure, or education 
development and foreign funding in Afghanistan? 
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APPENDIX F 
Thematic Coding from Respondents 
Questionnaire Analysis Findings 
For making graphs in Excel based on patterns and repetitions the following was 
used by counting who said what in their questionnaire answers (the numbers in parentheses 
represents the number of the questionnaire). For example, four respondents stated that 
education was outdated.  
Education 
Education is still suffering: (1) (2) (3) (7) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
=14 
Education is outdated: (1) (2) (7) (9) =4 
Education is better today (20) =1 
US funded educational projects (1) (2) (3) (7) (9) (11) (12) (13) (14) (16) (17) (18) (20) = 
13 
International donors funded projects (1) (3) (9) (10) (13) (14) (16) (17) =8 
Aid helped Education in Afghanistan but it is not enough: (1) (2) (3) (9) (11) (14) (15) (16) 
(17)(18)(20) = 11 
Not enough training for schooling boards and administrators (1) (2) (9) (16) (17) (18) =6 
A lot of schools and buildings were shut down or were not used for the intended purpose: 
(1) (7) (9) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) = 11 
Schools lack of educational components: (such as buildings, First-aid medical treatment,     
Food courts, playing fields, heating and cooling rooms) (1) (2) (9) (11) (15) (17) (18) (20) 
=8 
Schools’ lack of books and supplies: (1) (9) (17) (18) =4 
Schools’ lack of qualified teachers: (1) (9) (15) (17) (18) (20) =6 
Schools’ lack of female teachers: (2) =1 
No training for teachers: (1) (3) (9) (15) (17) (18) (20) =7 
Taliban and insurgents’ threat related to roads and schools: (1) (2) (7) (9) (11) (14) (15) 
(16) (17) (18) (20) =11 
Females are struggling with attending schools: (1) (2) (7) (9) (13) =5 
Big cities are getting more services and projects than rural and remote villages (1) (4) (9) 
(15) =4 
Teachers are not capable (1) (9) (11) (17) (18) =5 
No enough teachers and staff (5) (11) (13) =3 
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Afghan authorities are not capable if run schools and other educational facilities (1) (2) (7) 
(9) (17) (18) =6 
Aged-kids are not access to education (1) (2) (9) =3 
Security was a challenge (1) (2) (3) (7) (9) (11) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (20) =13 
Energy: 
Energy sector is still suffering: (1) (2) (3) (5) (7) (9) (10) (11) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(20) =15 
Weak and outdated energy infrastructure (1) (2) (5) (7) (9) (11) (15) (16) (17) (20) =10 
US or USAID/US Army funded TPP (1) (2) (3) (7) (8) (9) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(20) =13 
International donors funded projects (1) (3) (9) (10) (13) (15) (16) (17) =8 
Knowledge about TPP: (1) (3) (7) (8) (9) (10) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (20) =12 
TPP was costly (1) (3) (7) (8) (9) (10) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) =11 
TPP was not beneficial (1) (3) (7) (8) (9) (10) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) =11 
Aid helped energy sector a little: (1) (9) (10) (13) (15) (16) =6 
Aid helped the Government of Afghanistan purchasing fuel: (1) =1 
Taliban and insurgents’ threat related to control roads (7) (8) (9) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(20) =9 
 Stealing fuel and planets supplies: (1) (7) (15) (16) (17) =5 
Not enough training or no qualified technicians (1) (2) (9) (13) (14) (16) (17) (18) (20) =9 
Electricity was a challenge (1) (3) (8) (9) (11) (14) (15) (16) (17) =9 
Not enough fuel (1) (2) (3) (8) (9) (11) (13) (14) (16) (17) (18) (20) =12 
Using woods for cooking or heating homes (1) (3) (8) (9) =4 
Expensive fuel for cooking or vehicles (1) (2) (3) (9) (11) (14) (15) (16) (20) =9 
Lack of funding (1) (9) (14) (16) (17) (18) (20) =7 
Corrupted Afghan officials (1) (2) (3) (6) (7) (9) (13) (15) (16) (17) (18) (20) =12 
Local communities are not happy regarding services (1) (3) (8) (9) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(20) =10 
No trust for Afghan officials from contractors (unhealthy relationship) (1) (9) (18) =3 
Security was an issue and a challenge (3) (5) (7) (8) (9) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (20) 
=12 
Improving hydro power (3) (7) (8) (9) (15) =5 
Aid: 
Your opinion changed about your work in Afghanistan Positively  =0                                 
Your opinion changed about your work in Afghanistan negatively (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (20) =18 
Locals are not happy with security (1) (2) (3) (8) (9) (11) (12) (14) (16) (17) (18) (20) =12 
Afghanistan needs accountability tools (7) (8) (10) (15) (17) =5 
Aid didn’t provide training for Afghan officials (1) (9) (10) (11) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(20) =10 
Afghan authorities failed (1) (2) (5) (6) (9) (10) (12) (13) (16) (17) (18) (20) =12 
No coordination and cooperation between contractors and Afghans (1) (3) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(13) (14) (16) (17) (18) (20) =12 
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US military and ISAF can help (1) (9) =2 
US military and ISAF did poor job (2) =1 
NGOs was left out and no communication with them (1) (9) (13) =3 
HTS did fair job: (2) =1 
HTS did poor job (11) =1 
Access to water was a challenge (2) =1 
No effective media to educate people about projects (1) (2) (3) (9) (17) (18) =6 
Corruption in hindering effective delivery of aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) (14) (16) 
(17) (18)(20) =14 
Poor management and planning (5) (7) (9) (10) (11) (16) (17) (18) =8 
Cultural factor is a hindrance (2) (4) (7) (10) (17) (18) =6 
Logistics was a challenge (5) (14) =2 
Foreign contractors involved in corruption and got bribes (7) (9) (15) (17) (18) =5 
Language barriers for local Afghans (5 languages) (14) (15) =2 
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APPENDIX G 
Raw Data from Questionnaire Respondents 
Respondent #1 is a recent Afghan immigrant. He had worked within the 
Government of Afghanistan in an official capacity.  
Education aid summary: #1 saw years of various conditions within Afghanistan’s 
education system. He stated that Afghans had “suffered many years for three decades.” 
Education is better than before, but will remain weak without foreign intervention and 
long-term strategies. US and USAID were the main players in building and supplying 
schools over the last 15 years. They still need school supplies, plus training for 
administrators and even for Afghan officials. This respondent stated: 
I produced reports on education aid and its effectiveness for the Afghan 
government. I helped USAID set up schools and provided assessments for their 
evaluations. I know that USAID asked the Afghan government for recommendations for 
provinces that needed schools and learning centers. However, USAID never trusted the 
Afghans with their information, and they ignored our reports and advice. There was no 
cooperation or coordination between USAID and the Afghan government. This was a 
negative and unhealthy relationship that impacted the projects.  The US military and ISAF 
should be more involved to deliver and monitor foreign aid and provide security for aid 
projects. Many aid workers left due to insurgency. Donors and NGOs should trust local 
reports and feedback. Media needs to be improved to provide information for citizens about 
officials and what is going on in the country.  
“The education system is old and needs to be updated.” Teacher salaries are very 
low. There is no medical care for sick students. Parents keep students home to work 
because school is not mandatory.  Girl’s schools were implemented for a while, but now 
they are all empty and ghost schools.  Foreign governments need to send money to operate 
the schools as there is none from the Afghan government.   
Government officials used their power to get educational aid in their favorite areas. 
Local people complained about local officials that took humanitarian aid, whether it was 
for education or food for poor people. Even in safer areas, school supplies and building 
materials were stolen.  
Schools that were built were often closed due to insurgency and lack of security. 
Foreign aid for education had a bigger impact in cities than in rural areas where security 
was not available. Therefore, education aid was unevenly distributed in Afghanistan 
because of security and insurgency. In rural areas, where schools were built, there is 
nothing but ghost schools now. Education aid for areas with very high risk was at ‘0’.  
Energy aid summary: I lived in the area of the TPP. It cost a lot, but did not benefit 
the local people, due to poor management. Also, the firm who built the TPP did not 
designate local authorities or teach anyone local how to maintain it. The plant remains 
closed for months and months, and Afghans joke about the 300 million dollars it cost to 
build it. Fuel was bought by energy aid from Uzbekistan and Pakistan. But the Taliban 
control the roads now, especially at the border, so the fuel cannot get through.  
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There was some productive energy aid for Afghans though installation of small 
solar power units in urban areas. US firms built these. My family suffered from lack of 
electricity or fuel to heat and cook. Fuel was expensive even when it was available, which 
was rare. I could not get gas for a car. People who risked their lives to bring it in from other 
countries charged double prices. We did not drive for months and we used wood for heating 
our homes.  
 
Respondent #2: This respondent was a member of the HTS program, or a federal 
civilian employee as a social scientist in Afghanistan. The HTS (Human Terrain System) 
program developed HTT (Human terrain teams) to work with local populations for 
assessment and evaluation of their needs and to understand their culture in order to assist 
commanders in their decision-making processes. He had formerly worked as a SIGAR 
(Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction) inspector.  
Education aid summary: Locally, the US military built an adult literacy program 
for Afghans, and my team provided assessment for the local area of Argandab, which 
recommended a school that was built. I also visited schools around Maar-e-Sharif built by 
aid from ISAF forces.  
Afghans have a high illiteracy rate among adults. To that end, I helped review, 
design, and print textbooks to be used in a radio program for adult literacy. The idea was 
the adults would listen to lessons over the radio and follow in their books.  
In the Arghandab River Valley area, the Taliban used intimidation tactics to close 
schools. They threatened and carried out harm to children, especially girls. There were two 
or three Quranic schools for boys in the area. Hundreds of children roamed the streets with 
nothing to do. The US military provided a tent for a school, and the Government of 
Afghanistan (Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) provided teachers, which was 
a sustainable solution.  
The evaluation of the Adult Literacy program showed that it was a top down 
solution. The US military decided to distribute the books by enlisting a local branch of the 
Afghan army, which was unsuccessful. The books were stored in a local building without 
any plans for distribution. There was no coordination between the US military and the 
Afghans. I worked on an evaluation of the Adult Literacy project for HTS and received 
pushback from the military. They would not receive a formal written report, but only oral 
feedback. Our goal was to provide feedback to improve the program, not to criticize it.  
 Energy aid summary: As an HTS social scientist, I was skeptical at first that were 
making a difference in Afghanistan. Since then, I believe we did make a difference for the 
better in small ways. I sat in on meetings with USAID that planned a sustainable project of 
street lighting in Kandahar using solar panels. I worked on CERP evaluation for SIGAR 
earlier before I joined HTS.   
I was very familiar with the Shorandam Industrial Park between the airport and 
Kandahar. It was military funded power plant by CERP (Commander’s Emergency 
Response Program) for their operations and also helped the city of Kandahar. This fund 
was used at each commander’s discretion. USAID built the infrastructure in the park in 
2004, and the military built the power plant in 2010  
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The idea was to provide employment for the locals to stimulate the economy. They 
hoped that jobs would encourage the farmers to not grow opium. They wanted to grow a 
business class that had commercial ties and loyalty to a national government.  The main 
problem was sustainability as the plant required diesel fuel, which the US military 
provided. It was a short-term remedy for a military solution for energy in a conflict area. It 
was not a long-term or economically viable solution.  
My HTT held a focus group to evaluate local people’s perceptions of the 
Shorandam power plant. We also acted as liaisons with tribal people who lived next to the 
power plant that had heavy Taliban influence.  In 2015, the US military cut funding and 
the Government of Afghanistan said they could not afford to provide the diesel to run it. I 
found that the US military aid workers were not professional planners for sustainability or 
in acquiring local input for a needs assessment or a program’s cultural acceptance. The 
concepts of accountability, evaluation, and long-term sustainability were regulated to a 
lesser importance as this was a war zone, first and foremost. For instance, the Shorandam 
power plant was not sustainable, but it fulfilled its military purpose from 2011 to 2015, 
which was an important time in counter-insurgency measures. 
My involvement with USAID projects was minimal, but I do remember the failures 
such a building a refrigerated warehouse to wrong specification, rendering it useless for 
the purpose. Also, there was a road project that was rejected by locals as it did not take into 
account the local terrain. There were many other negative examples from all aid agencies 
of which I was aware. Generally, the US military was well intentioned and not corrupt, yet 
poorly informed, untrained for the culture, and the tasks at hand. Project evaluations and 
accountability were seldom pursued.  This was also true of the USAID projects when I 
worked for SIGAR.  
The issue was counter-insurgency was the reason for our presence. "Wars are 
wasteful in general, and counterinsurgency warfare is wasteful in its own way.” 
 
Respondent #3: As a USAID researcher, the respondent evaluated and assessed 
development projects for various nations, including Afghanistan. Other qualifications were 
employment as a liaison between an NGO, American firms, the US military, and the 
Afghan government. He is a degreed educated Afghan-American.  
Education aid summary: I provided briefs and sessions to help Afghan teachers 
(both males and females) in multiple languages. Foreign aid helped education a little at 
first. This built a lot of schools, especially for females, who could leave their homes and 
pursue different types of degrees. USAID especially built schools for females and orphans, 
but now most of them are closed or destroyed. Yet Afghanistan still needs educated people 
so they can better serve their country.  
I was hopeful when first working there, but after a time that hope decreased by 
2016. I witnessed a lot of tragedy and waste. I evaluated and assessed development projects 
for school construction and learning centers across Afghanistan.   
My suggestions are these: 
* Gender equality and female education would increase productivity, but it must 
come with government support.  
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Energy aid summary: Taking information from people with which I worked and 
locals, all sides agreed that the TPP project was wasteful for not only Afghanistan, but for 
the American taxpayers. I helped plan energy grids for remote areas, but did not work with 
the TPP project.  Energy issues are many. Neither foreign aid nor energy production is well 
planned. Afghanistan is a huge country, and there is no training or skills for administration 
or services to provide energy.  
Energy aid is critical for Afghanistan’s infrastructure. Locals do not have energy 
for heating or cooking or fuel for their vehicles. There has never been energy grid in the 
nation. Poor people suffer from the government’s lack of services. If the government had 
put in an energy grid, they could collect money for the electricity or fuel provided to homes 
for heating or cooking. More energy would provide jobs and markets in the nation. Many 
have tried to help, including the US and other western agencies, plus Asian efforts from 
Japan, India, the Gulf states, and Pakistan.  
The Afghan government did build some pipelines to schools, and I assisted with 
that project. We also installed solar powered street lights I Kabul. It took months and 
months to do as we lacked materials and not enough security. Major problems are lack of 
security, because corrupt officials, bribes, and shadow governments control many areas. 
The HTS teams gathered socio-economic information to support military objectives.  
Other problems with aid is that international donors do not coordinate their efforts. 
It is a waste of time and money. There was much failure due to this lack of coordination 
and communication. Also, the locals were not consulted on many projects. They have good 
information about issues of sustainability and local needs. Roads built across land should 
have permissions of those on the land first, and locals could be hired for labor, but often 
they are not. Education for the people about immediate project would be helpful. In fact, if 
there was media to teach people to change certain ways and for improvement, it would 
help.  
My suggestions are these: 
*Powerful countries should have clear objectives in stopping the fighting. 
* Hydro power plants would be most productive.  
* Safe roads would create an economic boom.  
* All donors should work together to build power grids for cities.  
 
Respondent #4: A military-trained person responded to the questionnaire.  
 Educational aid summary: The work in Afghanistan is important, but the internal 
conflicts (tribal and cultural) hampers Western efforts. Foreign aid helps raise the economic 
and educational level of the average Afghan. Yet corruption keeps funds from going to 
intended purposes. Only a few see impact, and the majority are Not impacted. I worked 
with USAID and they had good intentions and tried to assist Afghan people. Some of their 
schools appeared to work in large cities, but not in rural communities.  
 Energy aid summary: There was primarily corruption and inefficiency in delivering 
energy. Western methods may not work in Afghanistan.  
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Respondent #5: (Female) Many HTS personnel were eye-witness to aid projects. 
This respondent comments: 
 Education aid summary: I have visited the girls school in Kabul. Overall, it 
advances development and human rights. I am less optimistic than when I started. There 
are inefficiencies, corruption, and poor data knowledge management.  I would recommend 
a SIGAR investigation. From visiting the girl’s school in Hazra, I could see there was 
overall development and human rights were benefited. Yet I also observed inefficiencies, 
corruption, poor data and knowledge management, and subpar M & E. SIGAR 
investigations should occur.  
 
Respondent #6: (Female) Focusing on issues of female education, this respondent 
clarifies education issues.  
 Education aid summary: Working with Female Engagement Teams (FET), Civic 
Affairs Teams (CAT), and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PET) (financed by USAID 
and the US military) allowed me to understand the needs of teachers and students in 
Afghanistan. The information was written in reports to request supplies for students and 
teachers. International Women’s day was a very important event. Our goal was to 
understand female perspectives or the other 50% of the Afghan population. The sustainable 
benefits of educational aid in Afghanistan were that we helped women learn 
entrepreneurship skills such as chicken farming and bee keeping.  
 I have conducted research all over the world and the same issues rise on many 
continents. Corruption from the national government restricted aid trickling down to the 
local government, and resulted in mistrust by the people. We had Key Leader Engagements 
(KLE) where the leaders were only interested in their own families.  
 Our research in Afghanistan was important because it informed the US military. 
However, information on aid was not put into use. Nobody studied the lessons learned from 
aid work all over the world. No one incorporated good practices of how to administer aid.  
Money was wasted. Specifically, in Afghanistan: 
● Schools were built with no teachers or staff in the area.  
● There was a brain drain to Kabul or outside of Afghanistan.  
 
Respondent #7: This respondent worked as a cultural expert in Afghanistan. He 
states that hopes were decreased over time, as Afghanistan needs long term strategies and 
plans. Three dynamics affect all education and energy aid in Afghanistan: 1) Taliban, 2) 
Waste, 3) Corruption from Afghan and US agencies. Unless the people of Afghanistan 
reject the Taliban in their role of reinforcing old ways, and corruption of others, things will 
not improve. US and other major stakeholders have to play a role for improvement by using 
accountability for illegal and corrupt activities.  
 Education aid summary: What I experienced with education aid was far from 
improving education in Afghanistan. It is true that 50 years ago Afghanistan had schools, 
but they were destroyed in a civil war. USAID built the schools again in many villages 
across the country, but most of the schools closed.  
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Education is good for governance and brings prosperity to a country. Education opens 
horizons for people and brings acceptance of differences and tolerance of others. Good 
education will bridge the gaps of gender inequality.   
Local customs and traditions play a role in stopping children from attending school, 
especially girls. The Taliban enforce these traditions by threats and even killing people. 
Negatives of cultural practices, customs, Taliban, corruption from many directions, and the 
inability of aid agencies to develop long-term educational plans discourage parents from 
allowing children to go to school.  
 Energy aid summary: The TPP project was an example of poor work. Corruption 
resulted in the project costing 300 million dollars. However, in Kabul there was lighting 
added after USAID installed hydraulic power on dams. This type of energy should be for 
all provinces across the country. Energy is important as it leads to economic development. 
Currently people use wood heat their homes and cook.  
But leaders of Afghanistan became wealthy and did not heed the suffering of the people. 
Their close relative all became wealthy. They hampered the aid programs. Problems are: 
● Transit routes bringing Afghan goods and materials for energy projects do not get 
through.  
● Afghan government officials steal the resources for their personal benefit. 
● Security was too bad to administer aid.  
 
Respondent # 8: The information given by this respondent relates specifically to 
the TPP and other energy project.  
 Energy aid summary: The TPP was completed and handed over to the Ministry of 
Energy and Water of Afghanistan in June of 2010. Afghanistan imports 80% of its energy 
from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The power lines that supply the 5 million 
people of Kabul passes through Salang Pass, which is rough and unaccusable terrain. It is 
not sufficient in winter and the TPP should fill the gap. It generates electricity on both 
crude oil and diesel fuel. At a cost of 335 million US dollars, the capacity is 150 megawatts 
of electricity.  
 Otherwise, propane fuel could be imported from Pakistan or Turkmenistan, and 
cow dung is used for heating fuel and cooking. There was some electric power coming 
from the Naghlow and Sorobi water dams. However, at times there was not enough water 
to generate electricity from these dams. The war lords, (Mujahedeen) and other factions 
would cut off electricity to punish other groups.  
 My personal opinion is that donor counties who give aid money should have a 
system of checks and balances in place and hold those people responsible that fail in their 
projects. Aid is channeled through contractors to subcontractors, and the results reduces 
material and durability tenfold.  
 
Respondent #9: Subject Matter Expert  
 My experience as a SME included working for a Research and Development Company in 
Afghanistan allowed me to assist the US government officials and military decision makers 
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on social sciences research methodologies, statistical analysis, and quantitative and 
qualitative public opinion research.  
During my time in Afghanistan, I planned and designed multiple short and long-term 
projects. One of my major responsibilities was to collect primary data through in person 
interviews, conduct surveys, and travel to different cities in search of information. I ended 
up conducting over 300 interviews with the Afghan officials (civilian and military) 
including the local population while traveling throughout all provinces in Afghanistan. My 
research work covered various sectors including but not limited to health, education, 
stability, governance and local infrastructure. 
Unfortunately, the aid given to Afghanistan by the western countries did not produce the 
desired results. I remain quite pessimistic with regards to the future of Afghanistan. The 
deteriorating security situation, lawlessness and corruption remain at the forefront of many 
issues in Afghanistan. Majority of the population is without basic necessities such as 
electricity and clean water. My first-hand experience in Afghanistan has led me to believe 
that the foreseeable future in Afghanistan looks quite bleak.   
Summary of Energy and aid: The overall infrastructure in Afghanistan is extremely 
weak. I was able to determine that funding the projects was not the main concern; instead, 
issues such as waste management and corruption were more widespread. 
When it comes to TPP, it wouldn’t be fair to blame the Afghan officials for not 
using this very costly project and keeping it maintained. Afghans never received the proper 
training, nor do they hold the basic skills to run and maintain the TPP. According to the 
locals, the blame should be shifted towards the Afghan authorities for being involved in 
corruption and stealing the TPP supplies. But they shouldn’t be held solely responsible for 
not running a 330 million dollars project effectively.  One of the major challenges was to 
purchase diesel fuel in order to run the TPP. As I know, it was unsafe and costly to transfer 
diesel from neighbouring countries. Most of the roads by being controlled by the insurgents 
which made it nearly impossible to transport the fuel. 
The foreign aid failed to help Afghanistan improve its energy infrastructure. During 
my deployments, I lived in Kabul for almost two years, and I witnessed that people and 
businesses were struggling due to the shortage of electricity in most of the neighbourhoods. 
Those who are receiving electricity without any shortage are the rich and elite of the society 
as well as the foreign officials, but not the common people.  
The energy infrastructure in Afghanistan is improving slowly and it will take 
Afghanistan many years before we can expect to see any major improvements in the energy 
sector. I did witness some progress in regards to the Afghanistan’s energy infrastructure in 
Kabul. When I arrived in Afghanistan in 2009, the load shedding was apparent during the 
evenings and nights. The situation appeared to improve in Kabul by 2016. I think USAID 
and other international utility companies played a major role in bringing about 
improvement despite the fact it took a lot of time. According to the locals, the foreign 
contractors helped Afghan utility departments improve the infrastructure of residential and 
commercial solar power in several cities in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the locals said 
that the rural areas did not see any changes and the improvements were limited to the capital 
and other major cities. 
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According to some official reports, more than 70% of afghan citizens rely on self-
supplied energy sources such as wood, animal dung, and biomass for cooking their food 
and heating their homes. When I was in Helmand during the winter of 2015, I witnessed 
that most homes including the government offices had no basic heating resources. I 
interviewed an Afghan official in Feb 2015 in Nowazad district during the winter and 
immediately realized that his office did not have heating due to the shortage of fuel. I also 
witnessed that several medical centers in Kabul had to operate without any heat due to the 
shortage of fuel. 
For nearly thirty years, Afghanistan has been facing serious energy crisis due to the 
internal conflicts. It is true that insecurity is hindering the effective use of aid in improving 
Afghan energy sector because the foreign contractors would not jeopardize their lives in 
conducting projects due to the security issues. The foreign aid agencies need to effectively 
cooperate with each other and communicate closely with the Afghan authorities in 
achieving long term projects. This is easy to say but achieving such things will take a lot 
of effort and continuous funding.  
The Afghan energy sector is also struggling to find skilled technicians in order to 
effectively execute energy projects. During an international conference that was held in 
Kabul in 2013, Afghan representative from Minister of labor and Social Affairs urged 
international donors to provide training workshops for Afghan officials. He repeatedly 
reiterated the importance of training before a project can be executed. 
Summary of Education and aid: I visited many schools in Helmand, Kabul, and 
Mazar-e--Sharif provinces. In 2015, I visited a school in Nawzad district in Helmand and 
witnessed that the school was hardly operational with only a few students and teachers 
present. I was told that the school had been targeted and partially destroyed by insurgents.  
This “ghost school” as described by an Afghan interpreter was abandoned and remained 
closed for many years due to the lack of funding. We held a meeting with KLEs in that 
area and discovered that this school was built by an American contractor. The locals were 
scared to send their children to this school because the abandoned building as it had 
become, was housing criminals and homeless people. The roads leading to the school were 
also considered quite unsafe. We were told that this school was also used by the Afghan 
security forces for a period of time. 
I discovered that foreign aid did help the education sector in some areas in 
Afghanistan, but certainly not in all areas. The schools in Kabul were more modernized 
and better equipped to teach students throughout the year. I had the chance to visit a school 
that was located next to my work place in Kabul in 2016. The school was in much better 
condition than the one in Helmand. The classrooms were full of students. I met the principal 
who explained to me that the US AID made it possible for his school to buy furniture and 
other essentials required to run the school. The school had a built in food court and play 
ground.  The school was co-ed and males and female students were seen studying together.  
I would say that foreign aid proved beneficial for most of the major cities in 
Afghanistan such as the capital, Kabul. On the other hand, the foreign aid failed to bring 
much improvement to the education sector in rural areas.  Aside from uneven distribution 
of aid, transportation remained a major challenge for many students and parents, and most 
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did not have a vehicle that would transport them to the school that were sometimes located 
miles away. 
Education in Afghanistan was improved by pouring millions of dollars into 
projects. The USAID mainly helped Afghanistan in building hundreds of schools and other 
educational institutions, even though most were shut down later. It is not unusual to hear 
about the closing of schools in Afghanistan for several reasons. I was invited for the 
opening of a new school in Mazar-e-Sharif in 2012, which is considered the second largest 
city of Afghanistan. It was a good experience to witness the completion of a large school 
and the joy was apparent on the faces of all the teachers and students. The school was built 
by an American aid agency and it took them several years to build the school. It is 
unfortunate that the school was shut down some years later due to the deteriorating security 
situation. It was reported few months ago (Apr 22, 2017) that Mazar-e-Sharif experienced 
a deadly attack by the Taliban insurgents that killed and wounded over one hundred Afghan 
soldiers on a military base. That gives us an insight as to how quickly the situation in 
Afghanistan can change with one terrorist attack. 
The education sector has faced many challenges that led to the failing of many 
educational projects in Afghanistan. The education sector today in Afghanistan continues 
to suffer.  
 
Respondent #10: This respondent was a US military person. He states that the war 
took on a life of its own. At first, I thought the war and reconstruction effort as necessary, 
but now I view it as a waste of time and money. Basically the US never bothered to train 
local Afghans to maintain and operate infrastructure. The gap in understanding their 
religion and culture and negotiating the differences is contentious. We are creating 
dependence on Western aid and assistance. At the end of the day, Afghans need to decide 
what they want. The best outcome I can see is to allow the Taliban to have their own 
autonomous state in the south.  
 
Respondent #11: This respondent provided security for aid projects, both energy 
and school security.  
 I worked in Afghanistan for two years. My confidence in helping to solve problems 
with the tactics used by the military, foreign aid, the Afghan government, and the private 
sector decreased. HTS teams provided socio-cultural information, but it went to the army.  
Also the HTS teams varied through their research abilities. I worked with one team that 
achieved much success in helping to provide local perspectives. Some teams provided low 
quality work or bickered, and work by other teams were not used or respected by the 
military. We needed research to bring in solutions that would work.  
 Foreign aid benefited the contractors and other private western firms, but not as 
much for Afghanistan. The Taliban took control of many foreign aid projects after the 
western agencies left the areas. The Afghan government does not know how to build any 
education or energy infrastructure and we did not train them how.  
 Education aid summary: I provided security in rural areas near schools. Education 
was weak and not available before 2001, but foreign aid helped to improve the education 
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sector in Afghanistan. It could be better as people complained about the outcome. Some 
parents were not satisfied with the levels of learning.  
 Schools were built by individuals that came to Afghanistan for one year to leave a 
mark. Often times schools were built without proper planning and understanding or 
appreciation for the political and socio-cultural nuances of the areas. Hence schools were 
built without meeting the needs of the people.  Perhaps if USAID had included Afghan 
experts to help understand the issues of the projects.  
 I heard that schools were empty because they were built in the wrong area or too 
far with bad roads. During the winter, there was no heat or the roads and schools were 
flooded.  
 I saw many abandoned schools. I reported this to the US Army that schools were 
closed and teachers never came. Locals complained that teachers were still paid, but would 
not come because of security. Many schools closed, even if USAID spent millions and 
millions in some areas. We never trained locals to take over the schools and learn how to 
do things for themselves.  
 Energy aid summary: TPP was costly and helpless for all sides. Locals talked bad 
about the project. Somme new dams were built using hydraulic power to control water. But 
the energy sector is ineffective in most areas and locals never talked good about it. They 
had difficulty in heating their homes or getting cooking fuel. I made reports to Army 
commanders about energy projects that had been damaged by insurgents.  
 
Respondent #12: (Female) This military person trained for work in civil units and 
also as a combat advisor. The respondent also worked for the HTS effort.  
 Education aid summary: I investigated poisonings in a local girl’s school, which 
NATO also worked on findings. The education outreach by the US did appear to be modest 
and many schools sat empty.  
 The USAID and the State Department were very involved in assessing education, 
and efforts for women’s groups. When I worked for HTS, we were integrated with 
analyzing local impacts on education attendance. The education advances where I worked 
was served by international troops.  
 I visited a site for a midwifery program that was funded in part by USAID. It was 
threatened with broken windows to scare the young students. The other funding was by the 
Afghan government and their department of education. The program was seeking 
additional funds. The Koreans also funded some educational medical programs.  
 My most vivid memories were here at the midwifery school. There were 20 young 
women undergoing the training. The training material was very good and provided by 
USAID. Those administering the school were medically trained and we did HTS research 
regarding the curriculum. I heard the Afghans involved had to leave and are now trying to 
get to the US  
 The need for education in Afghanistan is profound and important. Young people 
have few opportunities and are lost in a modern era. The educated live in central cities and 
rural areas have no ability to improve or have social progress. 
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Respondent #13: (Female) Coming from a US military background, this 
respondent saw a lack of coordination between aid agencies. Designing aid for energy 
infrastructure and education was unsustainable because there were no teachers or engineers 
to maintain the structures and systems.  
 Often, we created programs that looked good on paper, but had no effect or negative 
effects due to a lack of understanding the systems and culture. Funds did not go where they 
were supposed to. Determining program objectives was difficult as there were competing 
narratives from the military, aid agencies, the state, and NGOs.  
 Education aid summary: Many schools were built, but are now abandoned due to 
lack of security, teachers, and parents’ concerns. Still there are some schools that are still 
functional. It is my hope that girls in school will become part of the culture.  
 Training did work for men and women as long as they were separate and respected 
the culture. There was a radio education program and even a prison literacy program. HTS 
would gather information from the locals and report to the military. The military would 
report to USAID, but it was USAID that made final decisions on where to build schools. 
One program start seemed hopeful that provided women to build solar power panels at 
home, but I do not know the fate of that one.  
 Energy aid summary: The US State Department built several dams that were never 
functional, and I imagine other programs had similar fates. If the right people ran the 
country after the initial round up of the Taliban and not funding the war lords, this country 
would be very different. People preferred the Taliban to the war lords.  
 
Respondent #14: As a contractor attached to USAID, this respondent had firsthand 
knowledge of aid projects. This contractor had also worked with the Afghan government 
in energy. Locals said that projects only benefited western contractors who received big 
salaries. Ultimately, the contractor said that the aid projects were a waste and time 
consuming.  
 Education aid summary: All I know is that schools did not have energy 
infrastructure. They had no heat in winter. Students did not show up for school because it 
was too cold. I was involved in building heating systems in some schools, but there was no 
fuel. Even the government buildings were short on fuel and called the US Army to receive 
fuel for heat. Eventually, security was so bad for schools that the weather was not the main 
concern. 
 Energy aid summary: My company was in charge of TPP. I also worked on several 
small projects relating to energy, such as installing new energy systems in government 
buildings. For energy projects, aid was not enough and was wasted because Afghans had 
no skills or knowledge on how to run energy infrastructure. They had 0 knowledge of 
energy installation and the US firms provided no training due to lack of security, money, 
and time. Language was an issue when locals were hired to work on menial jobs.  
 As I said, I provided maintenance for TPP for two years. My assessment is that it 
was a wasted project that cost a lot of money and did not benefit the Afghan people. 
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 On my job, security was the main problem most of the time. For months we had to 
stay on military bases due to insurgent activities. Getting fuel to the plant was time 
consuming and costly. Roads were very bad in all areas.  
 
Respondent #15: This respondent is a USAID Civil Engineer. He supervised teams 
to install energy in Afghanistan.  
 Education aid summary: Education should be the number one priority for all parties 
concerned.  
 Energy aid summary: We experienced lack of supplies and materials, trained or 
skilled workers, and insecure areas. I did not work on the TPP, but it was given as an 
example of an expensive but failed project in a speech by an American expert on energy 
infrastructure. He explained it had been investigated by SIGAR. Afghan officials told me 
that it was harmed by corruption from many parties. Zero tolerance for corruption and bad 
management should be the rule.  
The US should not have tried to do this without more commitment from other 
nations. We failed and it made us look bad. It seemed there were no clear strategies or 
central planning for success. Fragmentation hurt aid efforts. Corruptions by local regional 
officials did more to harm projects than other factors. Locals were very appreciative for 
anything that helped the villages.  
 
Respondent #16: This respondent was in the shura held for Afghans in America.  
 He said that rebuilding Afghanistan was more challenging that earlier expectations. 
USAID should have built rapport with all parties in Afghanistan to coordinate donations 
and resources. USAID projects built credibility for the US for many in Afghanistan. New 
roads and a railroad is necessary to build infrastructure for energy or education in 
Afghanistan.  
 Education aid summary: The lack of infrastructure in impoverished areas made it 
difficult to get resources to deliver education. USAID has helped to elevate the standard of 
living for millions of Afghan citizens, and especially for girls is a big achievement of 
USAID. If there is heavy Afghan government presence, people flourish with the influx of 
foreign aid and foreign investments. More Afghan children are going to school than ever 
before.  
Areas that are infected with heavy insurgents still suffer from lack of education. 
Children often fail to show up to schools due to lack of security and poverty and the schools 
built by aid set empty to create ghost schools.  There is a social stigma for women’s 
education. Language is a barrier when curriculum and supplies are in a language from 
another region.  
In my opinion, aid should be given to local villagers to modernize their standards 
of living and strengthen education efforts and projects, rather than building school 
buildings that turn into ghost schools.  
 Energy aid summary: The energy sector suffered due to sabotage, corruption, and 
inefficiencies for power plants and pipelines. USAID invested valuable resources to build 
the TPP. The primary fuel for operation was diesel fuels, which was often unavailable due 
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to border closings and insurgent attacks. The TPP is unable to provide power for 
Afghanistan grids. Now it is to provide backup for emergencies. The US Senate committee 
on foreign aid have launched multiple investigations into UASID work in Afghanistan.  
 Foreign helped to subsidize fuel for local consumption, and to establish hydropower 
dams across the country. Building cooperation with local elders and procuring security 
from tribal leaders increases the success rate of delivering fuel and providing education in 
the remote areas of Afghanistan.  Eighteen percent of Afghanistan has access to 
uninterrupted supplies as compared to 1% in the year 2000. More funding should go 
towards building more hydro power plants and small-scale dams on rivers for Afghanistan. 
Foreign aid should be used to harness the tremendous potential for solar and wind energy 
in Afghanistan.  
 Most aid is wasted in providing security for the infrastructure and workers that help 
the struggling sectors of Afghan economy. This is because power plants in Afghanistan 
rely on expensive fuels for operations. Interruptions in supply chains causes power plants 
to operate inefficiently, and they sustain costly damages. Pipelines suffer with sabotage 
and vandalism. Lack of roads and threats of insurgency decrease efficiency too. The biggest 
challenges are violence and the interruption of supplies at the border with Pakistan, plus 
lack of roads, railroads, and the absence of a dry port. In winter, some passes are completely 
cut off for months.  
  
Respondent #17: A long time USAID worker reports on Afghanistan.  
 I have worked with UAID since 2002 in many nations. I have coordinated with aid 
agencies and hundreds of NGOs around the world. I evaluated the living conditions of 
people in developing nations and each area was different.  
 I was an aid expert in Afghanistan for 8 years. I coordinated with the U.S Army, 
ISAF, and other international donors. It was tough to deal with different military and 
diplomatic personnel with different stakes and backgrounds.  
 Afghanistan is a war-torn country and will be for good, because uneducated people 
run the government. There has never been any training to lead people or run official offices.  
There were no jobs available for local people except for with the government or their 
military. Children die in large numbers due to lack of food and illnesses. Yet they are kind 
and generous people and will give guests any food they have.  
 Afghans are pessimistic about their future. They are a failed state due to lack of 
education. International donors tried, but their focus was wrong and they did not understand 
the culture. There was no training of locals to continue any project funded by international 
donors. This is true worldwide. Money is not the only consideration. Careful planning and 
accountability is the only way that aid would work and we have those lessons from decades 
of aid implementation. Audits and monitoring are needed for any nation building project.  
 The announcement by President Trump has shocked when they heard that no one 
will help them. The only reason that the US will be there now will be to kill the Taliban. 
Weapons will not increase the people’s help. The Taliban have nothing to lose as they are 
so poor and this is their territory. The people will pay a heavy price.  
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 Education aid summary: Understanding the culture and religion is the key to any 
progress in Afghanistan. It takes generations to create a slow change, and consistent efforts 
in education. USAID built many schools that are now closed. I have visited the ghost 
schools to confirm this. The Afghan government did not get involved in education, and 
there was no money to run the schools, no teachers, insecurity, and no supplies. There were 
no administrators to coordinate the school efforts. International donors and the Government 
of Afghanistan should be blamed for not completing the job. There is not enough funds or 
long term strategies. Coordination is needed. Locals have 0 knowledge about the outside 
world. If there was a good education system, the nation could develop.  
I was responsible for evaluation and assessing projects for educational resources. I 
issued reports back to my office in Virginia about what needed to be developed and what 
was suggested by the US Army. 
 Energy aid summary: Energy is another area that is critical to the nation’s 
development. The TPP was a failed project, with no sustainability. People were not happy 
from the beginning because the locals were not consulted, but only the corrupt officials. 
USAID and SIGAR conducted investigations and produced reports and I helped. The 
people said they had wanted small generators. Now they use animal dung for heat and 
cooking and the children get sick.  
 Pakistan built a similar plant to the TPP. It did not cost as much and is working 
well. The people benefit from it. But Pakistan has a strong government system, and the 
Government of Afghanistan is incapable of running any project. Corruption and bribes 
block the way. People are ignorant of the value of nation building projects and they steal 
what they can. I met HTS teams talking to local people and they even held shuras.  
 
Respondent #18: A USAID worker filled out this questionnaire. He is retired 
military.  
 I thought the situation would be better, especially with USAID and other agencies 
working so hard and saying they would rebuild Afghanistan. It is really a failed state. The 
situation will be worse if the ISAF go after the Taliban. They cannot win this war that has 
been fought for years and years. They more they try, the more the people will suffer. When 
the Taliban control areas, it is horrible. There are no schools, good food, no clean water, 
and women cannot leave their homes.  
 Education aid summary: International donors should build a skilled and educated 
new generation if they want to help Afghanistan. Many people tried to help, but it is all 
uncoordinated and inefficient. I heard a Canadian company sent a team to Afghanistan to 
investigate education aid projects to help women and children. They reported on corruption 
by the Government of Afghanistan, and were not happy at the Afghan officials and their 
lack of commitment to education.  
 USAID built schools that were not used and I heard of the ghost schools. I spoke to 
the locals and they talked about they needed food, medicine, and water. Local women 
would ask me for powdered milk for their infants. This broke my heart. They wanted 
protection from the Taliban while we were in the area. They said there would be 
repercussions. I found there were contradictions between what I had been told by USAID 
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and what the locals said concerning projects. USAID said locals stole supplies and locals 
said the contractors never delivered them.   
 Energy aid summary: I attended a Shura where the KLE said that the TPP only 
helped American companies. Now Afghan people are blamed that it is shut down. The TPP 
project did not benefit the people, but was built based on American concepts of what to do. 
How can Afghans maintain something like that with no training? One Afghan official said 
the USAID never talked about the TPP because it would hurt the reputation of American 
contractors.  
 There had no nation building projects during Taliban rule. But the American firms 
only stuck to their plans and never coordinated with locals. It was dangerous work and 
some people were afraid to work with me. HTS was there to talk to locals about their 
perspectives and report back to military commanders. My team evaluated projects 
completed by USAID and other American companies. I also worked as a coordinator 
between Americans and Afghans.  
 
Respondent #19: The respondent voiced the same opinions on energy and 
education as the others, but with an insight on the gaps in understanding between Western 
aid and Afghanistan’s social networks, culture, and religion. “The ways of culture and 
religion are enforced by Taliban.” There is only Taliban religious and cultural enforcement 
through strict religious law. Each member of the Taliban is easily replaced by anyone 
practicing the laws of their religion. Their numbers will always be the same. Someone said 
you cannot get rid of the Taliban, they are our culture. This meant that they were like a 
Religious Police. It was Afghan cultural laws that conflicted with Western ideals. 
Educating the young would change this, but that was not understood by aid agencies or the 
US either. 
 Education aid summary: Educational aid was not in line with the environment, 
cultural background, religious preferences, and local needs. The idea was that if given a 
chance with good security, people would change and want Western ways. This may have 
been true for a few, but not for many others.  
 Due to corruption and lack of input by the locals, the schools built were placed to 
satisfy official’s needs, and not the population. Some schools only had a few students 
within distance, and many areas had few schools, but large numbers of students. Aid 
agencies wasted a lot of money on opening ceremonies and decorations. Money went for 
personal uses, and during construction, there was a feeling of…we can buy expensive tools 
even for a one-time use.  
 
Respondent #20: This respondent was employed in the energy section of USAID, 
with previous experience with the energy issues and department in Afghanistan. He has a 
total of 19 years’ experience in this field.  
 Energy aid summary: I knew the energy sector in Afghanistan was very weak for 
years. USAID and other agencies tried hard to help a huge country to improve, but it would 
take time before Afghanistan could become independent in that area. There were some 
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benefits as hydro power systems were built, along with energy lines placed, and low-cost 
grid systems in some areas.  
The failures in aid delivery for energy infrastructure was first to not coordinate with 
locals. Western countries lack knowledge about Afghanistan’s culture, religion, and 
necessary information that only the locals know. Instead USAID and their contracted 
companies dealt with officials only who were corrupt. Most projects were built within 
locations of the official’s personal areas with low occupation, while thousands went 
without any needed energy. Westerners do not understand the system of corruption and 
hierarchies. Officials do not care about those under their care and no communication occurs 
so they do not know what the situation. 
 There was no training for maintenance on installations either, so that when USAID 
pulled out, the energy infrastructure became useless. I helped to evaluate the TPP as was 
required by USAID program manager in Afghanistan, regarding its function.  When asked 
during investigations, the contractors or USAID said there was not time or money for this. 
Afghan locals were out of the picture. USAID funded the TPP, and contracted with 
Westerners to build and implement the power plant.  
 The contractors had no contact with locals. The contractor had no knowledge of the 
local terrain or seasonal conditions. There should have also been relationships built with 
energy providers in other connecting nations. They knew what was needed to work with 
the terrain regarding transition lines and installing new hydro power. 
 I remember one incident during a bitter winter in Afghanistan with no heat. A man 
burst into our office and shouted that his family needed heat. We let him in to see that we 
had no heat in our office either with no blankets to keep warm, and we were part of the 
energy team. I feel that I contributed to some energy increase as I knew how to maintain 
equipment and small generators. I helped some coordination between the US contractors 
and Afghan utilities department. I was also part of a team that implemented hydraulic 
power generators in towns in the southern and northern parts of Afghanistan. I did see street 
lights in Kabul with power from solar panels.  
What is needed most is training to create skilled technicians.  
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Afghanistan is currently foreign aid dependent. The US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) has allocated over 100 billion US dollars since 2001 for the 
development and modernization of Afghanistan. The United States has invested over 700 
billion US dollars overall. There is a breakdown or a problem in USAID funding for 
Afghanistan, whereas not all the money allocated was utilized for intended purposes. 
Today Afghanistan remains a LDC, a least developed country, with extensive poverty, 
limited energy, poor infrastructure, and low literacy rates despite USAID and US spending 
and aid projects.  
This study examines examples of disconnects or the breakdown between funding 
and the fruition of intended modernization goals for Afghanistan. This qualitative 
dissertation utilizes primary reports from funding agencies including USAID, audits of 
projects, and formal inquiries. Additionally, the study utilizes respondent data completed 
by a diverse group of Afghan-born and American-born trained experts offering key 
information. These 28 individuals have insight into the political and economic impact of 
223 
 
 
 
USAID funding in Afghanistan, focusing on examples in the energy and education sectors. 
The energy-sector case study is of the 335 million-dollar Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP), a 
project funded by USAID, but considered a failure. The dissertation also includes a case 
study on the education sector in Afghanistan. I incorporate my own eyewitness accounts 
from serving as a social scientist for 8 months in 2011-2012 with the US Army’s Human 
Terrain System (HTS) in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Therefore, the final analysis 
triangulates data drawing on: 1) USAID and SIGAR official reports; 2) original qualitative 
research data from respondents; 3) HTS observations, and 4) media and academic reports.  
The theoretical framework for the improvement of a nation, or nation building, 
relies on modernization and human capital theories. The analyses of the data within 
modernization and human capital theories to form conclusions and recommendations. The 
conclusions will show a combination of a lack of communications, accountability, security 
risks, systemic corruption, and misguided planning and implementation. Top-down 
planning for development projects, like the Tarakhil Power Point and educational aid, did 
not succeed.  
(Key Words: USAID, Afghanistan, foreign aid, modernization, human capital, security, 
corruption, energy, education) 
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